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This thesis is concerned with giving a complete under-
standing of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The
organization of the thesis emphasizes three important factors
which help to explain what the PLO is, how it operates, and
why it acts as it does: Organizational Structure, Environ-
mental Constraints, and Belief Systems. The Organizational
Structure section includes data on PLO organization including
the Palestine National Council, Executive Committee, Central
Council, Commando Groups, and the medical, educational, trade
unions, cultural, and social institutions. The section con-
cerning the Environmental Constraints deals with the various
PLO leaders, PLO ideology, strategy, military, and economic
history. The Belief System section consists of an Operational
Code of the PLO as an institutional entity. After developing
all three factors the thesis gives three examples of recent
PLO behavior. By understanding the factors of Organizational
Structure, Environmental Constraint, and Belief Systems one
can more easily and logically comprehend how these factors
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I . INTRODUCTION .
A. BACKGROUND
At the time of the 1948 emergence of the state of Israel
the Palestinian Arabs were hopelessly disorganized and even
faced serious internal divisions. The two traditionally
prominent families, the al-Husseini and Nashashibi clans, each
attracted Palestinian Arabs. The former favoring military
opposition to the Jewish immigrants and the British overseers,
the latter choosing to work with the British and Jews in trying
to effect an agreement along the lines of the 1947 U.N.
Partition resolution. One member of the al-Husseini family,
Abdul Kader, had organized several thousand irregular forces
in Palestine during the 1940's. Another early organizer was
Fawzi al-Kawalji who formed a fighting group of about 7,000.
But while Palestinian Arab rivalry stewed the Jews successfully
organized and trained their partisans. The resulting Jewish
military organization, both legal and underground, included the
Haganah, the Irgun Zvai Leumi , and the Stern Gang. When the
Jews unilaterally declared the existance of the Jewish state
of Israel on 15 May 1948, they held a tremendous advantage over
the Palestinian Arabs in terms of training, organization,
leadership, and unity. The Arabs in Palestine, despite their
internal differences, felt they could rely on their neighboring
sister Arab states to defeat this imperialist, Jewish uprising.
In fact, those Arabs who left Palestine in the wake of the
1948 war left with the certainty that they would be only
temporarily displaced. The Arab states of Egypt, Transjordan,
Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon all sent portions of
2their armies, amounting to 70-80,000 troops, to defeat this
Zionist army. Although generally poorly trained the Arabs
held a numerical advantage over the Jews. Despite this numeri-
cal superiority the Jewish forces quickly won the military
victory and the state of Israel was born.
This paper deals with the military arm of the Palestinian
Nationalist Movement. This military arm cannot stand alone
and thus requires first a basic understanding of Palestinian
resistance organization, leadership, financial support, and
outside cooperation. The Palestinian resistance movement does
not constitute a separate nation-state although it does form
a political entity. When the Arabs left Palestine in 1948 and
again in 1967 they were dispersed throughout the Arab world in
general and within the "confrontation states" of Lebanon, Syria,
and Jordan in particular. Upon arriving in their new homes
they discovered that they were not accepted as citizens of
these countries. This stemmed partly from their desire to
remain aloof, living in "temporary" resettlement camps awaiting
the "imminent" recovery of their homeland. When this rapid
return failed to materialize and as they became more and more
entrenched in and identified with these refugee camps, their
pleas for equal treatment and citizenship status went unheeded.
They were, considered foreigners and outcasts and were treated
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as such. This may appear puzzling on the surface considering
the fact that these refugees were Arabs and Muslims just like
their new sponsors. But these Arab regimes had several fears
about accepting the Palestinians as citizens or at least
treating them equally. First, having just suffered a sound
military defeat at the hands of the Israelis the Arabs wanted
to let the issue of the Palestinian return to their homeland
rest for a bit. The victory by the Israelis was stunning. No
Arab thought it was possible for the few Jews in Palestine to
defeat the millions of Arabs surrounding them. The 1948 defeat
ushered in a period of deep reflection by the Arabs -- and a
desire not to prompt another military encounter with Israel.
Secondly, the relocation of hundreds of thousands of Arabs
created a financial burden upon these states. These Palestinian
outsiders, even though they were Arab and Muslim, were taking
what was considered an unfair amount of money from the already
poor citizens of those countries. Lastly, in Jordan, where a
large portion of the population was Palestinian and where the
greatest number of Palestinians fled in 1948, the refugees
posed a serious political problem. This large group, with a
common purpose and goal, was a potential political adversary.
With the overwhelming desire to return to Palestine coupled
with the Israeli threat many of these Palestinian Arabs might
give up the thought of an immediate return to their homeland
and settle for control over the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
10
In 1948, the Palestinian Arabs were a people without a country,
leadership, organization, or military. They had been expelled
from their homes, not accepted in their new homes, and had
little hope of regaining their homeland.
The dispersed Palestinians hoped and expected that their
Arab protectors would regain their former lands. The 1956 war
marked the beginning of Palestinian disillusionment with the
Arab states. Then in the June 1967 war the Palestinian
organizations played a role in sparking the conflict. They
expected the resulting Arab-Israeli war to restore their home-
land to them. With the 1967 defeat and the second Palestinian
diaspora the Palestinian leaders forsook the Arab states and
struck out on their own. They realized that they could not
trust others, even Arab brothers, with achieving their nation-
alistic goal. Thus in 1967 the Palestinian nationalist movements
began to flourish and to operate autonomously.
They soon realized that they lacked the political, military,
and financial wherewithall to succeed. They soon realized that
they still needed help from outside their organization. Syria,
who was competing with Nasser's Egypt for political leadership
of the Arab world was happy to sponsor Palestinian resistance
groups. The Syrian army trained and equipped Palestinian
guerrillas and then sent them on raids into Israel from
Jordanian territory. Syria hoped to appear as the only Arab
state actively opposing Israel but did not allow raids from
Syrian territory. The Palestinians, who scorned dependence
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on any Arab state, set up camps in Jordan from which it launched
its raids. In this way they drifted away from Syrian control
but began to pose a threat to Jordan. By 1970, King Hussein
feared a Palestinian political takeover and to prevent this he
launched an extermination campaign against the Palestinians.
In July 1971 the Palestinians were driven from Jordan and
decided that southern Lebanon would be the best place to set
up their camps. They found Lebanon to be a country already
torn by sectarian strife. Nevertheless the Palestinians
secured the right from the government to maintain control over
certain portions of southern Lebanon. It was during this time
that the 1973 October war erupted. After the war a question
arose as to who should represent the Palestinians at the
proposed Geneva Conference. Since Jordan was perceived as
being not totally committed to the Pan-Arab cause and even
seemed to have one foot in the Western camp, the Palestinians
saw their chance to take the leadership of the Palestinian
cause. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was
selected at the Rabat Summit in 1974 to be the spokesman and
representative for all Palestinians everywhere. It is at this
point in Palestinian history that this paper begins.
B. OVERVIEW
This thesis began as a strict Operational Code of the
various Palestinian Resistance groups in an effort to analyze
the coalition-forming and compromising nature of PLO policy-
making. During the research phase it became clear that the
12
dividing lines of Operational Code belief systems within the
PLO do not fall along these factional lines. The belief
systems of Fatah and DFLP, for example, do not differ radically
from one another. The differing belief systems in the PLO can
be divided into other categories such as Right, Moderate, and
Left with the members of each category coming from factions of
each Palestinian Nationalist group. Fatah itself has clearly
defined Right -leaning elements, a Moderate core, and a Leftist
faction. Due to the cross -cutting loyalties an Operational
Code of each Palestinian Resistance group would not give a
clear picture of the competing political belief systems. The
next logical step would have been to define these ideological
groupings, to perform the Operational Code analysis on each
group, and then to analyze the competitive/cooperative relation-
ships between all such groups. This type of study should still
be conducted by a rigorous researcher in order to paint a more
comprehensive and clear picture of the ideological structure
of the PLO. As the research for this thesis continued in
laying a foundation for just such a study this writer discovered
that there is a current dearth of formal writing concerning PLO
structure, leadership, and ideology. In the early 1970's a
steady stream of books appeared which described the PLO in
terms of historical development, leadership, organization, and
ideology. This thesis first of all provides an update on
these studies in describing the current status of PLO structure,
leadership, organization, and ideology. Chapters 2,3,4, and
13
5 present the current status of PLO structure, leadership,
ideology, and strategy. Chapter 2 describes the organization
of each of the major Palestinian Resistance groups. Each
group is analyzed in historical perspective as well as in
terms of current status. Chapter 2 also presents an organ-
izational look at the PLO as an individual entity. The
analysis of each of the PLCs National Council sessions provides
a unique and useful approach to viewing PLO organizational
metamorphasis . Chapter 3 gives a short biography of the
major PLO leaders. The current PLO leaders are the same
leaders who headed the PLO and its various factions a decade
ago. Chapter 3 thus provides the reader with the biographical
facts and the historical perspective of each current PLO
leader. Chapter 4 gives the ideological analysis of each
Palestinian group. This chapter includes historical evidence
and current trends to develop an ideological identity for each
resistance group. The military strategy described in Chapter
5 includes analysis of organization, recruitment/training, and
doctrine. The PLA, Fatah, and Popular Fronts are considered
under each of these headings.
The thesis goes on in Chapter 6 to present the Operational
Code of the PLO itself. The PLO consists of various Palestinian
Resistance groups and the Palestine National Council sessions'
decisions are necessarily based upon compromise and coalition-
forming. Chapter 6 defines the current PLO Operational Code
as based upon the last three political statements of the
14
Palestine National Council. As this writer researched the
Operational Code and belief systems in general it became very
clear that belief systems alone do not determine political
behavior. The factors already analyzed in Chapters 2,3,4,
and 5 make up a large portion of the remainder of the policy-
making equation. Belief systems, as defined by the Operational
Code, combined with the organizational, leadership, ideological,
and strategic factors give a more complete understanding of
PLO decision-making. In Chapter 7 another key to PLO policy-
making is clarified. Since the PLO does not constitute an
independent, sovereign state, it is dependent on outside
sources for economic means and military hardware. Knowing
which states the PLO depends upon for such support gives an
additional insight into PLO dependencies and how those
dependencies impact on decision-making. This factor, when
considered with all the previous factors, will provide a more
comprehensive understanding of the PLO and why and how it
chooses to act in the ways that it decides to. Chapter 8
documents PLO emergence onto the international political stage.
The three indicators of this emergence are PLO contacts with
other foreign governments, official diplomatic recognition by
other states, and PLO international mediation efforts. All
three factors show an outward reaching trend by the PLO over
the last five years. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by
summarizing the points made in the thesis and by describing
the current uncertain period in PLO history. This thesis will
15
hopefully provide the reader with sufficient information to
understand the PLO and the role it has played in Middle East
regional as well as international affairs. The information
given here should also enable a knowledgable scholar to under
stand and even predict future PLO actions. The appendices





The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is commonly
referred to as an umbrella organization consisting of various
nationalist/resistance groups. It is indeed true that a
number of Palestinian Nationalist groups are members of the
PLO but to assert that the PLO is simply a composite of these
groups is totally misleading. This section deals with the
PLO organization and will clarify what the PLO actually is
and how the various resistance groups fit into that organization
First, this chapter will examine the major categories of the
Palestinian groups: 1) Fatah; 2) Popular Fronts; 3) Arab-
sponsored groups; and 4) Other groups. Secondly, this chapter
will describe the PLO, its institutions, committees, and
bureaucracies. This will cover the Palestine National Council
(PNC) , Executive Committee (EC) , and various PLO diplomatic
and political institutions. Lastly, this chapter will consider
the various Palestinian social and economic organizations such
as the Palestine Red Crescent Society, trade unions, and
welfare institutions. All of this will hopefully create a
more complete picture of what the PLO is, what its component
parts are, and how diverse PLO interests are.
B. RESISTANCE GROUPS
The intention of this section is not to provide an
exhaustive list of all Palestinian Nationalist groups. Over
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the years since 1948 and even before there have been scores
of various such groups both very large and very small. Many
of these groups have since dropped out of existance or have
merged with one of the larger groups. For a detailed summary
of many of these groups see John Amos' Palestinian Resistance :
4Organization of a Nationalist Movement . The purpose of this
section is to define only the major actors and to deal with
the ideological groupings of the resistance factions. The
many organizations can be reduced to four primary categories:
1) Fatah - strict Palestinian nationalism; 2) Popular Fronts -
groups which focus on revolution throughout the Arab world;
3) Arab-Sponsored Groups - groups which clearly have a client
relationship with a particular Arab state; and 4) Other -
groups such as the communist -oriented Palestinian groups.
Many Arabs characterize the PLO as a multi-party system.
They liken it to a democratic, representative political system
where various competing ideologies vie for control and domination
If the PLO is viewed in this light we can identify the dominant
groups, the weak factions, the groups whose outlook is strictly
ideologically based, and those who rely on outside support.
The PLO thus is an arena where power, ideology, support,
pragmatism, and coalition-building are common features. With
this in mind let us examine each of the four categories before
speaking of the PLO itself.
1. Fatah5
Fatah is the pre-eminent Palestinian resistance
organization in terms of size and influence. Since 1969, Fatah
18
and its leaders have controlled the PLO. Fatah's basic policy
is the liberation of Palestine and the return of the Palestinian
people to their homeland. Beyond this Fatah ideology is rather
vague. This lack of clarity attracts members from a broad
spectrum of Palestinian political philosophy. Fatah has
attracted a broad base of support, has enrolled a large number
of members, and thus wields more power in the PLO than any
other of the Palestinian groups.
Fatah was organized in 1959 by Yasir Arafat, Khalid
al-Hassan, Khalil al-Wazir, and Salah Khalef who were all
exiled Palestinians. Joining these four in the original
organization were Farug al-Qaddumi, Mohammad Yusef, and Zuhayr
al-Alami. These men met in Kuwait where Arafat had established
himself as a contractor. These founders decided to separate
and concentrate on strengthening three geographic areas : West
Germany, Algeria, and Kuwait. Arafat also took an inspiring
tour through the Palestinian refugee camps. This tour instilled
within him the burning desire to free his homeland even though
in this effort he failed to organize formal Fatah cells in the
camps. Soon Fatah began publishing a newspaper (really a four-
page handbill) , Our Palestine
,
in Kuwait during the fall of
1959. This newspaper continued circulation until early 1962
when it was expanded to 48 pages and began publication in
Beirut. At that time the Fatah cells in Germany became
affiliated with the General Union of Palestinian Students
(GUPS), an organization which Arafat had headed in 1956 as a
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student at King Fued University in Cairo. Nasser had banished
the group from Egypt along with the Muslim Brotherhood but
the GUPS gained a strong following in Germany. Our Palestine^
was also reaching Germany and influenced Palestinian students
there. In Algeria, Fatah leaders maintained close contact
with Algerian revolutionaries in the FLN (Algerian National
Liberation Front). During these years in the early 1960's
there were two factors which led to the increased growth of
Fatah. First, in 1961, Nasser's United Arab Republic broke
apart freeing many Syrians to join any political party they
chose. Secondly, 35 to 40 Palestinian groups in Kuwait merged
7
with Fatah making it the largest organization there. A
similar unification took place in Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
In 1964, the PLO was created and Fatah had to decide
how to react and what policy to follow. At meetings held
during that year the Fatah members were split into two groups:
o
the Reasonable Faction and the Adventurers. The former
favored waiting and organizing before launching any guerrilla
activity. The Adventurers declared that then was the exact
right time to act using guerrilla tactics. In October 1964,
the first Fatah military operation was planned and scheduled
for 31 December 1964. The plan was to explode a section of
the Israeli water carrier project on the Jordan River. Arafat
and his fellow leaders wrote up and printed "Fatah Military
Communique Number 1" taking credit for the anticipated raid
before it actually took place. They delivered this communique
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to fifteen newspaper offices in Beirut. Without confirming
the story some of the newspapers printed the "success" of
Fatah' s first raid not knowing that the sabateurs had been
arrested by Lebanese security forces. Nevertheless, Fatah'
s
first "conquest" brought much welcome publicity. Popular
support was strengthened and it seemed that all Palestinian
refugees knew what Fatah was and Fatah 's leaders "became
9
convinced that we were the wave of the future."
Syria took note of Fatah's growing size and influence.
In June 1965 the Syrian government placed Mohammad Araka at Fatah's
head to organize and train the new recruits. Arafat and
Khalil al-Wazir went to the West Bank refugee camps to recruit
young Palestinians in 1965, but had little success. By 1966
Syria had taken nearly complete control over Fatah. Arafat
and his associates felt it was best at least temporarily to
forego some of their principles of independence from Arab
governmental control. However, as Syrian control grew stronger
so did the Fatah leaders' desire to break away and reassert
their independence. To accomplish this they turned to Jordan
and specifically the East Bank of the Jordan. At this time
two separate states grew up on the East Bank: Hussein's
1
2
Hashemite Kingdom and the Palestinian Fedayeen. Mohammad
Araka apparently had two goals: 1) to kill King Hussein and
13
2) to kill Isralei leaders. His hatred of Hussein undoubtedly
carried over to Arafat and Fatah's leadership. In February
1966 it seemed that Arafat was the de facto ruler or at least
21
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co-ruler of Jordan. The Fatah organization was split into
two camps: the faction led by Arafat and that dominated by
Syria. In February a coup in Syria brought a more leftist
military junta to power. This group established military
ties with the Soviet Union and also sought to tighten control
over Arafat's Fatah. Syria assigned Army captain Yusef
Urabi to take charge of both Fatah groups. Arafat felt
threatened and arranged to have Urabi assassinated. This
action prompted a gun battle between Arafat's men and the
Syrian-dominated Fatah faction. Arafat, Khalid al-Hassan,
Salah Khalef, and eleven other Fatah leaders were arrested
and spent the summer of 1966 in a Syrian jail. They were
released in late August then fled to southern Lebanon. They
learned that their influence in Fatah had waned considerably
while Syria continued to control the bulk of the Fatah
organization.
The next landmark event in Fatah history was the June
1967 war and its aftermath. The Arab armies were so completely
humiliated by the Israeli Defense Forces that it led to total
shock and shame among the Palestinians. Fatah' s leaders
realized that they should no longer depend on their Arab
brothers to fight the Israelis and win back their homeland.
They were convinced that Fatah would be the primary instrument
in creating a Palestinian state. Arafat boldly criticized
Syria and other Arab states for their failure to liberate
Palestine. Syria's reaction was to give Arafat control over
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Syria's Fatah organization and to provide Arafat with arms,
money, training, and military advice. Fatah did not grow as
fast as Arafat had expected, largely because of the growth of
Habash's PFLP and Syria's creation of their own Palestinian
group, Saiqa. In March 1968 an event took place to breathe
new life back into the faltering Fatah organization. On 21
March 1968 the Israelis launched an attack on the village of
Karameh in retaliation for Palestinian raids which had emanated
from that village. The Israeli forces were met by Palestinian
and Jordanian opposition. The ensuing battle took the lives
of about 200 Palestinians and inflicted substantial damage to
the Israeli force. The Battle of Karameh received considerable
worldwide media attention and the general feeling was that the
Palestinians had "won" the battle. Arafat used this to his
advantage and showed the world in general and the Palestinians
in particular that his small Fatah group had defeated the
Israeli army whereas in 1967 all the combined Arab armies had
failed to. The post-Karameh Fatah popularity led to a tremendous
increase in fedayeen recruitment and prominence of Fatah. Arafat
rode the wake of Karameh to solidify his own position then to
undermine the PLO. Fatah members took control of PLO offices
in 1968 and negotiated an agreement whereby Fatah would be
17liberally represented on the Palestine National Council. In
February 1969 at the Fifth PNC session Arafat took control of
the PLO. Since then he and his Fatah group have dominated the
Palestinian parliament. Also, Fatah was allowed by the Lebanese
23
government to create Fatahland in the Mount Herman foothills.
From southern Lebanon and from the bases in Jordan, Palestinian
guerrilla raids continued to expand throughout 1969 and 1970.
Fatah was also challenged by other Palestinian groups. Habash's
PFLP sought to catch world attention by staging the world's
first airline hijacking. However, Arafat managed to maintain
Fatah as the largest and most powerful of all Palestinian
resistance groups.
The following two years, 1970-1971, proved to be
crucial in Fatah' s existence. Jordan's King Hussein had seen
Fatah 's power and support expand until it became a formidable
political opposition. He perceived a unified Fatah as drawing
many Jordanian Palestinians into its ranks and challenging his
supremacy as the Monarch. To dispel this threat the well-
known Black September war took place in 1970. By July 1971
the Palestinian fedayeen were expelled from Jordan. Fatah
operations were then organized and carried out from southern
Lebanon. In 1972 the Black September Organization was formed.
Its major constituents were young, politicized commandos who
were disillusioned by the defeat of the Palestinian groups in
Jordan. They originally advocated attacks on Jordan to avenge
the September 1970 defeat, but later activity, such as the
1972 Munich Olympic massacre, were intended to gain worldwide
1 8fame and notoriety for the Palestinian cause in general.
The Palestinians fled from Jordan and congregated in
southern Lebanon. This too caused a problem for the already
24
faction-ridden Lebanese government. The infusion of
Palestinians created an imbalance among the diverse Lebanese
Christian, Shia, Sunni , Druze, and Arab factions. The PLO
was also coming of age at this time. The Palestinians were
not deeply involved in the 1973 war with Israel and Lebanon
did not play a major role after the war in the Geneva Con-
ference. The Geneva Conference was called to negotiate a
comprehensive settlement of the problems of the Middle East
and the Palestinian question was perceived to be a key problem.
Palestinian representation at the Geneva Conference became
almost an imperative. Of course two groups vied for status as
the representative of the Palestinian people: King Hussein
(Jordan) and Arafat (PLO). The Rabat Summit of 1974 settled
the issue by declaring the PLO to be the only sole, legitimate
representative of the Palestinians. The Rabat Summit also
called for the establishment of a national independent government
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of Palestine under PLO leadership. This Rabat recognition
led to a worldwide upswing in diplomatic recognition of the
PLO. Later in 1974, Arafat was invited to speak to the United
Nations General Assembly. The world was beginning to recognize
the Palestinian problem and the PLO as the spokesman for the
Palestinian people.
As the 1970' s continued the civil war in Lebanon drew
the PLO into inter-Arab strife once more. The PLO was attacked
by Lebanese Christians and the Syrians as well. This was in
addition to the PLO's primary conflict: against the Israelis.
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The PLO continued its guerrilla raids on Israeli villages and
military camps across the border. The Israelis tried to end
these attacks in 1978 by invading southern Lebanon and advancing
to the Litani River. After their withdrawal and the stationing
of UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) the Israelis financed
Lebanese Christian militia leader, Major Haddad's forces.
Haddad gained control over a portion of southern Lebanon called
Haddadland. Despite these measures the PLO continued its raids
on Israeli military bases and civilian villages in northern
Israel. The Israelis prepared for an attack on southern Lebanon
with the goal of eliminating the PLO. After considerable plan-
ning and an immediate justification, the attempted assassination
of the Israeli envoy in London, the Israeli Defense Forces
launched a full-scale ground and air attack in June 1982.
Within a few days the Israeli forces had pushed the PLO back
to Beirut. PLO leaders and fighters were holed up in Beirut
while Israeli forces waited outside the city awaiting the final
order to finish the job. An agreement was finally reached
whereby the PLO would evacuate its forces from Lebanon to
various Arab countries. The evacuation did not spell the end
of the PLO but it did constitute a new phase in PLO history.
2 . Popular Fronts
The so-called Popular Fronts form the second sector of
Palestinian resistance groups. Included within this category
are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP,
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
,
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the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General
Command (PFLP-GC) , and the Palestine Popular Struggle Front
(PPSF) . These groups are distinguished by their Marxist-
Leninist doctrine and their more radical terrorist tactics.
It was members of these groups which invented the modern
phenomenon of airline hijacking. These groups have also
claimed responsibility for other forms of terrorist activity
including the use of letter and parcel bombs. These groups
trace their origins to the pre-1948 war period.
In early 1947 a Palestinian Arab, Qustantin Zurayk,
accurately predicted that if a Jewish state were to be estab-
lished in Palestine it would soon become an extremely powerful
20
military force in the Middle East. Zurayk went on to call
for the creation of a "secret elite" of Arab youth to be
organized and unified through political parties. This secret
elite should be committed to common and pure doctrine, be
bound by complete loyalty, and would thus play a major role
in liberating the Arab world from the Zionist and Imperialist
21threat. Zurayk's plea fell upon the ears of George Habash,
then head of a group of students at the American University
in Beirut. Habash was inspired by these ideas and set to work
to create the "secret elite." Habash and his associates
belonged to al-Urwa, an organization of students established
in 1918 for the sole purpose of promoting literary abilities
22
of Arab students. Habash and a close associate, Hani al-Hindi,
were members of the editorial board of al-Urwa's literary
27
publication. They persuaded all but one or two Baathists in
al-Urwa to join them in their goal to liberate Palestine. In
1951 the first cells of what Habash called the Arab Nationalist
Movement (ANM) were created and consisted mostly of members
23
of al-Urwa. After these cells in Beirut were considered to
be strong, Habash went to Jordan to set up the organization
there. They found that a similar organization called the Amman
Conference had already been established since shortly after
24the 1948 war. Habash joined the Amman Conference and re-
cruited new members to his ANM. One of the first to join was
Nayif Hawatmeh, who later split from Habash' s group and formed
his own Palestinian resistance organization. While Habash was
in Jordan other ANM leaders went to Kuwait and established
cells there. More cells were founded in Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre,
St. Joseph's University, and in the Palestinian refugee camps.
A regional command was created in Iraq with Hawatmeh as the
25leader. Other cells were formed in the Arabian peninsula so
that by 1964 the ANM was a widespread organization that was
growing rapidly. In 1965 a radical element of the ANM called
the Palestine Liberation Front began its own fedayeen opera-
tions. The following year Habash founded the Heroes of the
Return
,
a terrorist group. Just after the 1967 war another
group, the Youth of Vengeance, was created from elements of
the ANM. In December 1967 these groups: Palestine Liberation
Front
,
Heroes of the Return
,
and Youth of Vengeance merged to
27form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
.
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The union of these groups was an attempt to counteract the
tremendous growth that Fatah underwent just after the 1967
war. Although the groups had officially combined to form one
unitary organization the unity turned out to be in name only.
In October 1968 Habash was jailed in Damascus. While in jail
Ahmed Jibril, former leader of the Heroes of the Return , took
charge of the PFLP. He immediately expelled the Youth of
Vengeance faction from the PFLP. Members of the Heroes of the
Return retaliated by siding with the Youth of Vengeance and
2 8
removed Jibril from power. Jibril and his followers withdrew
and called themselves Section A of the General Command of the
29
PFLP. In February 1969 Nayif Hawatmeh wanted to transform
Habash' s group into a strict Marxist organization. When his
attempt failed he left the PFLP and formed the Democratic Front
30for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) . It can be seen from
all of these divisions that ideological differences played a
major role in the splintering. Each group wanted to control
the entire organization and when it became apparent to them
that they would not be successful they split from the parent
group to form their own organization. Personality differences
also was a major factor. Habash, Hawatmeh, and Jibril each
had a loyal following. When the groups were "unified" the
members of each sub group still held allegiance to their
particular leader. The unity of the PFLP was, of course, short
lived and the resulting split led to the creation of three
separate and distinct groups: PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP. All
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three of these groups still exist today and by the end of 1969
they were well established and separate from one another.
Their trial unity had not worked and had caused an even sharper
definition of each group. Since 1969 several attempts have
been made to unify all Palestinian groups under Fatah leader-
ship. The Popular Front groups have specifically defined their
political ideologies and it is upon this basis that they stress
their individuality. They would rather retain their strict
ideological framework and remain numerically smaller than to
compromise their principles in order to become part of a larger
organization. To them the question revolves around their
ideology which is the perceived foundation of their strength.
Another split in the PFLP occurred in 1972 when about
150 members broke away to form the Popular Revolutionary Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PRFLP) . This new group did
not grow to become a major Palestinian faction but the
splintering did point out the division within the DFLP. The
mainline PFLP, represented by Wadi Haddad, Ahmed Khalid, and
Mohammad Mussalami were considered to be rightist. The leftist
faction of the PFLP, led by Abu Shehab, Abu Khaled, and Abu
Ali considered the rightists to be relying too much on the
31Arab states.
In 1974 what became known as the Rejection Front was
formed. Fatah and Arafat were expecting to be asked to
represent the Palestinians at the Geneva Conference. The
Rejection Front was formed to oppose Arafat's position. The
30
Popular Fronts which made up the Rejection Front were very
much opposed to the creation of a mini-state on Gaza and the
West Bank. They were opposed to Arafat's idea of a democratic
state. They supported the total liberation of Palestine in
32its entirety. The doctrinal make-up of the Rejection Front
and the Popular Fronts will be dealt with in the Ideology
section of the following chapter. The Rejection Front is
cited here as an example of coalition-forming within the PLO.
Although each component of the Popular Fronts has its own
identity and is strict in its ideological outlook, they can
be considered as a whole when we observe the PLO from a macro
viewpoint
.
3 . Arab-Sponsored Groups
In 1948 many of the Palestinian refugees fled to the
neighboring Arab states of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. These
states did not accept the Palestinians as citizens but set up
refugee camps for their "temporary" relocation. Shortly after
the 1948 war Egypt was the scene of a coup by young military
officers which eventually brought Nasser to power. During
the middle 1950's and through the 1960's Nasser's goal was
Pan-Arab unification and cooperation. Even though his army
was defeated during the 1956 Suez war, the Arabs generally
praised Nasser for being able to stand up against the Israeli,
French, and British armies as well as his army did. Nasser
established the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 as he
unified with Syria. The Pan-Arab movement became very popular
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and Nasser was clearly recognized as its undisputed leader.
The Palestinians felt that this growing Pan-Arab movement
would assist them in recovering their homeland. They relied
on the Arab confrontation states to militarily support the
return of the Palestinians to Palestine. While Nasser was
enjoying his fame and success other Arab leaders became
jealous. The Syrians found that the UAR was created less to
integrate Egyptians and Syrians into one people than it was
to subjugate the Syrians to Egypt's and Nasser's rule. Syria
dropped out of the UAR in 1961 when it was clear what Nasser's
intention was. Syria also felt the strong Pan-Arab popularity
and set out to upstage Nasser. In the early to mid 1960 's the
Syrians trained and supplied Fatah and other Palestinian
groups in an effort to show their loyalty to all Arabs. The
Palestinian problem became a handy instrument in Syria's hand
to build up their Pan-Arab image. Fatah and the Popular Fronts
accepted Syrian aid early in the 1960 's but soon became wary
of falling too heavily under Syrian dominance. In 1966 Syria
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created a new Palestinian resistance group called Saiqa.
This group was financed by Syria and their military arm was
equipped and trained by the Syrian army. Saiqa, since it had
such inseparable ties with Syria, followed very closely the
Pan-Arab philosophy of Syria's political leaders. Saiqa
remains strong, in fact it is today the second largest
Palestinian group being only eclipsed by Fatah. Today Saiqa
is one of the key Palestinian organizations and has been
represented on the PLO Executive Committee for many years.
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Iraq was not to be left out of the Palestinian
resistance organization. Iraq is in a unique position in
that it is not one of the confrontation states. Many of the
Palestinian organizations found popular support for their
causes in Iraq as they began their organizing process. Iraq
was a firm supporter of the idea of Palestinian resistance
and by 1969 had decided to sponsor their own group, the Arab
Liberation Front (ALF) . Iraq and Syria both had strong Baath
Party organizations in their governments but the two Baath
Parties were not unified. The Iraqis could not therefore
support the Syrian-sponsored Saiqa group because of ideolo-
gical and political differences. In April 1969 Iraq banned
34
all Palestinian organizations from the country. All the
Palestinian fedayeen were ordered to leave the country or to
join the newly-formed and Iraqi-sponsored group, the Arab
Liberation Front. The ALF thus became the official Palestinian
group of Iraq. Its military is equipped and trained by the
Iraqi military and its political ideology matches that of the
Baathist government. The ALF and Saiqa represent the Arab-
sponsored Palestinian groups. Iraq and Syria are the two
countries which set up and still operate Palestinian organi-
zations that are fully recognized by and represented in the
PLO. Libya also supports Palestinian Resistance groups al-
though it does not maintain a client relationship with any
group in the same sense as Syria or Iraq. Libya's support is
for small, radical factions rather than for conventionally
armed and trained forces as Saiqa and ALF.
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4 . Other Groups
Fatah, PFLP, PFLP-GC, DFLP, Saiqa, and ALF are the
Palestinian groups currently represented on the PNC Executive
Committee. There are also other groups which play a more
marginal role in the PLO. Several Communist-oriented factions
have been established but none have gained any real prominence.
In 1968 several Arab Communist parties worked together to
create a Communist-influenced Palestinian organization called
al-Ansar. Acceptance of al-Ansar by the other Palestinian
groups was slow and incomplete. Al-Ansar never grew to become
larger than about fifty active members. In early 1972 al-Ansar's
founding sponsor parties agreed to disband the organization
and most of its members joined Fatah but others sided with
35
PFLP.
The Arab Communist Organization (ACO) was created
probably in the early 1970 's as an attempt to replace the
Communist Parties of the Arab states. The group specialized
in terrorist activity such as bank robberies and bombings.
These appear to be some links between the ACO and PFLP.
Membership figures are unknown with varying reports of between
70 and 1200 members.
The Palestine National Front (PNF) is another of the
Communist-oriented groups. It operates outside the military
realm and acts solely on a political level. Its membership
is drawn heavily from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israeli
Arabs. The failure to develop a strong backing among
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Palestinians living in these areas has been a mystery to many
leaders of the other Palestinian resistance groups. The PNF
was established to link those Palestinians in the occupied
territories with the rest of the Palestinian Nationalist
Movement. One of the PNF leaders is long-time PLO spokesman
and Executive Committee member *Abd al-Muhsin Mayzar.
In early 1982 a Palestinian Communist Party was es-
tablished which included Palestinian communists in Lebanon,
37Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. The party was formed
with the formal approval of the Jordanian Communist Party.
The new party's goal is "the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state and the consolidation of the unity of the
Palestinian people." It also recognizes the PLO as the
Palestinian people's sole, legitimate leader and thus expects
to play a part in the PLO organizational operations.
C. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
The PLO was established on 22 May 1964. Nasser of Egypt
was instrumental in the creation of the PLO. As noted earlier
in this section, Nasser was the undisputed leader of the Pan-
Arab movement during the early 1960 's. The Palestinian
Resistance Movement also began a dramatic increase in support
and membership at about this time. Nasser could see that the
Palestinians could possibly pose a threat to his Pan-Arab
leadership. The Palestinian question became a rallying point
for many Pan-Arabists . Nasser deftly suggested and supported
the creation of the PLO. He wanted to be the driving force
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behind the PLO to enhance his position as the Arab leader.
As the primary backer of the PLO he could also keep control
of the organization and use it to his advantage. Nasser used
his influence in the Arab League to persuade that group to
support the creation of the PLO. The PLO was created on 22
May 1964 as a separate Palestinian organization. Since 1964
the PLO has undergone a series of changes. This metamorphasis
is best shown by examining the Palestinian parliament -in-exile
,
the Palestine National Council (PNC) . The following section
traces the sixteen PNC sessions since 1964 to point out how
the PNC is organized, how it has changed over the years, and
the role the PNC plays in Palestinian affairs.
1. PNC
The PNC is the equivalent of a democratic parliament.
It includes a number of delegates (the exact number varies
from year to year) representing the various Palestinian
nationalist groups and independent Palestinians outside the
established organizations. The PNC meetings are also attended
by delegations from many other countries both Arab and non-Arab
The PNC was designed to meet every year, then it was decided
to meet every six months, and currently the charter calls for
annual meetings. The PNC has had to postpone several sessions
because of regional conflicts and one extraordinary session
was convened, so a total of sixteen meetings have been held
over the nineteen and one half year history of the PNC. The
3 8following is a brief account of each of the PNC meetings.
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2. PNC #1
The first PNC session was convened in Jerusalem on
28 May 1964. Ahmed al-Shukairy had previously been appointed
head of the organization. Nasser had selected him because of
39his previous diplomatic experience. Shukairy had appointed
200 delegates to attend the first session but 360 delegates
actually arrived to take part in the meetings. Among them were
Abu Jihad, Yusuf al-Najjar, and Kamal Adwan representing Fatah.
At this first session Shukairy appointed the first Executive
Committee (EC) and the PLO set out to form its institutions.
Hikmet el Masri, Nicola el Durr, and Haidar Abdel Shafei were
chosen as vice presidents of the PLO and Abdoul Rahman el
Sikseil was selected to be secretary general. These leaders,
along with Shukairy, were perceived by the other Palestinian
organizations as being controlled by the Arab League sponsors
of the new PLO, especially Egypt. The bulk of the work of
this first PNC session was taken up by drafting the Palestine
National Charter.
3. PNC #2
The second PNC session was held in Cairo from 31 May
to 2 June 1965. President Nasser of Egypt gave the opening
address. PLO headquarters at this time was located in
Jerusalem. The work of the session included refining PLO
goals and tactics and setting up the PLO institutions. The
PNC saw the need to coordinate between the EC and the various
revolutionary Palestinian organizations. Fatah representatives
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also attended this session and were able to influence some of
the political and military decisions. The Palestine Liber-
ation Army (PLA) was established just prior to this session.
The PNC asked the Arab states to help train the PLA. A
national conscription resolution was adopted for all young
Palestinians to increase the size of the guerrilla forces.
The PNC emphasized that many Palestinians were helping in
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to build up the Arab world. They also
stated that they expected reciprocity from the Arab states.
4. PNC #3
Session three was convened in Gaza on 20 May and
concluded 24 May 1966. Five hundred representatives from the
Arab world attended. Egyptian Gaza governor general, Abd al-
Munim Husni, gave the opening address on behalf of President
Nasser. This session was held during a time of tension
between Jordan and the Egyptian-backed PLO. At this session
it was announced that PLO troops were being trained in Cairo,
Damascus, Iraq, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) . The
PRC was also actively supplying the PLO with arms. Shukairy
also announced that he had recently met with Soviet Premier
Kosygin.
5. PNC #4
The fourth PNC session took place after the catastrophic
Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis. Because of Shukairy'
s
independent action during this war and failure to act col-
lectively seven EC members called for his resignation as PLO
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Chairman. Shukairy resigned in late 1967 and a Palestinian
lawyer, Yahya Hamouda, was appointed to be caretaker chairman.
Fatah called a meeting of the various Palestinian groups on
17 January 1968 in Cairo where they called for the creation of
a military council, a permanent bureau for the PNC and election
of PNC delegates by a preparatory committee. The EC held
joint meetings with the various Palestinian organizations and
decided that the fourth PNC session would be composed of 100
members proportionally distributed according to each organi-
zation's size. The fourth session was also held in the wake
of the 21 March 1968 Karameh victory. Fatah's rapid growth
and increased popularity were reflected in its prominence at
this PNC session.
The fourth PNC session was held at Arab League Head-
quarters in Cairo from 10 through 16 July 1968. At this
session the power was taken from the PNC Chairman to personally
appoint the PNC delegates and the EC members. From this point
onward the PNC would elect members to the EC. The guerrilla
groups were well represented on the PNC: 38 from Fatah, 12
from PFLP, 10 from PLA. The PNC also decided to meet every
six months. The Palestine National Charter was also ammended
allowing only for armed struggle, rejection of UN resolution
242, and the total liberation of Palestine. (Articles 6 and
15 were ammended and article 24 was dropped.)
6. PNC #5
The fifth PNC session convened in Arab League Head-
quarters in Cairo 1-4 February 1969. During the preceding year
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Fatah had been infiltrating PLO offices, taking control over
them, and operating them under the name of the PLO. Because
of this action, Fatah' s dominance in size and influence and
through Arafat's political maneuvering he was elected as PLO
Chairman at this session. This is a post he has not re-
linquished since. President Nasser gave the opening address
for the first time since PNC #2. PFLP, PLA, and PLF all
boycotted the meeting and only 84 delegates attended. In
addition to becoming chairman of the EC Arafat became head of
PLO military affairs. Other EC members were assigned positions
which equate to cabinet -level appointments. The offices on
the EC were Political Affairs, Occupied Homeland Affairs,
Popular Organization, Financial Affairs, and Guidance and
Information. Abd al-Majid Shuman was elected chairman of the
Palestine National Fund and Hayha Hammudah was elected chairman
of the PNC. The number of PNC seats was increased from 100 to
150 with 33 for Fatah, 12 each for PFLP and Saiqa, 42 for
independents, and 6 for PLA.
7. PNC #6
PNC session six was held in Cairo in September 1969.
This was a period of Middle East tension and Palestine conflict
in particular. Fatah and Saiqa set up Fatahland in southern
Lebanon after conflict with Lebanese factions had intensified.
Palestinian problems in Jordan were also on the rise. At this
session Arafat was unanimously re-elected as PLO chairman.
The EC membership was increased from 12 to 15.
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8. PNC #7
This session was held in Cairo in June 1970. At this
time Palestinian clashes with Jordanian armed forces were
about to reach a climax during Black September. At this
session the Palestine Central Council was established as a
separate organization from the EC. It was intended to be a




This session was held just weeks after the previous
session. This extraordinary session was held at Widhat
refugee camp in Amman, Jordan. PLO leaders called this meeting
to deal with two issues: 1) How to respond to the US Roger's
Plan and 2) How to defeat the Jordanian plots to exterminate
the Palestinian resistance fighters. Foreign delegations at
this session included those from Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, South
Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and the American Black Panthers. At this
time there were 115 PNC members. For the first time all
eleven guerrilla groups were represented on the PNC. This was
also the first PNC meeting to be held outside Egypt and Nasser's
influence. The mood was decidedly anti-Nasser because of his
recent acceptance of the Roger's Plan and Egypt's ceasefire
agreement with the Israelis.
10. PNC #8
This PNC session was held at Arab League Headquarters
in Cairo from 27 February to 5 March 1971. This was after
Black September but before the total expulsion of the fedayeen
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from Jordan which would take place in July 1971. Prior to
this session Arafat had made several attempts to unify all
the guerrilla groups under his command. He was opposed by
the PFLP and DFLP who had no intention of submitting to
Arafat's rule. Syria also refused to relinquish its control
over Saiqa. Fatah came to this PNC session prepared to offer
a new organizational framework. The 115 PNC members approved
the following: 1) The PLO was to embrace all Palestinian
revolutionary forces, 2) The Charter was to define the PLO
aims and to guide its course, 3) The PNC was to draw up
strategy for political, military, information, and financial
affairs, 4) A Command was created to command the Palestinian
struggle from three levels -- regular forces, fedayeen, and
popular militia, 5) A Central Committee was to consist of 21
members to meet every three months, 6) A political bureau of
nine members was created to meet on a weekly basis and was to
supervise the daily affairs of the Palestinian struggle,
7) "bodies, establishments and offices" were created to carry
out the PNC decisions. One hundred fifty PNC members were
elected from among the guerrilla organizations, trade and
craft unions, and intellectuals and specialists to serve a
three-year term.
11. PNC #9 This session met from 7 to 13 July 1971 in
Cairo at the Arab League Headquarters building. At this
session Arafat became Commander-in-Chief of the PLO, Chairman
of the EC, and Commander-in-Chief of the PLA. The new EC
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consisted of 12 members: four from Fatah (including Arafat),
two from Saiqa, one each from PFLP, DFLP, ALF , and three
independents. The Central Committee was dissolved and its
responsibilities were transferred to the EC. The guerrilla
groups' representation on the PNC was 85 seats out of 115.
Funding for the PLO was reportedly a problem with the only
Arab state contribution in 1970 being £62 , 500 from Qatar.
12. PNC #10
PNC session 10 was held in Cairo from 6 through 12
April 1972. The PNC adopted an organizational platform at this
session aimed at unifying the Palestinian resistance groups,
the unions, etc.
13. PNC #11
Session eleven was held in Cairo from 3 to 12 January
1973. There were 143 PNC members in attendance. Eighteen
delegates were unable to attend because they were detained by
Jordanian officials. The PNC decided to reinstitute the
Central Council as a connecting link between the PNC and the
EC. The Central Council was to consist of 19 to 21 members
chosen by the EC. The PNC also called for the overthrow of
the monarchy in Jordan.
14. PNC #12
The twelfth PNC session was held at the Arab League
Headquarters in Cairo from 1 to 9 June 1974. At this session
the PNC adopted a tenpoint program which included a new
Palestinian philosophy. The PNC agreed they would set up an
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independent state on "any part of Palestinian territory to be
liberated." They also reaffirmed the strategic objective of
the PLO to be "the establishment of a democratic state on the
whole of Palestinian territory." At the time of this meeting
eight Palestinians were deported by Israeli authorities from
the West Bank. These eight Palestinians were accepted as new
members of the PNC and three of them became members of the
new 14-member EC. The political program adopted at this
session guided the PLO during the very important events of
1974: the Rabat Summit and the UN recognition.
15. PNC #13
PNC thirteen was held at Arab League Headquarters
once again from 12 to 20 March 1977. This session was
delayed because of the 1975-76 Lebanese civil war. Membership
on the PNC was increased from 187 to 290. The PNC decided to
set up a Palestinian state on any liberated part of Palestine
instead of waiting for the liberation of the entire territory.
An example of how the PNC operates is the sub-committees which
routinely meet and report during the PNC sessions. At PNC
#13 the following committees met and produced policy documents
Political, Occupied Homeland, Financial Affairs, Palestinian
National Unity, Popular Organizations, Social Affairs and
Labor, Legislative, Information and Educational Affairs. Also




Again conflict in Lebanon delayed the regularly-
scheduled PNC session. PNC fourteen was convened in Damascus
from 15 to 22 January 1979. The PLO decided to meet outside
Cairo because of the Camp David capitulation by Egypt. The
opening speech was delivered by the host President Assad.
The PNC rejected the Camp David accords charging that they
were a part of the US global imperialist offensive. At this
session there was considerable infighting and jockeying for
seats on the EC. Because of this seeming power struggle no
new EC was elected. Faruq Qaddumi cleared up this apparent
discrepancy by stating that EC members are elected to serve
a three-year term and so the current EC's term would not
expire until March 1980. Qaddumi said that the new EC would
be elected the following year. However, the next PNC session
was not to convene until 1981.
17. PNC #15
The fifteenth PNC session was held in Damascus from
11 to 16 April 1981. President Assad again opened the session
with an address to the delegates. Delegations from 92 Arab
and friendly countries attended. The PNC declared the occu-
pied city of Jerusalem to be the capital of Palestine. The
PNC also agreed to increase the number of occupied land
representatives from 122 to 180. A new 15-member EC was
elected but the PFLP and PPSF were not represented on the EC.
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18. PNC #16
This PNC session was the first since the 1982 evacu-
ation from Beirut. It was held at the Palais des Nations in
Algiers from 14 to 22 February 1983. After the dispersion
to nine Arab countries in September 1982 the PLO was thought
by some to have been hopelessly splintered. This session
thus was an important one through which PLO unity could be
displayed. Also a series of peace plans had been tendered
which the PNC undertook to discuss: the Fahd Plan, the Fez
Plan, the Reagan Plan, and the Brezhnev Plan. This session
included the first mention of the acceptance of a Palestinian
mini-state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at least in
principle. Jerusalem was designated to be the capital of
such a Palestinian state. Isam Sartawi resigned from the PNC
for the second successive session but his resignation was not
accepted. A new 14-member EC was elected including a PFLP
representative.
The members of the EC act as a Palestinian Cabinet
with the Chairman serving as Prime Minister. Yasir Arafat
has served in this role since 1969. The other EC members
hold such positions on the cabinet level as heads of the
following departments: Political, Military, Health, Finance,
Education, Popular Organizations, National Relations,
Information and National Guidance, and Affairs of the Occupied
Homeland. Palestinians view the PNC as a parliament and the
EC as a council of ministers. Viewed strictly in this sense,
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Arafat can do nothing without the consent of the EC and at
every PNC session he is subject to what amounts to a vote
of confidence when the new EC is elected. When challenges
to Arafat's leadership have occured they have come on the
heels of a conflict. The period of Arafat's instability have
been: 1) after the 1970 Black September defeat in Jordan,
2) after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, 3) after the 1978 Israeli
incursion into southern Lebanon, and 4) after the 1982 Israeli
invasion of southern Lebanon and the expulsion of the PLO from
Beirut. In each of these cases Arafat's opposition has
claimed that he was acting independently and collectively as
stipulated in the PNC. The PNC appears to have become a well-
established institution in which the Palestinian people be-
lieve and in which they have placed considerable trust. If
the Palestinians eventually attain the statehood which they
have for so long struggled they will be organizationally prepared
just as the Zionists were in 1948.
The format of PNC sessions follows a very predictable
pattern. The opening address is usually given by the head of
the host country or his representative. The first session
also features speeches by Arafat and other major PLO leaders.
For the first two or three days the PNC sessions are occupied
by hearing the addresses of delegations from many Arab,
socialist, and friendly countries. At the conclusion of these
speeches the PNC delegates separate into committee sessions
to debate and draft a preliminary committee report and
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resolutions. After several days of committee work the PNC
meets in plenary session to discuss and vote on the committee
recommendations, to debate and vote on final resolutions, and
to vote on new EC members. The EC members represent all the
major Palestinian factions plus unaffiliated independent
Palestinians. The new EC members are elected not by actual
balloting but they are nominated and then their approval is
indicated through applause. At the 16th PNC a proposal was
made to change from this customary practice to actual tabu-
lation of votes in deciding upon EC members as well as the
EC chairman. Despite this proposal the EC members are still
chosen on the basis of enthusiastic applause.
The PNC, as has been noted, meets only once every
year and sometimes less frequently. Because of the sporadic
convening of PNC sessions and because the PNC decides upon
very broad strategy the EC was instituted as a smaller, more
easily manageable institution to coordinate daily activities.
The EC meets usually twice a month. During crisis periods
and during PNC sessions the EC meets in permanent session.
Representation on the EC is by commando groups and independents
Fatah dominates the EC with Arafat as chairman plus two other
EC members. The remainder of the current representation is
as follows: one member each representing PFLP, DFLP, Saiqa,
ALF, PFLP-GC, and six independents. Each EC member is given
a Cabinet-type assignment. Thus, it is the EC of the PNC
which wields the actual power in the PLO.
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D. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 40
A quick glance at the type of departments headed by PNC
and EC members gives an idea of the diversification of PLO
interests. The bulk of PLO publicity has been centered on
terrorism and guerrilla activity. The military capabilities
and exploits of PLO fedayeen have become well-known to people
throughout the world. This section leaves the political and
military aspects of PLO organization and focuses on the PLO
accomplishments in the field of social welfare. The Pales-
tinians have established a series of institutions to assure
their social, welfare, medical, and educational progress.
Each of these institutions is dealt with individually below.
These data are valid as of June 1982. The Isareli invasion
of June 1982 and resulting occupation of Southern Lebanon may
have caused a change in some of these organizations and
institutions
.
1 . Palestine Red Crescent Society
The Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) was begun
in Jordan in 1968 and the PLO institutionalized it in 1969.
The PRCS works in the fields of both preventive and curative
medicine. When the Palestinians were expelled from Jordan in
1970 the PRCS relocated most of its facilities to Lebanon.
The PRCS maintains thirteen major hospitals: eleven in
Lebanon, one in Syria, and one in Egypt. Each hospital has a
modern operating room, radiology department, laboratory,
pharmacy, blood bank, and outpatient clinic. Most hospitals
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include a dental clinic as well. These hospitals are each
equipped with a specialized unit for maternity, pediatric,
or orthopedic care. In addition to these major hospitals
the PRCS operates 100 clinics: 60 in Lebanon, 20 in Syria,
and the others located throughout the Arab world. The clinics
are staffed by one doctor and two nurses. Care in both hos-
pitals and clinics is provided either free of charge or for
a very low fee. Clinic visits cost about one dollar while
inpatient hospital visits run about five dollars per day.
Any PLO employee and his family members receive free care.
If a patient requires care which a PRCS facility cannot provide
the patient is transferred to a facility outside the PRCS
system and the expenses are paid by the PRCS.
Most doctors and nurses in the PRCS system are Pales-
tinians. Salaries are low and there are a number of volunteer
teams from Holland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, France, Britain,
and elsewhere who come to work in PRCS facilities for three
months to a year at a time. Other specialists work for the
PRCS under contract and are paid by the World Health
Organization.
The PRCS also operates a medical school for 150
students in Beirut. Programs of study include registered
nurse, practical nurse, medical technicians, and paramedic.
Tuition is free but graduates are expected to work in a PRCS
facility for a length of time equaling their PRCS training.
The PRCS is also active in the following activities:
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1) A continuous child vaccination program (in
cooperation with UNICEF).
2) Teaching literacy courses to wives and mothers.
3) Providing vocational training (sewing, embroidery,
language instruction, and typing).
4) Selling Palestinian handicrafts and funneling
the money back to the artists.
5) Maintaining day care centers for PRCS workers.
About one-half of the PRCS budget comes directly from
the PLO. Remaining funds come from the International Red
Cross, other Red Cross Societies, the World Health Organization,
and supporting agencies in Sweden, France, Switzerland, Norway,
Finland, as well as from three private groups in the US:
United Holy Land Fund, United States Overseas Medical Aid,
and the Association for Near East Relief Aid. The PRCS also
has observer status in the International Red Cross. It also
sends representatives to the Ministries of Health meeting in
the WHO. It is also a full voting member of the Arab Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
2 . Institution for Social Affairs and Welfare for the
Martyrs' and Prisoners' Families
The PLO established this Institution in 1965 to provide
monthly subsistance payments to the widows and orphans of PLO
combat victims as well as support for all full-time PLO workers
and leaders and their families. With branches in Jordan,
Syria, Kuwait, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon the
Institution gave aid to over forty thousand persons in 1980.
As a part of the Institution's work is a payment for secondary
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and university education for the children of the PLO martyrs.
Widowed wives and orphaned daughters are taught to sew,
embroider, or type. Aid is also provided to civilian Lebanese
and Palestinians who have become victims of Israeli attacks.
The budget in 1980 for this expense alone was over thirty
million dollars. In addition to the PLO expense of sub-
sidizing the Institution for Social Affairs and Welfare for
the Martyrs' and Prisoners' Families, there are several other
items of note concerning PLO financial dealings. First, the
PLO is responsible for the administration of the refugee
camps. The PLO pays for the camps' electricity and water and
is also responsible for refuse collection, fire and police
41protection, and ambulance service. Second, the PLO maintains
an acting investment portfolio. Many of Fatah' s funds are
reportedly passed to Abu Hassan who transfers them to bank
accounts in Switzerland, Italy, and West Germany. Money from
these accounts is used for various business investments. In
1972 the PLO's European investments were estimated to be £30
42
million. The PLO owns and manages a Belgian charter airline,
industrial plants that produce shoes, clothing, processed food,
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and furniture. Third, the PLO accepts financial grants on
a "no strings attached" basis only. A partial reason for the
souring of relations between the PLO and Libya was Libya's
desire for reciprocity for its financial aid to the PLO. The
PLO also denied a report that they paid two dollars per barrel
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of oil for Iranian aid. Fourth, Palestinian financial aid
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sometimes depends on the political platform of the supplier
or the Palestinian faction. For example, the PFLP tra-
ditionally refused to accept direct payments from such
45
"reactionary sources" as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. But in
many cases these "reactionary" regimes refuse to give aid to
the radical Palestinian factions such as PFLP or DFLP, pre-
46ferring to support the moderate Fatah group. Lastly, the
PLO announced in the summer of 1981 that it would compensate
Palestinian and Lebanese civilians for the damage or
destruction of their homes during the fighting with Israel.
This aid amounted to two thousand Lebanese pounds for each
house destroyed and one thousand Lebanese pounds for each
47damaged house.
3 . Arts and Culture
The PLO realizes that the Israeli occupation of
Palestine included not merely the taking of territory but
also represented an attempt to expropriate a culture and
folklore. Israeli Jews came from such diverse backgrounds
that they had no one, single, common culture. To create a
sense of unity the Israelis tried to create an "Israeli"
culture. In so doing they usurped the native Palestinian
culture and called it Israeli. Seeing this expropriation the
PLO sought to protect and develop the traditional Palestinian
customs and traditions. They felt that by emphasizing the
unique Palestinian culture they would be able to develop a
oneness and a sense of belonging which could also benefit the
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PLO politically. In creating, formalizing, and continuing
this Palestinian culture the PLO established the following
agencies
:
1) Arts and National Culture - This agency maintains
a collection of traditional Palestinian costumes and dresses.
It also teaches Palestinian women the necessary embroidery
skills to continue making these costumes.
2) Palestinian Cinema Institution - This institution
began in 1967 and produced its first documentary in 1968.
Since then its films have won awards at various international
film festivals.
3) The Association for Theater and Palestinian
Popular Art - This group was established in 1978 and is divided
into two branches: folklore/dances and music/song.
4) The Palestinian Folk Dancing Troupe - This troupe
was organized in 1971 and includes two children's folk dance
troupes. It has entertained abroad since 1973.
5) The Palestine National Theater - The Theater
presents plays written and produced by Palestinians about
Palestinian experiences. It has toured and performed in
several Arab countries.
6) The Plastic Arts Section - This is a division
within the Department of Information and Culture of the EC.
This group gives support to Palestinian painters. In June
1980, the works of 58 Palestinian painters were on exhibition
in Berlin. The PLO also pays rent on two art galleries in
Beirut where Palestinian artists display their work.
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7) Graphic Work - Palestinian artists also work to
produce posters, greeting cards, emblems, book covers, post
cards, and other such works. The PLO uses the medium of
graphic art to convey messages to the masses who do not
visit the art galleries.
8) Research Center - The Palestine Research Center
was established in Beirut in 1965. It is the repository of
Palestinian culture and historical heritage. It has its own
printing press and publishes a professional journal,
Palestinian Affairs
.
In addition to these cultural agencies the PLO has
declared a number of national holidays:
1 January The Birth of the Palestinian Revolution












29 November International Day of Solidarity
with the Palestinian People
The Palestinians have also adopted a national anthem,
"Biladi, Biladi" (My Land, My Land). It is sung on every
possible occasion. The Palestinian national flag has also




Practically every Palestinian worker can find at
least one union to which he may choose to belong. Along with
union membership comes political activity since all unions
are granted seats on the PNC proportionally based on size of
the union. The unions play an import role in Palestinian
decision-making in areas of economic, educational, welfare,
and political concerns. The unions include:
General Union of Palestinian Workers
General Union of Palestinian Women
General Union of Palestinian Teachers
General Union of Palestinian Students
General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists
General Union of Palestinian Lawyers
General Union of Palestinian Engineers
General Union of Palestinian Artists
General Union of Palestinian Youth
General Union of Palestinian Medical Professionals
The Palestinians living in the diaspora have found
that they have not been accepted in their host countries with
the same rights as the natives of those countries. Palestinians
are treated as foreigners, discriminated against, and must
abide by special laws and restrictions. In the occupied
territories they are prohibited from organizing outside the
Israeli labor institution, the Histadrut. The largest
Palestinian union is the General Union of Palestinian Workers
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(GUPW) . GUPW has thirteen branches in the Arab world as well
as in East Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Australia, and Belgium.
This union works to protect Palestinian workers and to
secure their equal treatment with other workers. GUPW also
has established cooperatives in order to provide basic
commodities to all workers at a moderate cost. GUPW enjoys
observer status in the International Labor Organization.
Another large Palestinian union is the General Union of
Palestinian Women. This union is active wherever Palestinians
live. The union operates women's centers where women are
taught such skills as typing, needlepoint, embroidery, language
proficiency, preventive medicine, hygiene, and nutrition. An
important aspect of the Women's Union is the Children's
Steadfastness House. This is an orphanage in which the
children are organized into "families" of seven or eight led
by a surrogate mother. The Home operates nursery schools and
kindergartens for its two hundred children. Also employed by
the Home is a pediatrician, two psychologists, and two social
workers
.
One other large Palestinian union is the General Union
of Palestinian Teachers. This union was established in 1969
and now has fifteen branches in which it assists the 63,000
Palestinian teachers throughout the world. The goal of the
Union is to secure better educational opportunities for
Palestinian children, to improve the quality of Palestinian
schools, and to combat illiteracy. The union reaches the
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occupied territories and other Palestinians through its radio
broadcast programs. An international exchange program is
available to all Palestinian children everywhere whereby they
may attend summer camp in the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,
or East Germany.
All the other Palestinian unions seek to secure and
maintain the rights of their constituent members. Several
unions participate in international organizations and receive
support from concerned groups and countries throughout the
world. The unions are also represented in the PLO leadership
institutions such as the Central Council and the Executive
Committee. PLO funds are expended in some instances to support
union activities. One of the PLO Cabinet-level Departments is
the Department of Popular Organizations which maintains close
contact with each of the Unions.
This chapter has presented the structural aspects of
the PLO. There is obviously more to the PLO than a military
organization which carries out terrorist and guerrilla activities
against Israel. The PLO is active in internal political
development, establishment and maintenance of Palestinian
culture, and improvement in Palestinian medical and educational
levels. The sum of all of these activities gives one a more
complete understanding of what the PLO is; that it is not just
a lossely organized collection of disgruntled political radicals
but a well -organized group of leaders dedicated to a worthy
cause.
III. LEADERSHIP
Since its inception in 1964 PLO leadership has undergone
relatively few leadership changes. At the top the PLO chair-
manship has been held by only three people. From 1964 to 1967
Ahmed Shukairy was chairman. Yahya Hamouda took over after
Shukakairy's resignation and remained chairman until February
1969 when Yasir Arafat emerged as the new chairman. On the EC
level the leadership has remained fairly constant since 1974.
Eight of 1974*s EC members are still serving on the Committee.
Each of the major fadayeen organizations have also maintained
fairly stable leadership. Fatah has been led by Arafat, Faruq
Qaddumi , Salah Khalef, and Khalil al-Wazir since the group's
creation in 1959. George Habash has led PFLP since 1967 when
it came into being. Nayif Hawatmeh still leads DFLP since he
split with PFLP in 1969. Ahmed Jibril remains the leader of
PFLP-GC after forming the group in 1969. In this section each
of the primary Palestinian leaders will be examined.
A. YASIR ARAFAT
Since his rise to power within Fatah and the PLO Arafat
has been reluctant to reveal much information concerning his
life, especially about his early years. A biography of Arafat
was published in 1976 by Thomas Kiernan which gives a fairly
thorough outline of his life. Through extensive interviews
with Arafat and his friends and relatives Kiernan pieced
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together the life of the PLO's most famous leader. Arafat's
birthplace has been under dispute, some claiming he was born
in Cairo, others say he was born in Gaza, while Arafat himself
claims he was born in Jerusalem. He prefers to claim Jerusalem
so that he can claim a birthright in the heart of Palestine.
Arafat's mother was the daughter of a cousin to Haj Amin al-
49Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The al-Husseinis had
been a traditionally prominent family since the seventeenth
century. Arafat spent his early years in Cairo where he
attended elementary school and apparently received special
religious training, his parents believing he had a rare spiritual
gift. In 1939, at the age of ten, Arafat and his family moved
to Gaza where his father had been assigned by the Muslim Brother-
hood to work for them. Arafat had several contacts with Arab
terrorists and was involved in revolutionary youth groups. In
his late teens Arafat's family moved back to Cairo where Arafat
enrolled in an Egyptian technological high school. In 1951
Arafat entered King Fuad University in Cairo studying civil
engineering. While a student he participated in the Palestinian
32Student Federation which had been active at the university.
Soon he became an officer in the Federation and directed many
of its activities. In 1953 Arafat and other Palestinian students
formed a new group which they called the Palestine Student
53Union. During this time Arafat met two Palestinians about
his age who had come to Cairo to receive guerrilla training,
54Salah Khalef and Khalil al-Wazir. These two were trained by
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the Egyptian army and were commissioned as lieutenants in a
special Gazan brigade. Arafat volunteered for military training
and was selected to receive extra training which led to a
commission. He returned to Cairo in December 1955 with his
commission and set out to help organize a new Palestinian
group, the General Union of Palestinian Students. Arafat
became the President of the Union in 1956 just about the time
of the Suez crisis. Arafat was particularly disillusioned by
Egypt's actions during the war. He saw Egyptian disorganization,
desertion, cowardice, and little positive action.
In 1956 after the Suez war several GUPS students, including
Arafat, Khalef, and al-Wazir, were part of an Egyptian delegation
to an international student conference in Prague. While there
they received word that if they returned to Cairo they would be
immediately arrested. The three managed to go to Stuttgart,
Germany but were unable to obtain much support among Palestinians
there. After only a few months in Stuttgart, Arafat left for
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Kuwait where he worked first for the Department of Water Supply.
Later he opened his own contracting firm, the Free Palestine
Construction Company. Soon another young Palestinian, Faruq
Qaddumi , came to work for him and later his friends, al-Wazir
and Khalef, joined him. Before long about twenty Palestinians
had joined this group and they decided to officially organize
themselves. Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir, Salah Khalef, Khalid
al-Hassan, Faruq Qaddumi, Mohammad Yusef, and Zuhayr al-Alami
5 8formed the inner circle of the new group called Fatah.
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From the beginning Fatah sought to lead through a ruling
committee rather than relying on a single leader. They sought
to avoid any kind of personality cult which often develops
when a single leader emerges. After the 1967 war, when Fatah
became known throughout the world, pressure began to mount for
Fatah to reveal who its supreme leader was. Apparently because
he was absent from a high-level meeting or because of security
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reasons Arafat was declared to be Fatah' s chief. Since that
declaration Arafat has been the leader of Fatah and since 1969
the leader of the PLC He has become exactly what the early
leaders tried to avoid --an almost legendary hero. The whole
world focuses on Arafat and it is Arafat who most Palestinians
accept as their spokesman and leader. Arafat has survived
several challenges to his leadership, the most significant
being in 1978 and 1983. In 1978 the Rejection Front demanded
new PLO leadership claiming that political decisions were being
made individually instead of in a collective manner. Some
elements within Fatah joined the Rejection Front in making these
charges. Arafat regained control by renewing the pledges of
support from Saudi Arabia, East Germany, Syria, Algeria, Libya,
and within Fatah itself. In 1983 a rebellion was sparked
within Fatah. Reportedly 70% of Fatah members supported the
uprising which was caused by Arafat's appointments of officers
to military posts which were seemingly based upon political
considerations. Arafat was also accused of treading a moderate
course when the majority of Palestinians felt a radical path
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was most appropriate. Arafat tried to maintain his leadership
by again appealing for outside support. He traveled to Romania,
Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and India to obtain promises of support.
The rebellion was apparently fueled by Syria who sought to gain
control of the PLO after the fedayeen expulsion from Beirut.
It appears that some aid to the anti-Arafat factions came from
Libya. At this time Arafat still maintains control over Fatah
and the PLO but it is too early to determine how long this
control will survive.
B. GEORGE HABASH
George Habash has been a prominent Palestinian leader for
many years and is known throughout the world as the mastermind
of the airline hijacking tactic. Habash's political ideology
is much more rigid than Arafat's and thus he has attracted a
much smaller, yet politically more loyal organization. His
background is quite different than Arafat's yet both are
Palestinians struggling for the return to their homeland.
Habash was born to Christian parents in 1925 and he grew
up in the Lydda-Ramle area about midway between Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem. His family was well-to-do, his father being an
importer of food products who then sold them to local shopkeepers
Habash was a bright boy and a dynamic student. He and his
family were driven from their home during the 1948 war. This
left a very strong impression with Habash and created within
him an intense feeling of revenge. According to him he had no
other choice than to "become a revolutionary and fight for the
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cause. After the war Habash enrolled in the American
University in Beirut where he studied medicine. He was also
active in a student organization called al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (The
Firm Tie). Al-Urwa had been established in 1918 to be a non-
political student society to promote the literary abilities of
Arab students. In 1950 Habash was elected President of al-Urwa
after serving as a member of the editorial board of the society's
literary journal. Habash used the society to expound his own
ideas and by 1951 all but one or two of the Baathists in al-Urwa
became adherents to Habash' s philosophy. In 1951 Habash
graduated from AUB medical school with distinction. He had
every promise of becoming an excellent physician. Habash and
other leaders organized cells of the group which was named the
f\ 7
Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) , until 1952. At that time
Habash and an associate, Wadi Haddad, went to Amman where they
established a medical clinic to treat Palestinian refugees on
a gratis basis. They also formed a school there for combating
illiteracy. One of the first new recruits to Habash's group
in Amman was a young East Jordanian, Nayif Hawatmeh. In 1956
Habash was jailed in Jordan for a short time but was released
to run with a few comrades for Parliament in the national
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elections. He was unsuccessful in this bid but through the
campaign he was able to introduce the ANM to a wide range of
Palestinians. By 1958 repressive measures taken by the
Jordanian government crushed the organizational work Habash had
accomplished. During the next five years Habash was in Syria.
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Throughout this time period the ANM expanded throughout
the Arab world. Delegations were sent to Lebanon, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Although cells
of the group were so widely dispersed the leadership remained
centralized. In early 1956 a conference was held in Amman
which was attended by eight delegations: four from Lebanon,
two from Jordan (Habash and Haddad) , and one each from Syria
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and Kuwait. At this conference the leadership decided to
create a formal structure. Up to this time the ANM had operated
under the cell system whereby cell members knew only one or two
other members and were unaware of the existence of other cells.
The cell leaders were also organized into similar cells. The
conference established a National Conference as the highest
authority of the ANM. An Executive Committee of this National
Conference was created to manage the daily affairs of the ANM.
At the level of each Arab country a Regional Command was
established to direct ANM activities throughout that country.
Next in hierarchical order came the Shuba, which led the Movement
in a province or town. Next came the Rabita (League) which was
the cell. The cells recruited new members and trained them
before they passed on to higher levels of the Movement. Such
tight control required very few central leaders and those
leaders could maintain close contact with each other to preserve
ideological unity.
In the early 1960's the concept of class struggle entered
to explain the Syrian coup of 1961 which spelled the end of the
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UAR. Two opposing groups had emerged within the ANM: 1) the
majority who favored the already established organization and
ideology and 2) a minority who believed in the principles of
the dialectic. Habash favored the former stance and Hawatmeh
the latter. Habash was jailed in Syria in July 1962 and was
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not released until March 1963. After his release he found
that Hawatmeh' s group had grown in size and influence. Habash
maintained that the ANM represented but one stream flowing into




This ideological infighting continued until the June 1967
war. In December 1967 Habash and his comrades established the
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PFLP. Less than a year later Ahmed Jibril withdrew from PFLP
to establish his own separate group which he called PFLP-General
Command (PFLP-GC) . Disagreement between Habash and Hawatmeh
continued until 1969 when Hawatmeh broke away to form the DFLP.
Since that time Habash has maintained control over the PFLP.
PFLP leadership has been restricted in size and unitary in
ideology. Since 1967 the PFLP has participated with the PLO
74but has been expelled or has withdrawn on several occasions.
Habash has been at the forefront of Palestinian affairs since
the early 1950's and remains at the head of one of the strongest
of the Popular Fronts. Some analysts have remarked that if
Habash' s given name had been Mohammed or Rahman he would have
commanded a much larger following. They maintain that being
labeled as a Christian has cost him considerable support from
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the Muslim community. Religion is not an official part of the
Palestinian struggle but some ingrained traditions are difficult
if not impossible to breach.
C. NAY IF HAWATMEH
Hawatmeh was born northwest of Amman in the es-Salt district.
His family belonged to a small Christian tribe of no political
significance or influence. Hawatmeh's family belonged to a
poorer section of the tribe. His uncle owned a chicken farm
and so could afford to send Hawatmeh and his younger brother
7 5
to elementary school in Amman. It was not until 1966 and
through Hawatmeh's involvement in the ANM that he could attend
college. His education was subsidized by the ANM and he enrolled
in the Beirut Arab University where he majored in philosophy.
In 1953, when Habash and Haddad came to Jordan to recruit
for the ANM, Hawatmeh was one of the first to join the group.
During the 1958 Lebanese civil war Hawatmeh was assigned to
7 f\
al-Mina, near Tripoli, to head the ANM ' s committee there.
Later that year he was posted to Iraq with the charge to unify
all sympathetic groups under the ANM. Hawatmeh became head of
the Iraqi Regional Command but was arrested near the end of
1961 and was held until February 1963. Upon his release he
was deported to Beirut and there he became one of the leaders
of the Marxist-oriented element within the ANM. He led this
faction until he split with Habash's PFLP in 1969. He subscribed
to a strict Marxist-Leninist program which may be the most
sophisticated of any Palestinian resistance group's philosophy.
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Hawatmeh is close to the USSR and has traveled there at the
77Soviet's invitation. Recently, the Soviets have promised
support for Hawatmeh and the DFLP. Hawatmeh was the first
Palestinian leader to advocate the creation of a ministate on
7 8the West Bank and Gaza Strip. His group has been represented
on the EC of the PNC continuously since 1973. The DFLP, under
Hawatmeh's leadership, has participated actively in PNC debates.
During the latest challenge to Arafat's leadership Hawatmeh,
along with Habash, publicly supported Arafat and called upon
Palestinians everywhere to solidify their support for Arafat.
The Palestinian leaders described here do not follow a
particular pattern in family background, educational level,
socio-economic background, or even political philosophy. They
each are, however, captivating personalities. Each is able to
fire up a crowd moving it skillfully from tears to cheers.
They often deliver speeches lasting for hours at a time. A
part of the Arab and Palestinian heritage is allegiance to a
group -- family, clan, or, in this case, Palestinian guerrilla
group. Rallying around such a common ground fits the Arab
personality. The rise to prominence of such leaders as Arafat,
Habash, and Hawatmeh is natural. According to Abu Iyad, a Fatah
leader, George Habash uses his intellectual and oratory skills
to attract and keep his followers. In public Habash is very
dogmatic, intransigent, incredibly violent and mesmorizes
crowds with his fiery speeches. In private, however, he is
soft-spoken and calm, listens with utmost attention and expresses
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reasonable opinions rather than fanatical convictions like
79
other Popular Front leaders. Similar differences between
public and private behavior have been reported among other
Palestinian leaders. The key to future PLO and Palestinian
actions depends on the future leadership. The new leadership
will likely include a better educated, politically more aware




During the Mandate years various groups of Palestinians
were organized with a distinct anti-Zionist and anti-British
ideology. All of these groups, however large or well organized
adopted a basically universal goal of denying the Zionists a
foothold in Palestine. What was glaringly lacking was an
active push for a pro-Palestinian government. A prevalent
attitude harked back to the era of the Crusades. The Crusader
Kingdom, the Palestinian Arabs reasoned, lasted less than one
8hundred years and so would this Zionist phase. This gives
the hint of history being on the side of the Palestinians.
Given sufficient time they would be able to overcome. The rise
of Palestinian political awareness took various forms as
evidenced by the numerous fedayeen groups which arose after the
1948 war. Some Palestinian groups gained power because of a
strict, well-defined ideological platform while others grew
despite an elaborate ideology. This chapter deals with the
various ideological positions of the principle Palestinian
resistance organizations.
A. FATAH
It is generally accepted among Palestinian experts that
Fatah lacks a distinct ideology and has thereby been able to
attract support from the entire spectrum of the Palestinian
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masses. It is true that Fatah's ideological platform is not
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as clearly defined or restrictive as that of the Popular Fronts,
but it is misleading to state that Fatah is a "moderate, non-
ideological movement." Fatah leaders have spent considerable
time developing and defining their ideology. It is true that
Fatah's ideology is more moderate than some of the other group's
but it is not this moderation only that has attracted a large
number of followers. Fatah does not claim to be the leader of
a pan-Arab revolution but Fatah is concerned with the resto-
ration of the Palestinian homeland and the rights of the
Palestinian people. These are issues of vital concern to the
Palestinian refugees. They are generally not primarily
concerned with a Marxist philosophy of the Palestinian people
leading the Middle East class struggle. For most Palestinians
the liberation of their homeland is preeminent. Fatah has
attracted more members than any other group by simplifying its
doctrine to focus on the single most important issue to the
Palestinians then by leading in the active struggle to attain
that goal.
Salah Khalef (Abu Iyad)
,
considered second in Fatah command
to Arafat, has stated very clearly and basically the foundation
of Fatah Ideology:
"Our goal was to become the catalyst of a unitary and
revolutionary Arab force, the spearhead of a wide front
which alone would be capable of restoring Palestinian
rights. Such was and remains our strategy. "82
When the founders of Fatah established their organization
they felt they would not be able to compete ideologically with
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the Baathist, Muslim Brotherhood, or the Communists. They
83felt that action would transcend rhetoric. In 1958 the Fatah
guiding principles were:
1) Revolutionary violence is the only means available
to liberate the homeland.
2) Violence must be exerted by the masses.
3) The object is to liquidate the political, economic,
and military institutions of Zionism.
4) The movement should be free of outside state control.
5) The struggle of necessity will continue over a long
period of time.
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6) The Arab revolution is spearheaded by the Palestinians.
The Baathists, Muslim Brotherhood, and others were active
at this time and maintained that the liberation of Palestine
would be one of the fruits of Arab unity. Fatah reversed this
creed and declared that the liberation of Palestine itself
8 5
would create Arab unity. Of the above six guiding principles
Fatah was unable to abide by two. Fatah and other Palestinian
factions have been unable to successfully organize the
Palestinians living in the occupied territories which has
caused deep consternation to Fatah leaders. In the 1960's
the Fatah leadership found it temporarily expedient to accept
Syrian sponsorship. It was Syrian equipment, funding, and
training which enabled Fatah to emerge as a powerful fedayeen
organization.
In 1965 a Fatah pamphlet, "How an Armed Popular Revolution




1) Establishment of a consolidated leadership -- the
Revolution's pioneers.
2) Winning the people's confidence in the leadership,
clarifying the movement's objectives.
3) Planting trustworthy, indoctrinated members in all
institutions in order to create a hierarchy of
command.
o y
4) Begin the military struggle.
Fatah established a clear, consolidated leadership and
eventually gained a degree of popular support, but the full
organizational process referred to in phases two and three
were largely overlooked. The movement began phase four before
laying the firm foundation they had planned in 1965.
Fatah leaders conferred with other revolutionary leaders
as a part of their own ideological education. Fatah has been
especially attracted by the Algerian FLN and the writings of
go
Franz Fanon. Fatah leaders have also conferred with Che
89 90Guevara, Mao, Giap, and Castro. While meeting with General
Giap in North Vietnam in 1970 Arafat was lectured on the nec-
essity of sometimes accepting concessions such as the division
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of their claimed territory. It was this type of thinking
which led to the acceptance of a ministate concept regarding
the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an interim step toward the
total liberation of the Palestinian homeland.
Prior to the June 1967 war Fatah policy was to precipitate
an Arab-Israeli war. The ensuing conflict would undoubtedly
result in the Arab redemption of Palestine. The Palestinians
would victoriously return to their homes and set up their own
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government. Arafat likes to claim that his fedayeen did cause
the 1967 war. The result of that war, of course, was just the
opposite of what he had expected. Instead of total liberation,
thousands of more Palestinians became refugees and major
portions of Palestinian territory came under Israeli suzerainty.
This terrible defeat jolted the Fatah leadership out of their
dependence on the Arab states. Fatah decided they needed to
undertake the struggle themselves. They sought to take control
of the PLO, whose image had also been tarnished in the 1967
defeat, and to unify all the fedayeen groups to continue a
solitary fight against Zionist imperialism.
Fatah has sought to unify all the Palestinian resistance
groups within the framework of the PLO. This policy did not
include the use of international terrorism which had been
popularized by the Popular Fronts. In the late 1960's Arafat
repeatedly denounced the use of international terror by
Palestinian groups. Abu Iyad in 1971 distinguished between
92terrorism and revolutionary violence. Terrorism, he explained,
is an individual act performed outside the context of an
organization and without strategic vision. Revolutionary
violence, on the other hand, is part of a large, structured
movement and constitutes a political act. Iyad was emphatic
in his resolute opposition to political assassinations. Despite
eschewing the use of international terrorism a splinter group
of Fatah, the Black September Organization (BSO) , emerged in
931971. This organization was deeply involved in international
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terrorism. Its most famous act being the 1972 Munich Olympic
massacre. The activities of BSO brought immediate and intense
worldwide recognition of the Palestinian cause. BSO was linked
to Fatah and the leaders seemed willing to accept the recog-
nition and some even claimed that BSO was actually the Fatah
94intelligence branch. In this case Fatah's official policy
was to reject international terrorism as a tactic but to accept
the publicity that accompanied BSO activities. This points
out again the pragmatic, moderate policy of Fatah.
Fatah's policy toward the liberation of Palestine became
the official PLO policy at the fifth PNC session in 1969. This
plan was to work for the creation of a democratic state where
Jews and Arabs would live together harmoniously as equal
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citizens. Originally the goal was to establish a Palestinian
state on all of Palestinian territory. Thus the 1947 UN
Partition plan was not acceptable since it would allot a portion
of Palestine to the Arabs and a portion to the Jews. Fatah's
ideology called for acceptance of only a democratic state
comprising all the Palestinian homeland. Within this territory
Jews and Arabs would be allowed to live together under a
democratic government. Another aspect of this question was
the strict refusal to recognize Israel or to negotiate with
her leaders. Fatah's position has also softened on these points,
Fatah has accepted the concept of setting up a Palestinian
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state on a portion of Palestinian territory. This mmistate,
of course, would merely be a temporary reality. Eventually a
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democratic state of Palestine would be established over all of
Palestine. Thus the strategy remains the same, the moderation
coming only in the tactics to achieve it. Fatah ideology has
shifted somewhat concerning recognition of Israel. Issam
Sartawi, formerly a leading Fatah right-wing spokesman, was
commissioned to meet with and hold meetings with moderate
Israelis. He held several such meetings but was assassinated
by an outcast Fatah organization, Black June, for such behavior.
Since Fatah is the PLO's largest and most influential group,
Fatah is ideologically dominant in official PLO ideology.
Within Fatah there are at least three major categories:
1) Right-wing - which Sartawi was associated with, 2) Left-wing -
97led by Abu Iyad, and 3) Moderate - led by Arafat. Since Fatah'
s
ideology and policy frequently represents a compromise hammered
out by Arafat, it appears that Fatah is taking a moderate stand
on most issues. It is precisely on this point that opposition
has arisen against Arafat both within Fatah and among the other
fedayeen groups. At least four major challenges to Arafat's
leadership have taken place. First, in 1971, he was accused
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of creating a cult of personality. Fatah Left-wing leaders
spearheaded the opposition. Second, after the October 1973
war, Abu Nidal separated himself from Fatah and was supported
by Iraq. In 1974 Abu Nidal mounted a coup attempt to oust
99Arafat but he was unsuccessful. Third, in 1978, the Rejection
Front organizations unitedly opposed Arafat for taking
individual rather than collective political decisions.
76
Arafat again managed to maintain control. Fourth, in the
spring of 1983 Arafat made two military appointments based on
what appeared to be political rather than military bases.
The ensuing uprising within Fatah seemed to be sponsored by
Syria. Arafat was able to keep control of Fatah although many
analysts felt that he would need to take a more Left-leaning
ideological stand to maintain his strong leadership position.
B. POPULAR FRONTS
If Fatah is characterized by having a moderate and ill-
defined ideological construct the Popular Fronts generally
espouse a narrow, Marxist doctrine. The three principle
factions of the Popular Fronts are the PFLP led by George
Habash, the DFLP led by Nayif Hawatmeh, and the PFLP-GC led by
Ahmed Jibril. Habash' s PFLP was organized in 1967 from the
ANM. Jibril and Hawatmeh became members of the PFLP but soon
after split to form their own groups. These three groups are
currently represented in the PNC and on the EC.
1. PFLP
The PFLP views Palestinian history since the Mandate
in Marxist, dialectic terms. Habash viewed the British rule
102 . -
as imperialist oppression. The prominent Palestinian
families (al-Husseini and Nashashibi) were considered aristo-
cratic. There was a great divergence between these families
and the Arab governments and the Palestinian masses. Over the
years a new entity emerged in the Arab world: a working class
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party. PFLP theorist al-Hakim Darwara explained that
"nationalism is the mental and emotional condition through
which the nation realizes its collective unitary existence.
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From this evolves the collective will of the people. At
this early stage the ANM stressed Arab unity and the leaders
supported the UAR and Hashemite Federation in 1958 plus any
other hint of Arab unity. Union was considered the magic cure
for all Arab maladies.
In the early 1960 's ANM theorists introduced the concept
of class struggle. With this the ideology shifted away from
Arab unity and toward a marxist program. The other primary
PFLP theorist, Mushin Ibrahim, in analyzing ANM history since
World War II claimed that the Arab bourgeoisie had failed to
bring about Arab unity and that the leadership had passed into
the hands of the Arab middle class. This drift to the left
conflicted with Habash and his comrades' emphasis on Arab unity.
The ensuing internal dispute sowed the seeds for the eventual
split between Habash's PFLP, Jibril's PFLP-GC, and Hawatmeh's
DFLP.
In 1967 the overriding objectives of Habash' s PFLP were:
1) to dramatize internationally the plight of the Palestinians,
2) to force the world to return the Palestinians to their
homeland, 3) to show the other Palestinian resistance groups
that desperate measures would work, and 4) to make it clear
to the Arab states that the PFLP would not have any part of a
peaceful settlement with Israel that did not return the
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Palestinian homeland. Just one year later, on 23 July 1968,
three PFLP members hijacked an El Al airliner to Algiers while
107
it was enroute from Rome to Israel. This marked the
beginning of a series of hijackings. PFLP strategy called for
other unique tactics such as bombings and kidnappings of
targets in Israel as well as outside the Middle East. PFLP
philosophy dictated that these dramatic attacks were more
psychologically damaging than military forays. Because there
are so many Jews in Europe and because the European states
support the Zionists, the Europeans are also legitimate targets
for the PFLP. According to Habash burning a store in London
10 8
was worth more than burning two kibbutzim in Israel. These
PFLP tactics, including airline hijackings, brought the
Palestinian cause wide public exposure. The publicity, however,
did not lead to the recovery of the Palestinian homeland as
they had hoped the world public opinion would. These tactics
had succeeded in publicizing the plight of the Palestinians
but at the same time had failed to gain sympathy for the
Palestinian cause. By 1973 Habash decided the PFLP should
109
stop the airline hijackings and turn toward Moscow for support.
PFLP strategy called for attacks on Israel, international
Zionism, and international imperialism. Included in the
international imperialism category were the US and the Arab
reactionary governments. During the 1970 Black September
conflict in Jordan Habash was in North Korea studying Kim li-
sting's "Revolutionary Strategy Against American Imperialism.
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Habash also viewed the Middle East conflict in class struggle
terms thus seeing the Arab capitalists collaborating with the
11 2international capitalists. This made them enemies of the
Palestinians and the target of PFLP tactics. Habash claimed
that this group could attack one of these Arab countries to
gain the respect of the other states and to prevent an Arab
movement from concluding a peace agreement without the PFLP.
Habash stated: "We are the joker in the deck. Without our
consent the other Arabs can do nothing, and we will never
agree to a peaceful settlement. If the Arab countries think
they can gang up and make peace over our heads they are
mistaken. All we have to do is assert our power in one
country and the rest will lose their resolve and start
backsliding." 113
This basic philosophy has not changed over the years.
In the wake of the 1982 expulsion of the PLO forces from Beirut
PFLP continued to call for establishing a Palestinian state on
"a part of the national Palestinian soil without limitations
or conditions." An integral part of this strategy is to
struggle against the Camp David plan for autonomous Palestinian
rule. The method for carrying out this policy is to continue
the armed struggle. In connection with this strategy the PFLP
called for close ties with Syria "at the highest levels" and
to maintain and strengthen the alliance between the PLO, Syria,
and the Lebanese Nationalist Movement.
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2. DFLP
Nayif Hawatmeh views the Middle East in stricter
Marxist terms than Habash. Hawatmeh even accuses Habash's
PFLP as being dominated by the bourgeoisie. Hawatmeh con-
siders the class struggle to exist throughout the Arab world
and not only among the Palestinians. The leadership of the
DFLP represents then the workers, peasants, and poor refugees.
The DFLP considers all members to be both political and
117
military activists. The members study the writings of Marx,
Engels, Lenin, Mao, Giap, and Guevara as indoctrination to
Marxist philosophy. They criticize other Palestinian groups
on several fronts: 1) those groups fail to base their activ-
ities and support on the Arab masses, 2) they are controlled
too much by the Arab countries, 3) their leadership has evolved
into a bourgeoisie class, and 4) they have resorted to unac-
118
ceptable tactics such as airline hijackings. In 1973,
Hawatmeh was the first Palestinian resistance leader to
seriously consider the creation of a Palestinian state on the
119West Bank and Gaza Strip as an interim goal. Since 1973
this has become the current official PLO strategy.
Hawatmeh' s current strategy includes armed struggle
12but only within the occupied territories. He also stresses
Arab unity and cooperation in thwarting what he considers the
121US-Zionist imperialist strategy. Hawatmeh also has urged
Palestinians to seek direct contacts with progressive Israelis,
122
an undertaking which right-wing Fatah leaders have also sought.
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The DFLP advocates the mutual recognition of Israeli and
123Palestinian peoples by one another. All of these philosophies
coincide with Fatah and Hawatmeh admits that his views and
Arafat's are very similar.
3. PFLP-GC
Ahmed Jibril split with Habash in late 1967 to lead his
own group which he called the PFLP-General Command. Jibril has
maintained an independent stance regarding cooperation with
other Palestinian groups. Nevertheless, the PFLP-GC has been
represented continuously since 1974 on the EC. The PFLP-GC
stresses terrorist tactics and has used hijackings, bombings,
kidnappings, assassinations, and guerrilla attacks to fight
against the Israelis. Jibril has not been a scrupulous
political ideologue but has developed an intense military
124training program in which he personally acts as an instructor.
Jibril does not often give speeches or public statements and
his group acts independently from the other Palestinian groups.
In 1972 and again in 1981 the PFLP-GC ignored ceasefire agree-
12 5
ments and continues to fight. Jibril is supported by Syria
1 9 f\
and falls at least nominally under Syrian control.
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V. MILITARY STRATEGY
In considering the PLO's military capabilities and its
strategy several points need to be stressed. First, an under-
standing of PLO military formal organization forms the
foundation upon which the military establishment is built.
Second, the methods of recruitment and the training of
Palestinian fighters acquaint one with the PLO military capa-
bilities -- both conventional and guerrilla. Third, a dis-
cussion of PLO military doctrine points out the external
sources of Palestinian strategy and tactics. Last, a brief
list of types of PLO weapons and major suppliers also gives
an indication of where PLO political support lies.
A. ORGANIZATION
The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was established in
1965 about one year after the PLO. As with the PLO Egypt
played the major role in the PLA's creation. It is generally
considered that Nasser felt, as leader of the pan-Arab movement,
he was threatened by the rise of Palestinian consciousness.
He therefore agreed to help create and thereafter control the
PLO as well as the PLA. In the words of Abu Iyad, "It (the
PLA) was not designed to fight Israel -- which all the Arab
regimes wanted to avoid at all costs -- but rather to sidetrack
the Palestinians, to keep them from waging an autonomous
127
struggle." The PLA was initially trained and stationed as
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a small militia in Gaza. The early organization and training
-too
followed the pattern set by the Algerian FLN.
The PLA grew until the 1967 war when its strength was
129
about 8-10,000. Since the PLA had been established under
Egyptian and other Arab state guidance the PLA officers and
men were trained by the militaries of these Arab states. As
a result the PLA developed as a conventional force trained to
130fight large-scale, mechanized operations. ~ Because of this
training the PLA leaders disapproved of the various guerrilla
tactics employed by the emerging Palestinian resistance groups.
As the PLA grew it also began to form an opposition to the PLO.
The PLA sought to take control of the PLO in the early years
(1965-1968) and then tried to dilute the influence of the
commando groups in 1968. The PLA boycotted the fifth PNC
session at which Arafat and Fatah took over leadership of the
132PLO. With the change of command in the PLO to the guerrilla
organizations came a decline in PLA influence. The PLO
emphasized military activity on a guerrilla level. The PLA
forces in Syria generally came to be controlled by the Syrian
.,. + 133military
.
The PLA saw action in the 1967 war but its forces were
134quickly overrun. After this poor showing in the war the
135PLA fell to pieces. PLA forces in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq
were split up and were formed into a "new" PLA made up of
three brigades: 1) the 'Ain Jalut Brigade in Egypt, 2) the
Hittin Brigade in Syria, and 3) the al-Qadisiyah Brigade in
84
Iraq. The Hittin and al -Qadisiyah Brigades attached themselves
to the Syrian-sponsored Saiqa and Iraqi- sponsored ALF
-I 7 fL
respectively. A fourth Brigade, the Yarmouk, was later
created from elements of the Hittin and al-Qadisiyah forces
and deserters from the Jordanian army. During the 1973 war
the PLA made a better showing compared to the 1967 experience.
A number of PLA units were helicoptered behind Israeli lines
in the first day of action. They were successful in seizing
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a section of the Golan area. * Several attempts have been
made to draw the PLA into the PLO military organization and
thereby to control the PLA. For example, in 1970 Arafat was
13 8proclaimed supreme commander of the PLA. These efforts were
opposed by PLA commanders and the PLA has maintained an inde-
pendent force under supervision of the EC. After six years of
preparation Fatah launched its first military operation on
18 August 1964 when a fedayeen patrol on a reconnaisance
mission to Gesher (a kibbutz in the Jordan Valley) met Israeli
1 39
soldiers and clashed with them. Fatah's military arm is
called al-Asifa (the Storm) and in the beginning it was not
explicitly stated that al-Asifa was a part of Fatah. Originally
al-Asifa was backed, financed, and trained by Syria. At the
time of the 1967 was al-Asifa consisted of a force of about
141500 men. Four events are considered by Fatah to most critical
in its development and in the solid establishment of its military
arm: 1) November 1966 - Israel attacked the West Bank village
of Samu. This attack promoted the Jordanian government to
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allow the fedayeen to arm themselves, 2) 1967 War - This war
proved the ineffectiveness of the conventional Arab armies
and led to an increase in Fatah membership, 3) 20 August 1967 -
The Fatah leadership decided to resume large-scale guerrilla
operations in the occupied territories despite the June 1976
war disaster, 4) 21 March 1968 - The battle of Karameh. This
was possibly the most important date in the history of the
142Palestinian struggle. The Israelis decided to attack the
Palestinian training center in Karameh but were met by a strong
resistance composed of about 300 Palestinian fighters who were
supported by the Jordanian army. During the battle the
Israelis were forced to retreat. Although the Palestinians
suffered greater numerical losses than the Israelis, compared
to the devastating Israeli offensive just nine months earlier
the Battle of Karameh was hailed as a Palestinian victory. In
the eyes of the Palestinians and some Arabs the small Palestinian
forces were able to defeat the Israelis whereas the united Arab
armies had been so humiliated in June 1967. The Karameh
"victory" greatly facilitated Fatah recruitment and led to the
decision to increase the number of guerrilla raids.
Fatah has organized its military forces with the Military
Command at the head. The Military Command makes basic Fatah
military strategy and issues a Plan of Action covering three
144
months and sends the Plan to each of the Sector Commanders.
This Plan of Action may be specific but more likely it consists
of a vague statement such as, "It's time we did simething."
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The Sector Commanders elaborate on the Plan, determine the
immediate objectives, establish the timing, and then send the
Plan to their subordinate Group Commanders. The Group
Commanders then have considerable latitude in carrying out
this detailed plan. In establishing its general military
program Fatah uses information about the enemy which it
obtains through its intelligence unit, Jihaz al-Rasd (or Rasd)
.
The Popular Fronts have concerned themselves more in
terrorist tactics than in guerrilla raids or conventional
warfare. The Popular Fronts also have fewer total members
and thus comprise only a relatively small percentage of all
Palestinian fighters. The PFLP has favored the creation of
small, mobile units which could operate away from Israeli
146
strongholds. To make the best use of all manpower resources
and for purposes of unity of effort and coordination, the PLO
in 1969 began to organize all fedayeen groups into a single
fighting force. Meanwhile the two Arab sponsored Palestinian
groups, Saiqa and ALF, were strengthened in 1967-68 by the
147
addition of PLA forces to their ranks. These two groups
eventually became integrated into the military structures of
their respective Arab sponsor countries.
Arafat became head of the PLO in February 1969 and just
two months later the PLO under direction of Fatah established
148
the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) . Eight
Palestinian groups joined the PASC and agreed that the PASC
149
would be their military coordinator. The PASC was also
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designed to dictate military strategy and to control PLO propa-
150ganda. Although its charter called for the PASC to unite
the various fedayeen groups it turned out to become nothing
more than an office through which the groups issued their
communiques taking credit for their separate guerrilla attacks.
In 1970 a Unified Military Command was formed to replace the
PASC. Members of this Command included Fatah, PFLP, DPFLP,
PLA, AOLP, ALF, Saiqa, APO, FPPS, and AMLP. 152 Subordinate
to the Unified Command were the Commando-Lebanese Committee
153
and the Commando- Jordanian Committee. In September 1970
the civil war in Jordan and near-liquidation of the Palestinian
guerrillas brought a reorganization of PLO forces. Arafat was
appointed "General Commander of all the Armed Forces of the
1 54Revolution.
"
At the March 1971 PNC session the Palestinian Military
Command was designated to lead a united Palestinian struggle.
The Palestinian fighters were divided into three types of
forces: 1) Regular, 2) Fedayeen, and 3) Popular Militia.
Later that year at the ninth PNC session Arafat was designated
as Commander-in Chief of the PLA, PLO, Fatah, and the
Revolution. From this basic structure evolved the PLO military
organizations which are still in existance today. The PLO
convenes a Supreme Military Committee comprised of military
commanders of the guerrilla groups and PLA. This Committee
meets periodically to discuss strategy but leaves much of the
overall direction of the military to the Higher Military
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Committee. The Higher Military Committee plans and coordinates
strategy and tactics. It is also involved in arms procurement
and foreign military training. The committee in 1982 sent a
155delegation to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
The lowest level of PLO military command is the Military
Council. Arafat usually chairs the meetings of the Military
Council which convenes about once a month. This Committee
controls and directs the daily affairs of the unified PLO
forces. At a level above the PLO is a Joint Command which
consists of the Secretaries General of the Palestinian re-
volutionary groups, the Lebanese Nationalist Movement, and
several PLO EC members. The Joint Command coordinates the
activities of the PLO forces in concert with the forces of
the Lebanese Nationalist Movement and the Syrian armed forces.
This close coordination was active during the 1982 Israeli
invasion of southern Lebanon as evidenced by Brigadeer General
Tahir al-Khadra, PLA Chief of Staff: "There is complete
military coordination among the Palestinian revolution groups,
Lebanese Nationalist Movement, and the Syrian forces in
t u -.157Lebanon .
"
B. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING
In the early years of Fatah and the Popular Fronts re-
cruitment became linked to the success or publicity of each
groups' guerrilla efforts. Many of the commando group leaders
traveled through the refugee camps, the confrontation states,
89
and elsewhere in the Arab world to recruit dedicated
Palestinians. The early military "successes" such as Karameh
prompted many young Palestinians to volunteer. These vol-
unteers were then trained in military skills and political
philosophy to keep them active in the struggle. Another
incentive to join the fedayeen and to stay was the monetary
benefits associated with fedayeen activity. In 1972 Fatah
paid its members £15-50 per month depending on the number of
158dependents. This amount was considered to be substantial
wages in the Arab world. The Popular Fronts paid <£8-15 per
month which comparable to the wages of a Beirut office boy.
The PLA paid about the same as most of the Arab armies and
the Syrian-sponsored Saiqa was reported to pay its guerrilla
better than any other group.
After establishing a cadre of dedicated members the com-
mando groups established a training program to teach the young
Palestinian boys and to encourage them to follow their fathers,
uncles, and brothers in joining the struggle. Fatah began a
training program in 1968 called the Ashbals (Lion Cubs).
159Within a year the PFLP had set up a parallel organization.
Training for the boys began at age eight and included military
training and political indoctrination. The Ashbals are
taught to fire a variety of automatic weapons, to compete in
various sports such as volleyball, soccer, judo, and boxing.
In September 1969 the PFLP had 2,000 boys in the Ashbal
1 f\ ?
training program. The PFLP used some of their Ashbal in
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the 1969 bombings of the Israeli embassy in Bonn and the
Hague. However, to point out the varied goals of the
Ashbal, one Ashbal leader said, "We are not just a paramilitary
organization. This is a morale-building and educational move-
ment to prepare the well-rounded citizen of Palestine --
equipped and trained to defend his nation but also to be a
164good, productive citizen." Abu Yusef, a Palestinian leader,
stated in 1973, "We know that our generation will never reach
the sea (the Palestinian coast). We sow the seeds, but others
will reap the harvest. We shall likely be killed, for we face
a ferocious enemy, but young Palestinians will take our place.
They are the future; we belong to the past. The Israelis will
soon realize the true value of these young men."
Early Fatah training consisted of only ten days' instruction
in weapons handling and sabotage techniques. The training
was physical and very rough. Desertion rates were high. The
instructors were mostly officers and NCO's from Arab armies
who had been seconded to Fatah to train the Palestinians. By
1969 the severe physical punishment techniques had been dis-
1 f\ 7
carded and many instructors now were Chinese. Political
education also increased to ten hours of instruction per week.
Every camp had a library on revolutionary theory and guerrilla
warfare. By 1970 several months of infantry and commando
169training was added to the basic military training. After
this training those recruits who showed the most promise were
sent to officer's school or specialists school in Egypt,
Algeria, Syria, Libya, Iraq, China, Vietnam, or Cuba.
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PFLP training had a slightly different goal. The PFLP
training program was intense and included endurance marches
on which the members were required to find whatever food they
170
could, often subsisting on cockroaches and snakes. The
courses lasted 18 to 20 weeks and were taught in Jordan and
later in Lebanon. Political education was based on the
171
writings and careers of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.
The training program was geared to establish a cadre of
leaders who could supervise PFLP fedayeen bases, form cells
and give the cells a specific purpose, and plan and execute
172
sabotage activity.
As the Palestinian resistance movement gained worldwide
recognition it began to associate itself with other states in
terms of sending Palestinians for military training as well
as in training foreign nationals in guerrilla tactics. In
1978 Cuba and the PLO signed an agreement calling for Cuban
173training of PLO guerrillas. The PLO set up a training
camp on the Egyptian-Libyan border in 1980 to teach anti-
Qaddafi units to carry out military activity inside Libya or
174
against Libyan interests abroad. This camp was set up and
operated in cooperation with Egyptian intelligence personnel.
In August 1980 a Palestinian military delegation left for
Nicaragua to supervise the training of Palestinian forces
175there. These forces were being taught techniques using
"Eastern bloc weapons and equipment." Also in 1980 Fatah
leader Abu Iyad was reportedly secretly financing Kurdish
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guerrilla operations in Iraq. The strong link between the
PLO and the Soviet Union was emphasized in 1981 by Brigadier
Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaier, head of the PLO Moscow office. He
reported, "Scores and hundreds of Palestinian officers eligible
to command major sectors, such as brigades, had graduated from
177Soviet military academies." He went on to claim that 2,000
Palestinians were currently studying in Soviet schools and that
300 scholarships to Soviet schools per year are reserved for
the PLO. Other such training arrangements have been made with
178 179
El Salvador and North Korea. The PLO has also trained
foreigners in terrorist training camps in Lebanon. In 1981 it
was reported that 1,700 terrorists from South America, Germany,
180
Italy, Japan, and Angola received training.
The PLO in 1980 decided to implement obligatory military
181
service for all Palestinians. This was part of a general
18 2
mobilization order issued that year. The mobilization
order covered all males in the 16 to 49 age range. It covered
a time period of 1 May 1980 to 30 June 1981. It also applied
to the Palestinian factions. The men were to report to various
PLA centers throughout Lebanon. The only exemptions were:
1) the only son of a family, 2) the medically unfit and per-
manently handicapped, 3) those under 16 or over 49 years of
age, 4) preparatory, secondary, and university students, and
5) doctors, nurses, pharmicists, and bakery workers. This
mobilization order apparently led to the return of Palestinians
18 3from East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union. According
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to PLO military operations branch chief, Abu Walid, the mobil-
1 84ization would bring Palestinian forces up to 40,000.
Also during this mobilization period the PLO carried out
a series of military exercises. The exercise in December 1980
was intended to practice protective measures to take in case
18 5
of an Israeli chemical attack. In October 1981 a brigade
level tactical exercise "The Road of Return" was conducted
using medium and heavy weapons including tanks. Also in
October 1981 the PLO held a wide-scale anti-aircraft exercise
18 7
using their most modern equipment. On New year's day 1982
the PLO held a large military parade in Beirut to help keep
18 8
the Palestinian morale high. The parade included such mil-
itary equipment as missiles, heavy artillery, modern tanks,
and a US-built howitzer. The mobilization order, obligatory
military service, military exercises, military parades, and
basic and advanced military training all point out how sophis-
ticated the PLO military establishment has become.
C. DOCTRINE
The military doctrine of Fatah has been spelled out by the
group's leader. "We carry out two kinds of actions," Arafat
said, "commando and guerrilla. The commandos infiltrate,
perform their mission and then return to their bases. The
guerrillas remain in their zone, move about, disguise themselves
1 89
and attack..." Fatah began their guerrilla attacks on
Israeli units and positions and has continued this activity
94
since 1965. In fact it was these guerrilla raids and the
losses the Israelis suffered that led to the Israeli plan to
execute the 1978 and 1982 invasions of southern Lebanon. The
PFLP on the other hand has used international terror tactics
such as airline hijackings, parcel, book, and letter bombs
coupled with guerrilla raids. George Habash explained PFLP
strategy, "The way to destroy the enemy is to give a little
blow here, a little blow there; to advance step by step, inch
by inch, for years, decades, with the determination, doggedness
190
and patience, and we will continue our present strategy."
On the battlefield the Israelis report that the Palestinians
191
used Soviet tactics. Under this doctrine two squads deploy
for the attack with the soldiers firing as they advance. A
third sqaud runs in a column in the rear to complete the
maneuver
.
In the pre-1967 war era the Palestinian strategy was to
spark a major Arab-Israeli war which they were certain the
Arabs would win. When the Arabs were miserably defeated in
1967 the Palestinians had to switch their strategy. They
began to engage in international terrorist acts intended to
rivet world attention on the injustice to the Palestinian
people. Even Fatah seemingly favored this strategy by en-
couraging if not assisting the Black September Organization.
Also, very early the fedayeen groups found it necessary to
align themselves closely with an Arab state such as Syria,
Egypt* or Jordan. After it became apparent that the Arab
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states were not totally committed to their work in assisting
the wronged Palestinians and that the Arab states were in-
capable of defeating the Israeli military, the Palestinians
decided they must operate independently. The current Pale-
stinian policy is that they will accept any part of the
Palestinian territory to set up a Palestinian state, but only
as an interim step. This ministate would preferably be
established on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But the Pale-
stinian dream of total recovery of all Palestinian territory
remains alive even if the hope of rapid recovery remains
buried.
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VI. OPERATIONAL CODE OF THE PLO
The "Black Box" of international politics is a conglomerate
of individual political leaders. How that Black Box operates,
what roles it plays, and how it makes decisions have been the
subject of many political scientist's debates. The study of
the elites which make up that "Black Box" has received con-
siderable attention and has undergone numerous types of testing.
The purpose has been to define the personal political beliefs
of these elites in an effort to better understand and predict
their future political behavior.
Such political leaders as Napolean, Churchill, Gandhi,
Hitler, Ataturk, Stalin, and FDR were men who made a profound
difference in their own country and throughout the world. Were
they able to accomplish this because of their unique personal
characteristics? Did they possess certain traits that allowed
them to gain such power? Did they simply occupy a position of
power when history dictated that significant events would
transpire? Did it matter that those specific persons were the
ones in power or was it the position they held that was the
primary source of power? What role does the individual political
leader play? How significant are his ideas, ambitions, and
actions? Some scholars discount the entire notion of the
power of an individual leader. They view international
relations from the macro-level. Each state in the international
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system consists of a "Black Box" and individual political
leaders within that Black Box do not significantly contribute
to political policy-making. It is the type of Black Box that
makes the difference. On the other hand, other scholars
maintain that the leader is constrained by organizational
factors. Bureaucracies block the way of individuals and
eliminate significant input by specific persons. The bureau-
cracy takes control and blunts any individual inputs. Still
others contend that the great accomplishments of Hitler or
Gandhi or Ataturk took place because "the time was right."
The situation was ripe for a change to occur. A gentle nudge
from any political leader would set a similar chain of events
in motion. Many scholars consider the individual leader as
being an important factor in this political decision-making
system. The literature surrounding personality and politics
is extensive but far from conclusive. This study will focus
on individuals and their contribution to political policy-
making
.
It is apparent that political action rests upon three
factors: the personal political beliefs of the decision-maker,
the external situation or environment, and the organizational
bureaucracy within which the leader operates. Each of these
factors play a role and the outcome of their interaction
results in the political behavior of the group. Fred Greenstein
had two of these factors in mind when he stated:
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"behavior ... is a function of both the environment
situations in which actors find themselves and the psycho -
logical predispositions they bring to these situations ... It
is also sometimes instructive to think of attitude and
situation as being in a kind of push-pull relations?iip
:
The stronger the attitudinal press for a course of action,
the less the need for situational stimuli, and vice
versa. "192
Graham Allison's well-known analysis of decision-making
theory helps to lay a foundation for understanding. He postu-
lates three models: First, the Rational Actor Model. This
defines decision-makers as individuals and recognizes that they
indeed make policy. They consciously analyze the problem, list
possible courses of action, then select the best course of
action. All this assumes that the decision-maker thinks and
acts rationally. Allison's second model is the Organizational
Model. Allison assumes that groups, agencies, departments,
and offices in the governing structure have established
standard operating procedures, traditions, or rules for dealing
with decision-making. When a decision must be made this
organizational machinery is set in motion to pound out the
approved solution. After the prescribed set of procedures is
followed the decision is churned out. This model assumes a
systems approach: input, output, throughout. The last of
Allison's models is the Bureaucratic Politics Model. Under
this model a decision is reached after considerable bureau-
cratic squabbling, compromise, and in-fighting. Each bureau-
cratic office concerned has its own vested interest in a
solution which is favorable to that office. Thus, the various
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bureaucracies meet and settle on a compromise option which
invariably is less satisfactory to all offices than any one
of their own proposals.
In considering the individual decision-maker and his
impact on policy decision-making many analytical tools have
been devised to determine the role and influence of the
individual. One such method of research is the Operational
Code. The Operational Code framework for analysis attempts to
isolate a subject's salient beliefs and to define them. To
accomplish this a series of research questions are posed, the
answer to which constitutes the subject's operational code.
The questions are categorized as focusing on philosophical
beliefs and instrumental beliefs. Upon assessing the answers
to these questions the researcher can accurately define the
subject's political belief system. The researcher can then
attempt to draw a casual relationship between the subject's
political beliefs and his political behavior. The set of
political beliefs defined by the categories of philosophical
beliefs and instrumental beliefs serves to define the actor's
belief system as this term is defined by Philip E. Converse.
Converse sees a belief system as:
"A configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the
elements are bound together by some form of constraint or
functional interdependence. The individual beliefs in an
operational code have this kind of internal consistency
or interconnectedness for the actor, though not necessarily
a logical consistence . "193
Thus, when the Operational Code defines the political
belief system of a political actor the researcher has achieved
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one of the three milestones for understanding the policy-
making process: political beliefs, situational/environmental
stress, and organizational/bureaucratic structure. Once the
researcher fully and analytically defines what the actor's




Earlier chapters of this thesis have described and defined
the organizational structure of the PLO to show what constraints
that organization may present to the PLO's political decision-
making. The factor of environment can also be considered from
the historical sections in the introduction as well as from the
development of the ideology and strategy of the various
Palestinian Resistance Groups. The Operational Code, linked
with the preceding chapters of this thesis, helps to establish
specifically how the PLO is organized, who the PLO leaders are,
what their ideological positions are, what the basic PLO
strategies are, and what the PLO belief systems are. Armed
with this information the researcher is better able to under-
stand what the PLO is, why it has historically acted the way
that it has, and predict how it may act in the future.
In this Operational Code chapter only the PLO as an inde-
pendent entity has been considered. None of the individual
resistance groups was analyzed. In the previous chapters
these major groups were described in terms of their organization,
leadership, ideology, and strategy. The serious researcher can
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infer from the information contained in these chapters the
basic beliefs of each group is. This chapter deals with the
PLO itself to show how the divergent beliefs or the resistance
merge to form the Operational Code of the PLO. To establish
the PLO's Operational Code the Political Statements from the
last three Palestine National Council Sessions were analyzed.
These three were selected because of the shift in PLO political
position after the signing of the Camp David accords. These
three Sessions constitute all of the meetings of the PNC since
that historic event. A qualitative content analysis of the
three political statements was undertaken to define the most
current Operational Code of the PLO. The results of that
research follows.
A. PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS
la. What is the "essential" nature of political life?
-- Is the political universe basically conflictual
or harmonious?
-- What are the sources of conflict?
-- What are the conditions of peace?
-- What is the nature of conflict?
-- What is the scope of the conflict?
-- What is the role of conflict?
The PLO sees political life as being basically con-
flictual in nature. The cause of this conflict is the
oppression of peoples by outside forces. The PLO blames
imperialism for the oppression of Palestinians as well as of
other peoples throughout the world. According to the PLO many
people are not allowed to enjoy freedom in their political lives
because of the presence of imperialistic forces. Since the
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Zionists began to settle in Palestine in the late 19th Century
there has been oppression of the Palestinian Arabs to one
degree or another. The various Arab revolts and riots in the
1920's and 1930's were manifestations of the reaction to this
oppression by the British and Zionists. The 1948 declaration
of the State of Israel marked the dispersion of thousands of
Palestinians from their homes and the beginnings of the Arabs'
struggle to return to their homes. The neighboring Arab states
of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt all endured colonial
rule. The experiences of the Palestinian people and the other
local Arab states with colonial and imperialist powers served
to program the PLCs mind. Since 1948 the Palestinians have
sought to overcome the domination of outside powers and to
establish their own political control over their homeland.
In the case of the Palestinians the conflict deals with
imperialism and an illegal usurpation of their homeland. This,
however, is but one symptom of a worldwide problem. Throughout
the world imperialist powers seek to dominate local peoples
and prevent them from achieving political independence. In
viewing the conflict this way the PLO has sought to become
affiliated with national liberation movements in Africa, Asia,
Latin America, and the Middle East. Because of the Palestinian's
lack of territory, political legitimacy, and numerical strength
the PLO sees armed struggle as the only road to the defeat of
the imperialists and the return of their people to their
homeland. For the PLO, once the military victory is
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accomplished, the return to their homeland will occur,
political independence will be established, the basic conflict
will be dissipated, but imperialism will continue to be an
influence to be dealt with.
lb. What is the fundamental character of one's political
opponents and of other significant political actors?
What is the nature of the opponent's goals?
What are the sources of the opponent's goals?
Is the adversary's opposition permanent and
general or limited and specific?
How is the opponent likely to respond to our
conciliatory actions?
How is the opponent likely to respond to our
policies of firmness?
What is the opponent's image of one's own nation?
What is the opponent's view of conflict?
What is the nature of the opponent's decision-
making process?
What is the opponent's "Operational Code?"
The PLO is very clear and explicit in stating who
their enemies are: the United States and Israel. In general
terms the PLO strikes out against imperialism, Zionism, and
racism. They claim that the US and Zionist imperialists violate
international law and the UN Charter. They denounce the US
and Israel for using terrorism as an official and organized
tactic. During the past three PNC Sessions the PLO has levied
specific charges against the US and Israel in this regard.
The PLO claims that the US goal in the Middle East is
to control the destinies and resources of the region and uses
various means to accomplish this goal. The US is accused of
providing "deadly arms" to support the Zionist's "blantant
aggression." The US is considered the leader of the camp
which is hostile to the Palestinian issue. The US, during
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this time period, has begun to establish military bases in the
Middle East region, another indication to the PLO of US
imperialist designs. Additionally, the US has joined with
various Arab armies in joint military exercises. These acti-
vities are but American tools to strengthen its domination of
the peoples of the region. The Camp Davis accords, signed 17
September 1978, are viewed as a capitulation by the Egyptian
regime, but, more importantly, as another US effort to
eliminate the PLO. The PLO sees the Camp David agreements as
a crucial danger and as perpetuating Zionist and imperialist
colonialism. The Reagan Plan of 1 September 1982 is totally
unacceptable to the PLO as a framework by which peace negotia-
tions can be established. Since the Reagan Plan fails to
specifically guarantee an independent Palestinian state with
the PLO as its leader, the PLO sees it as another method to
destroy the PLO, sidestep the Palestinian problem, and dominate
the Middle East.
The PLO's other primary adversary, of course, is Israel,
or the "Zionist entity." The PLO summarizes the Zionist threat
as carrying out "policies of persecution, despotism, and
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settlement." The PLO charges Israel with usurpation of
land in 1948, 1967, and de facto in 1982. The annexation of
the Golan Heights and Jerusalem are viewed as violations of
Palestinian rights and international law. Coupled with the
occupation and annexation of territory is the Israeli settle-
ment policy. The recent Israeli plan of building settlements
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in the occupied territories is labeled as a conspiracy aimed
at preventing Palestinians from obtaining independence in
these lands. The Israeli government's policy of intimidation
and persecution of Palestinians living in the occupied terri-
tories are also viewed as violations of human rights. In
fighting the Palestinians the Israelis use deadly weapons
provided by its imperialist partner, the US.
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of
one's fundamental political values and aspirations?
Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on
this score?
What is the nature of one's fundamental goals?
Should one be optimistic or pessimistic? About
long term goals? About specific undertakings?
Is the optimism or pessimism conditional?
On whose side is time?
The PLO's basic aim is to effect the return of the
Palestinian people to their homeland where they can establish
their own independent, democratic state. PNC #14 political
statement declared that the unified Palestinian and Arab stand
in rejecting Camp David "make us more determined to confront
195the conspiracy and more confident of its defeat." Such
optimistic statements are found in all three PNC political
statements considered in this study. At PNC #15 the PLO urged
support for UNRWA "until the time comes for our refugees to
practice their unshaken right in returning to their homes and
196taking over their properties." Also at PNC #15 the PLO
stated its optimism in a short-term goal by proclaiming its
belief in "the inevitable triumph of the will of our Arab
people in Egypt so that Egypt would resume its role of leading
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the Arab struggle against imperialism and Zionism." Other
optimistic examples are found in the political statement of
PNC #16. In this document the PLO clearly states, concerning
the Palestinians and other oppressed peoples, "The triumph
198
of peoples will undoubtedly be achieved." And, concluding
the PNC #16 statement is the confidently bold declaration,
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"Revolution until victory!"
These statements, taken at face value, decidedly point
to unshaken confidence in the eventual achievement of PLO goals
From reading the statements there remains little doubt that
the Palestinians are confident of their inevitable victory.
Caution, however, is suggested on two accounts. First, the
PNC political statements are produced for a subsidiary function
of propaganda. In other words, the statements seemingly must
portray a positive tone in order to engender support for the
PLO. The optimism and positive attitude keep the Movement
moving forward. If negative or pessimistic themes were evident
the Movement would not instill the enthusiasm and support it
requires to sustain itself. Second, the Arabs as a people
generally speak in optimistic terms. The Arab society is
based on honor and shame. Words which would discredit or
bring shame to the PLO are culturally incorrect. Thus, the
PLO is bound by cultural values to express optimism for the
eventual achievement of their goals.
Concerning the factor of time and which side is
benefited by the time the PLO makes it clear that time is on
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their side. PLO leaders remind their followers of the
Crusader Kingdom which lasted only for a relatively short
time. The Crusader "victory" was only very short-lived with
Arab domination eventually taking control. Arafat and the
other PLO leaders consider the current Zionist threat to be
only a temporary phenomenon. Eventually, they reason, the
Palestinians will succeed in establishing their state on their
historical homeland.
3. Is the Political future predictable? In what sense
and to what degree? What is the role of chance in
human affairs and in historical development?
Is political life capricious, or does it conform
to a more or less discernable pattern?
What aspects of political life are predictable or
unpredictable?
What degree of unpredictability exists in political
life?
The note in the previous section concerning the role
of time also applies to the PLO view concerning predicatability
of future events. The PLO seems to be tied very closely to
history and views history as a cyclical system. For example,
since the Crusaders were expelled after only a relatively short
term the PLO expects the Zionist threat to be expelled after
a brief tenure. This "brief tenure" is given in historical
terms which lead us to believe that it could control Palestine
for up to several hundred years. In the macro sense the PLO
views the political future as being generally predictable.
On the micro level the PLO is also confident in the predicta-
bility of political events. Since the 14th PNC session in
March 1979 the PLO has actively sought diplomatic recognition
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by the sovereign states of the world. The PLO has expressed
pride in the actual recognition accorded them and expects this
trend to continue. In dealing with other states on a government
to government basis the PLO treats political life much the
same way as the other states in the world community. For
example, when Arafat officially visits another country he is
generally given the same formal welcome as any visiting head
of state would receive. Also, the PLO deals with many countries
on a diplomatic level by maintaining diplomatic representatives
in many countries and at many international organizations.
Concerning the final point of the role of chance, there is no
indication in the last three PNC political statements which
indicate a PLO belief in chance in political affairs. Chance
apparently does not play a significant role in political life
according to the PLO.
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over
historical development? What is one's role in "moving"
and "shaping" history in the desired direction?
What is the role of the leader?
Although the PLO sees historical development as fol-
lowing a basic pattern and an inevitable track the PLO also
perceives itself as a catalyst in achieving these outcomes.
The PLO sees itself as being a major player in establishing
the Palestinian question at the crux of the entire Middle East
peace settlement. The PLO and its leaders play a major role
in shaping and directing events in the region. In the 14th
PNC political statement the PLO explains that "its position
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and relations with any Arab regime will be determined by that
regime's commitment to the Algiers and Rabat summit resolution,
by its rejection of the Camp David agreements." The PLO
is convinced that "the only alternative for resolving the
201Palestinian problem is the Palestinian alternative." It
is to this end that the PLO has succeeded in establishing a
202
"complete cohesion with the PLO and occupied homeland."
The PLO is proud to have attained a "standard of struggle" and
to have been an example to other revolutionary movements of
the world.
The PLO has also taken specific actions to control or
shape historical developments. The PLO has brought about a
broad international recognition of the rights of the Palestinian
people through the forum of the United Nations. These ac-
complishments are embodied in UN Resolutions 3236 and 3237.
The PLO has also been active in mediation efforts. In the
political statement of PNC #16 the PLO makes laudatory note of
the PNC Executive Committee's efforts to mediate a peaceful
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end to the Iran-Iraq conflict. The PLO expressed its
desire for the end of this war so all the Arab and Muslim
states could unite their efforts to fight for the liberation
of Palestine. The Executive Committee had been active in
mediating between Iran and Iraq and this PNC political state-
ment called on the Executive Committee to continue. The PLO
was playing an active role in accelerating the historical
development toward the liberation of Palestine.
110
B. INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or
objectives for political action?
How should one establish the goals for political
action?
Should one seek optimal goals or is it better to
seek satisfactory ones?
How many paths are there to the achievement of
ultimate goals?
How should one deal with value conflict?
Over the years the PLO has very consistently demanded
the same goals: to restore the inalienable rights of the
Palestinian people to return to their homeland, to establish
in that homeland an independent state free of outside inter-
ference, and to thwart the designs of the Zionists who would
seek to continue to control the region. The "homeland" issue
has remained central to the PLO political platform and to the
PLO there is no possible "substitute homeland" as Palestine
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is "the sole historical homeland of the Palestinian people."
It is these goals that stand out as being paramount for the
PLO and their struggle is aimed at accomplishing these
objectives. The only sign of PLO acquiescence concerning these
goals has been the recent PLO statements which accept a
"Palestinian state on the smallest piece of land that Israel
will vacate." This should not be taken as a renunciation of
the former position. The PLO clearly states its position as
working for the return to all of Palestine. The acceptance of
a Palestinian state on a "piece of land" would only represent
an interim step toward full sovereignty over all of Palestine.
Ill
Another long-term PLO goal is the unification of all
Palestinians. PLO efforts to unify the Palestinian people
inside and outside the occupied homeland has been a major goal
which they have only partially been successful in achieving.
This unification has included a merger of military organizations
and activities, representation of Palestinians from the
occupied territories on the PNC, financial and moral support
from Palestinians living outside the confrontation area, and
the creation of a national front which is active in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and seeks to strengthen PLO influence there.
Since 1948 fifty-three separate peace proposals for
the settlement of the Palestinian problem have been presented.
So far all have failed to establish lasting peace. Currently
the Reagan Plan, the Brezhnev Plan,. the Fahd Plan, and the Fez
Plan are on the table. Speaking of these plans the PLO is
very strict in stating its stance in relation to these offers.
The PLO declared its "rejection of all the resettlement plans
and affirmed its full adherence to our people's right to return
205to their homeland -- Palestine." The PLO calls for the
"rejection of all schemes aimed at harming the PLO position as
? n f\
the sole representative of the Palestinian people." The
PLO considers "the Fez summit resolutions as the minimum for
207political moves by the Arab states." Of the Reagan proposal
the PLO declares, "Reagan's plan, in style and content, does
not respect the established national rights of the Palestinian
people" and is thus not acceptable "as a sound basis for the
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just and lasting solution of the Palestine and the Arab-
2 8
Zionist conflict." The PLO position concerning the nec-
essity of including Jerusalem as capital of the future
Palestinian state is equally steadfast. The PLO understanding
is that "the occupied city of Jerusalem is the capital of
Palestine" and the PLO views the "Zionist occupation of
Jerusalem as violation of the Palestinian people's rights and
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a defiance of international laws." These examples point
out rather graphically the intractability of the PLO goals and
intentions
.
2. How are the goals of political action pursued most
effectively?
Under what circumstances is it permissible to
modify, substitute for or abandon a goal?
What approaches should be used in the pursuit
of goals?
Under what circumstances should one push harder,
be prepared to compromise, or retreat from a
previously held position?
Under the circumstances is unilateral action
preferred? Multilateral action?
The PLO has been very reluctant to modify its goals
in recent years. The only sign of a modification of a goal
has been the willingness to accept a Palestinian state on the
smallest piece of land that Israel will vacate. This shift
was made because "we believe that this alone can be an initial
210positive step toward solving our problems." The PLO has
never been able to act unilaterally without outside inter-
ference by one Arab state or another. The decision to modify
this goal was made by realizing that in order to recover the
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entire homeland they must first establish sovereignty over at
least a portion of their homeland.
In pursuing its goals the PLO has always used the
military approach. Since the Palestinian Nationalists groups
were established guerrilla military activity has been the
hallmark of their struggle. Armed struggle remains a cardinal
point in the pursuit of PLO objectives but in recent years
other approaches have been made. The PLO has encouraged more
conventional means of struggle, namely through diplomatic
channels. At the 15th PNC session the PLO "emphasized the
211importance of widening the circle of recognition for the PLO."
The PNC pledged its effort to "continue its political and
diplomatic moves and activity at the international level,
21 2including the states of West Europe." Another angle on the
diplomatic approach concerns the PLO attitudes toward Israel
which takes two fronts. First, the PLO stress "continuing the
struggle to isolate the Zionist state in the United Nations
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and in other forums." Secondly, the PLO called on the
Executive Committee to study the best methods for establishing
and maintaining contacts with moderate Jewish leaders."
3. How are the risks of political action calculated,
controlled, and accepted?
How are risks assessed?
What approaches should be used to limit or
control risk?
How should one deal with various types of tradeoffs
associated with risk?
Under what circumstances are high risk (or low
risk) policies mandatory? Permissible? Prohibited?
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The PLO has stated the conflict in which they have
been engaged as a struggle between Zionist/US/Imperialis
t
forces and Palestinian/Arab/worldwide national liberation
movement/socialist forces. By viewing the conflict in these
terms the PLO has sought to strengthen its forces. In
solidifying its side the PLO takes into account the threat
and risks of the Zionist/US/Imperialist forces. The PLO
affirmed the importance of a "strong alliance among the world's
21 5
revolutionary forces." Included within these forces are
specifically the states of Africa (including Zimbabwe, Namibia,
and South Africa) , Latin America and the Carribean region, the
socialist states led by the Soviet Union, and the states of
the Non-Aligned Movement. The PLO called for the widening and
strengthening of relations with these states. The PLO has also
sought to improve its contacts with the Arab and Islamic states.
The PLO specifically mentioned the need to improve the ties
with Lebanon (especially through the Lebanese National Movement)
,
Egyptian people, Syria, Jordan, Iran, and Iraq. Also on the
Arab/Islamic front the PLO called for increased emphasis on
strengthening the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front as well
as establishing relations with Arab states based on mutual
respect for the resolutions of the Algiers, Rabat, Baghdad, and
Tunis summits. Additionally, the PLO claimed "adherence to
the principles and the charter of the United Nations and its
resolutions which affirm the inalienable and indisposable rights
? 1 f\
of the Palestinian people." All of the above approaches to
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unification are to be carried out in addition to the unity
of the Palestinian people themselves. The PLO calls for the




4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's
interests ?
How important is timing in the achievement of
major, long-term aspirations?
How important is timing in the success of specific
policy undertakings?
When is action required, permitted, or prohibited?
The PLO has exhibited its attitudes toward the timing
of its actions in several ways. First, since the PLO's in-
ception in 1964 the PLO has increasingly advocated armed
struggle as the means to accomplish its goal of liberating
the Palestinian homeland. This policy has been continuous
and PLO guerrillas have been active for nearly twenty years
participating in this armed struggle. It appears that in this
case timing was important in 1964 but since that time has not
been an overriding factor. In 1967 the PLO felt it had to
rely on its own resources and less on outside Arab states'
assistance. Since in 1967 the timing was apparently right
for the armed struggle to begin and to continue the PLO
vigorously advocated armed struggle as the primary means for
the liberation of their homeland. The time is supposedly
still right since the 16th PNC session called for the PLO to
718
"develop and escalate the armed struggle."
Secondly, the PLO leadership in the person of Yasir
Arafat has recently turned to a more moderate position regarding
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peaceful negotiations. The 13th PNC session in March 1977
called for contacts to be established between PLO and moderate
Israeli leaders. Arafat also urged the approval of King
Hussein to be the negotiator for the Palestinians in conjunction
with the US' Reagan Plan. It was this moderate position of
Arafat which sparked the leadership challenge of 1983. This
opposition was evidence that the PLO considered this to be an
inappropriate time to encourage PLO moderation and in fact to
emphasize belligerent action.
Thirdly, during the late 1970's the PLO began a push
for international recognition of the Palestinian problem and
the PLO as spokesman for the Palestinian people. This program's
major pillar included seeking official diplomatic recognition
of the PLO as a political entity. The 15th PNC session in
April 1981 and the 16th PNC session in February 1983 speci-
fically spelled out the policy of expanding PLO recognition
in Western Europe and Japan as well as throughout the Third
World and socialist states. Prior to 1978 the time was
apparently not yet correct to pursue this type of diplomatic
policy
.
5. What is the utility and role of different means for
advancing one's interests? What resources can one
draw upon in the effort to advance one's interests?
What are the preferred tactics?
How is the power conceptualized?
The PLO has developed a number of different means for
advancing its interests. The PLO still views the "development
and escalation of the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy
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as being the cardinal task."^ 19 There have been, however,
other methods and sources of the struggle. First, the
Palestinians have had a long and enduring interest in the
education of its people. The PLO called for the continuation
of UNRWA educational projects when it appeared that the Agency's
programs might have been curtailed. The Palestinians have the
highest literacy rate of any Arab society in the Middle East.
Secondly, the PLO supports and finances several mass media
approaches. The PLO operates radio stations, film-making
facilities, newspaper presses, and propaganda workshops all
with the intention of widely disseminating the truth about the
Palestinian problem. Thirdly, the PLO has consistently tried
to stabilize and develop the Palestinian culture through the
theater and arts, traditional costumes, national flag and
anthem, and cultural history. All of these efforts to maintain
a unique Palestinian culture have created a stronger Palestinian
unity and identity. Fourthly, the PLO has called upon its Arab
neighbors to provide financial support for the Palestinian
cause. This financial aid comes in various forms including
direct monetary payments to the PLO and other Arab confrontation
states. Financial support from other Arab states comes in the
form of the regulation of oil production and export. This
includes the 1973 oil embargo aimed at the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan. Another method which has been used
by groups within the PLO in an attempt to further the struggle
is international terrorism. The PFLP inaugurated the well-known
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airline hijackings in 1968 and continued this policy for
several years. Other forms of international terrorism in-
cluded letter and parcel bombs, kidnappings, and the bombings
of buildings and autos. These activities were later discouraged
and finally eliminated as official PLO policy. Currently
international terrorism is not considered to be an officially
approved PLO practice.
This Operational Code of the PLO reveals a quite
concise yet broad conception of PLO goals, intentions, and
methods. To review the preceding Operational Code questions,
the PLO considers political life to be basically conflictual.
The PLO clearly accepts the US and Israel as the primary
imperialist power and its arch enemies. The PLO perceives the
US as realizing the value of the Middle East to US national
interests and planning to dominate the region through its
proxy, Israel. The primary US client is Israel which America
bankrolls and supplies with considerable modern and (according
to the PLO) illegal weapons. The PLO views the Israeli occu-
pation of Palestine since 1948 to be illegal and Israeli
territorial expansion since then to be equally unlawful.
Because of the illegality of Israeli and American actions the
PLO sees itself as being justified in seeking to return to
their homeland. The Palestinian people have been persecuted
and driven from their homes and many have been killed. From
the PLO point of view the Zionist presence and expansion in
Palestine has been a truly brutal experience. PLO philosophy,
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however, assures the Palestinian people that their cause is
just and right. Therefore they will eventually succeed in
their aims. In his speech at the 15th PNC session in April
1981 Arafat stated that "in 1947 we were swallowed up in the
political and geographical domains. Palestine was simply
swallowed up. It no longer existed, neither on the geographical
nor on the political maps. The most important work we have
done and the most important achievement scored by this
Palestinian rifle and this incessant flow of Palestinian blood
is the fact that Palestine has again been placed on the poli-
tical map. Palestine has returned to the political map.
Brothers, we once again speak in this view: what one returns
to the political map will unavoidably be returned to the
220geographical map. The question is one of a time." At this
same 15th PNC session Arab League Secretary General, Chedli
Klibi, labeled the US stand concerning Palestine as being
abnormal. When UN votes concerning the Palestinians are taken
many times the only two dissenting votes come from the US and
Israel. Because of the support for the Palestinian cause by
most of the states in the world community the PLO feels very
optimistic that they will succeed. The PLO is also convinced
that their struggle cannot be carried out by outside Arab
forces but that the PLO itself is responsible and most
effective in struggling for their rights. The PLO recognizes
the need to maintain friendly relations with the local Arab
states but it shuns any domination by any outside power.
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The PLO has been quite consistent and specific in
stating its goals. The PLO has continually voiced its policy
of non-recognition of Israel, the legality of the right of
the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and the
unification of all Palestinian people. These have been the
basic goals of the Palestinian Resistance Movement since 1964
but recently several modifications have been made. The PLO
has stated that it was prepared to recognize Israel in exchange
for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
Another modification which Arafat attempted to institute was
to negotiate a peace rather than using the traditional means
of armed struggle to accomplish this goal. It was this trend
toward apparent moderation which touched off the challenge to
Arafat's leadership in the spring and summer of 1983. The
PLO also publically delineated the acceptable boundaries of an
independent Palestinian state: the West Bank and Gaza Strip
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with Jerusalem as the capital. This represents a modification
of the previously stated goal of accepting nothing but the
liberation of the entire territory of Palestine. These recent
modifications may have come about because of the perceived
political expediency and gains which were expected to be
achieved. Also, the PLO may have decided that the time was
right to pursue these modified policies -- that this was in
their long-term best interest.
In calculating the balance of power between the
Palestinian forces and their enemies the PLO has taken several
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factors into account. The PLO recognizes Israel's tremendous
military power which is supplied and supported by the US. The
PLO knows that it cannot unilaterally confront Israel on the
conventional military level. The PLO has therefore sought to
use other means to combat Israel. The PLO has tried to isolate
Israel in the international community. Much of this activity
has taken place in the forum of the United Nations. Recent UN
resolutions have proclaimed near worldwide unanimity in recog-
nition of and support for the Palestinian position. The PLO
has also worked to ally itself with the socialist states of
the world led by the Soviet Union, with national liberation
movements in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East,
with the states of the Non-Aligned Movement, and with the
Western European states and Japan. In addition to these
diplomatic actions the PLO uses such tools to advance their
cause as educational improvements, Palestinian media expansions,
various social programs, and economic cooperation. This
Operational Code is thus a valuable tool in describing the
aims, actions, and ambitions of the PLO.
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VII. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT
The intent of this section is to accomplish the goal of
desc "ibing the arms transfer and financial aid history of the
Palestinian National Movement. During the research for this
section at the Naval Postgraduate School as well as at the
University of California, Berkeley and at Stanford University
no books or articles were found which describe the financial
and military history of the PLO in any detail. These histories
are considered to be vital to a complete understanding of the
PLO but they have been apparently ignored. During the research
phase of this section problems were unearthed. Although these
were not insurmountable the data compilation task was tremendously
arduous. No record of financial aid and military arms transfers
to the PLO has been maintained. In fact, the PLO is very
secretive about its financial status and holdings. They are
also quiet about stating the numbers and types of military
equipment they possess. A major research task was to compile
a historical record of arms/financial transfers. The research
began with the year 1974 because the Rabat Summit had officially
recognized the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of
the Palestinian people. Also, by 1974 all the major Palestinian
factions had been solidly established and could be easily
separated and identified. The data in this section are
admittedly incomplete and not comprehensive. Compiling such
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a list is virtually impossible given the PLCs secretive nature
and the numerous conflicting PLO claims and Israeli reports.
The following sources have been searched rather thoroughly:





East Research and Information Project reports, the Middle East




and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) . Other sources
include the New York Times
,
the Middle East and North Africa
Yearbook, and numerous other books concerning the PLO. The
search of FBIS is not complete prior to September 1978. More
research needs to be completed from 1974 to 1978. Another
stumblingblock was the lack of recently published accounts of
PLO history. A rash of such documents were produced in the
early to mid 1970 's. Since that time only very few have been
printed. This lack of current study and writing on Palestinian
history left a void which required primary research to fill.
Despite facing these problems and seemingly endless research
the necessary data lists were compiled.
A. MILITARY ARMS TRANSFERS
The research of military arms transfers to the Palestinian
nationalist organizations was begun knowing full well that
the goal of compiling a comprehensive and exhaustive record
would not be reached. The PLO is very secretive when it comes
to revealing its sources of arms and the amounts and types of
arms it possesses. The information which was uncovered was
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frequently from a third party source. Many times Kuwait or
another country would report Palestinian arms deliveries.
Israel would periodically report its intelligence estimates
of the "terrorist" strength. No attempt was made to determine
actual numbers of particular weapons possessed by the PLO
although a list was made of the types of weapons mentioned in
the various reports. By tracing the arms transfers over a
period of several years many significant details and trends
began to emerge. The primary findings are outlined below
under the headings: Types/Amounts of Arms, Sources of Arms,
and Delivery/Payment.
1
. Types/Amounts of Arms
The PLO accumulated an impressive amount and variety
of military equipment up to June 1982 when compared with many
Third World countries. Table One below gives a list of the
types of Equipment specifically stated to be in possession of
the PLO.
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In addition to these items should be added many types of small
arms, machine guns, hand grenades, mines, ammunition, bazookas,
anti-aircraft guns, armored personnel carriers, trucks,
transport vehicles, and anti-tank missiles. During the summer
of 1982 when the Israeli forces discovered PLO arms caches in
southern Lebanon they valued the total worth of the arms as
2 2 2being $5 billion. They found caches in Sidon, Tyre, and
vicinity filled with enough food, ammunition, and arms to
supply a "population of hundreds of thousands for a very long
2 23 224time." They found hundreds of tanks, artillery pieces,
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and hundreds of tons of "fighting weapons." Another
Israeli report indicated that there were enough new, light
7 9 f\
weapons and equipment to outfit a division. It appears
that the PLO had sufficient arms either for a prolonged
conflict or to outfit an outside army. Indeed, this was the
speculation of some last summer.
Over the time period of this research (1974-1982) the
type of equipment delivered to the PLO changed. In the mid-
1970' s, the PLO was equipped with an continued to receive
small arms, machine guns, grenades, mines, and some artillery
and armor. During this time they were involved in guerrilla
raids on Israeli settlements and military posts on northern
Israel. They also were involved in the Lebanese civil war
from 1976-78. During this time and in this type of conflict
they required ammunition, small arms, and artillery to meet
their strategic and tactical needs. Also, during the mid-1970's,
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the Israelis began to intensify their air raids in Palestinian
camps and military centers in southern Lebanon. As the
effectiveness of these attacks grew so did the PLO desire to
obtain weapons to counter this increased threat. As early as
the spring of 1975 Arafat made a request to the Soviet Union
227for "sophisticated rockets" to fire at Israeli aircraft.
Apparently this request was denied. It is evident, however,
that beginning in the late 1970' s the PLO began to receive
2 2 8
anti-aircraft missiles, including the SA-6. The PLO also




such as the SA-9 and sophisticated anti-aircraft and ant
tank missiles "never before exported outside the Warsaw Pact.
The PLO at this time was developing a conventional military
force to augment its well-established guerrilla force. In
addition to this ground equipment the PLO also developed a
naval capability. PLO guerrillas have attacked Israel by
sending commando teams down the Mediterranean coast in small
boats. But in 1978 it was reported that the PLO was acquiring
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a submarine. It appears that the deal was concluded and
that the PLO took possession soon after and used the craft on
232guerrilla raids. In 1979 the PLO reportedly received from
233Libya two SX 404 miniature submarines. The PLO has also
been developing its air force. The first mention of PLO air
power came in 1980 when they received helicopters and jet
234trainers from India. After the 1982 fighting had ended the
PLO reported that they had purchased an unspecified number of
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planes for transporting their dispersed troops throughout the
235Arab world. The PLO also mentioned that a Palestinian
pilot had died while on a training flight in North Yemen. One
Palestinian source claims that PLO pilots have been training
since the early 1970's in French Mirage and Soviet MiG-21,23,
and 25 fighter aircraft. The source further reports that the
PLO now has "squadrons of planes now stationed" in Libya, North
Yemen, South Yemen, and Syria.
After the summer of 1982 and the fighting with Israel
had ended very little activity was noted by the PLO in recouping
its military losses. With the Israeli capture of huge amounts
of arms it is obvious that the PLO had very little military
capability when it dispersed the PLO fighters to widely
scattered areas. The Israelis thought that when the leadership
of the PLO was forced to operate outside the confrontation
states the PLO military arm would be quickly weakened. There
remained, of course, in Lebanon some PLO fighters stationed
with Syrian troops, but the PLO central authority was absent
and Arafat's clash with President Assad along with the
challenge to his authority from within Fatah leave the
situation still unsettled. Only with the passage of time will
we be able to see if the PLO will be able to recover its
military might and operational capability.
As we look at the general trend of amounts of arms
transferred to the PLO from 1974-1982 it is obvious that a
climax was reached in early 1982. Although the data is not
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totally complete it is sufficient to discern an upward move-
ment in amounts of deliveries. The frequency of delivery
stepped up in 1979 and continued at a steady rate until June
1982 when the last significant deliveries were made. Also
during this time period there was an improvement in the quality
of weapons delivered to the PLO. Prior to the late 1970's the
PLO relied basically on standard conventional arms. From
1978 onward the PLO began to receive and field sophisticated
Soviet missiles.
2
. Sources of Arms
The PLO has received arms from a great variety of
suppliers although it is dependent upon only a few major arms
exporters. Some suppliers work through third countries while
others prefer to do business directly with the PLO. The PLO
gets many small arms and ammunition on the open market using
the money it receives from various sources to finance their
deals. The PLO even has some U.S. equipment including a 105mm
howitzer that it obtained from the Lebanese army which had
237purchased it from the U.S.
The PLO first began obtaining arms by collecting
abandoned Egyptian weapons from the 1967 battlefield. About
the same time they began to smuggle weapons into their camps
via bedouins and professional smugglers. As early as May 1969
the Chinese started their delivery of arms by supplying £1.5
2 38
million of arms. The Chinese were the major supplier of
arms into the early 1970's. The USSR did not begin direct
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shipment of arms to the PLO until late September 1972.
Even then they delivered only small arms, machine guns, and
mortars. Since the mid to late 1970's many of the Palestinian
arms have been manufactured by the Soviets or Chinese and many
have been delivered by those two countries. This increase in
Soviet arms deliveries coincides with the closing of diplomatic
and arms supply relations with the Egyptians. The Soviet Union
remains the PLO's primary source of sophisticated arms and
their most important supplier. Libya has served as a middleman
for a number of PLO arms deals. In 1979, when the PLO was
asking the Soviet Union for SA-6 missiles, the Soviets told
them to ask the Libyans for such hardware. Three days after
asking "an Arab country" put up $16 million to help finance
240
the SA-6 deal through the Soviet Union. Later on in 1979,
Libya worked out a deal with the Swiss Oerlikon company for
the delivery of twenty 35mm anti-aircraft batteries to the
241PLO. In 1978, Libya had also helped the PLO by arranging
a $40 million arms deal with East Germany.
Much of the PLO military activity is related to
guerrilla warfare, smallscale skirmishes, and limited, short-
term conventional engagements. Because of this a great amount
of their equipment needs consist of small arms, machineguns,
mortars, grenades, and the like. Part of this supply is
obtained directly from their major suppliers but a significant
amount is purchased on the international open arms market.
There are five or six major arms dealers in the world from
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whom can be purchased all but the most sophisticated weapons.
These dealers carry extensive stocks and can arrange very
large and complex delivery schemes. Below this level of major
dealers lie 40 to 50 expert dealers who understand the arms
transaction business well and know where to obtain particular
items. Their personal contacts with the major arms manu-
facturers make it possible for them to fill almost any arms
order. The third level of arms dealers are the many smaller
dealers who hope for a major sell but do not usually get the
large orders. The top two rungs of dealers bring together
sellers prepared to do business for cash and buyers who have
considerable money to make the transaction. It seems that the
key to underground arms sales is cash. If the cash is
available, the arms can be easily purchased and delivered.
Since an export of arms outside the manufacturing country will
take place two documents must be obtained before the govern-
mental authorities will allow the transaction to be completed.
The first is an "end-user certificate." This is a government-
signed document stating that the weapons are required by the
buying country and that the weapons will not be re-sold or
re-exported. The end-user certificate is usually issued by the
foreign or defense ministry of the selling country. The second
document is the export license. The exporting government
issues the export license when it is assured, through evidence
of the end-user certificate, that the weapons deal is
legitimate. Once the export license is issued the deal can
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take place. This system for making arms deals can be circum-
vented. This can be done in two ways. First, a government
which is sympathetic to the buyer will supply the documents
required to make the deal. Secondly, and more common, the
buyer can purchase an end-user certificate from any of a
number of corrupt politicians. Such certificates are reportedly
be purchased for between £500 and ,£1500. The author of the
article in the Middle East
,
Peter Durisch, bought one himself
for £1000. There seems to be no lack of embassies willing to
sell such documents. There are eighteen such sources in
London and a similar number in Paris. One caution in arranging
these deals is to be sure that the buyer is requesting items
which the purported buyer has in its inventory. For example,
if the PLO wanted artillery rounds for their 155mm field guns
they would have to be sure that the country under whose name
they were importing them actually had a hypothetical need for
that type rounds. It must appear that the country making the
deal appears to be the actual buyer.
In the case of the PLO they most frequently use
friendly Arab states to arrange their arms deals. From the
evidence I gathered it appears that Libya and Algeria are the
most active in playing the role of middleman. In June 1978
it was reported that Libya arranged a $40 million arms deal
243between the PLO and East Germany. In June 1982, Algerian
diplomats in Beirut received an urgent and very detailed list
244
of small arms that Arafat was requesting from the Soviets.
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The Algerian diplomats contacted their home office in Algiers
and President Benejedid called an emergency cabinet meeting
at 11 pm that night. At 4 am he called upon the Soviet
ambassador, gave him the list of weapons along with a check
for $20 million, and asked him to contact Moscow concerning
delivery. A few days later the Soviet arms were airlifted to
Damascus as well as two plane loads of weapons from Algeria.
From these two examples and considering the amount of cash the
PLO reportedly possesses it is quite obvious that such trans-
actions have taken place and will continue to be an integral
part of the PLO arms acquisition network in the future.
3 . Arms Delivery
Lebanon and Syria have been the final destination for
many of the PLO arms imports. China began its first shipments
245
of arms to the PLO in 1964. In March of the following year
China delivered its arms to the PLO by air via Damascus and by
sea to Syrian ports. Also, in 1970, China sent three plane
loads of arms to Damascus to aid the PLO during their fighting
246
with Jordan. The Soviet Union's first direct arms delivery
to the PLO occurred in September 1972 when they sent twelve
247tons of small arms, machine guns, and mortars. Some of the
arms shipments by sea have been interdicted by the Israeli
navy. In 1975, ships bearing arms for Palestinian and
Lebanese leftist groups were intercepted by the Israelis and
2 4 8the arms were turned over to the Lebanese Phalangists.
During last summer's Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon
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huge Palestinian arms caches were discovered at the port
cities of Tyre and Sidon. In one instance the Israelis timed
their raid into this area waiting until a new arms shipment
249had arrived so they could destroy the arms or capture them.
In the mid-1970's arms deliveries were also traced from
Bulgaria and Eastern Europe arriving in Syria overland via
™
-, 250Turkey.
In recent years more deliveries have been made by air.
The Soviet Union's friendly relations with Syria have allowed
them to airlift PLO supplies to Damascus. For five days during
the heavy fighting in mid-June 1982 between three and five
Soviet IL-76 Candid heavy transport aircraft landed at Damascus
251loaded with military equipment for the PLO. Even with these
Soviet deliveries the PLO leadership was still discouraged that
support was not greater. But, in the words of the Soviet
ambassador to Lebanon in speaking to Fatah' s second-in-command,
Abu Iyad, "Do you think you can tell the Soviet Union what aid
252it should give or what it should do?"
India provides a good example of the delivery problem
of which Palestinian faction should take possession of the
arms when they are delivered. In June 1980 India made a
delivery of helicopters, jet trainers, and military vehicles
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to a PLO training base in northern Iraq, near Mosul. Indian
officials made it clear that these items were for Fatah' s use
only. This caused a stir of objection within the various
Palestinian factions. The spokesman for the dissenters was
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Nayif Hawatmeh, leader of the DFLP. He said that all
Palestinian organizations should agree that all military
equipment should come to the PLO centrally and from there be
dispersed to the various factions. This, of course, did not
take place and other countries continue to aid only one
faction or another. Notable among these are the Soviet Union
and Saudi Arabia who both favor Fatah, although for differing
reasons. The Saudis prefer to deal with Fatah because it is
a moderate organization and thus the Saudis are not forced
to provide embarassing support to a radical Palestinian
element. The Soviets on the other hand support Fatah because
it is the largest and most influential of the Palestinian
organizations. There are other Palestinian groups (PFLP, DFLP)
whose official ideology is unmistakenly Marxist in orientation
but are considered to be too small in numbers to be of much
consequence in the overall Palestinian revolution to warrent
Soviet support.
B. FINANCIAL AID
1 . Sources of Aid
Even before the PLO was created in 1964 Palestinian
groups were active in establishing financial backing for their
organizations. Fatah, the largest and oldest of Palestinian
groups, depended in donations by its members for financial
aid in its early days. In 1959, Fatah's policy was not to
seek aid from Arab countries but to require sacrifice of its
members, some of whom gave one-half or more of their wages to
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the organization. By the early 1960's Fatah had established
an elaborate network of contributors throughout the Arab world.
They concentrated on soliciting from Palestinians and their
255
sympathizers in the Arabian peninsula. The PLO was
established in 1964 under the guardianship of Egypt and with
support from the Arab League. PLO Chairman Ahmed al-Shukairy
was given a seat on the League and the Arab League voted to
provide the PLO with yearly payments to support the organization.
This annual payment was set at £15 million but it was cut off
after the 1967 war. In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab
defeat came the Palestinian disillusionment with the Arab
states. The PLO realized that they would not be able to
depend on the established Arab states to fight and win back
their homeland for them. The Palestinians began an intensive
campaign to gain broad popular support from throughout the
Arab world. As a consequenc financial aid skyrocketed in the
years 1967-1970. During March 1968 £200,000 was collected
during a fund raising drive in Lebanon. In Kuwait, a 5% tax
was levied on the wages of Palestinian workers with the funds
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which were collected goint to Fatah. Most Arab countries
2 58
also added a 2% surcharge on all entertainment tickets.
Funds from this so-called "Fedayeen tax" were turned over to
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the PLO. Money was also extorted from wealthy Palestinian
businessmen living outside the confrontation area. During
this time Saudi financial support amounted to <£1.4 million
? f\ n
per year. In September 1969, at the Islamic Summit, Saudi
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Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya agreed to collectively supply the
7 f\ 1
PLO with £,110 million per year." The Fifth Arab Summit in
Rabat held in December 1969 promised the PLO £26 million and
9 f\ 9
King Hassan of Morocco separately pledged <£20 million. In
1970 Fortune magazine estimated Fatah's war chest stood at
? f\ \
$25 million and that its annual income was $10 million.
The exact amount of financial aid given to the Palestinians
is not known but from the information given here it is evident
that the PLO has received millions of dollars per year from
Arab sources.
There have also been attempts throughout the 1970'
s
by various Arab organizations to collectively provide financial
support to the PLO. In 1974, at the Rabat conference which
recognized the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of
the Palestinian people, the Arab states voted to give $50
million per year to the PLO. In May 1976 at the Seventh
Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Istanbul, the
delegates resolved to set up a fund for assisting the Arabs in
7 A C
Jerusalem. The PLO was a voting member at this conference
and Palestinians benefited from the aid which this fund
provided. Another Foreign Ministers' conference was held in
Riyadh in January 1977. The foreign ministers agreed to
pay $27 million to the PLO in 1977 and 1978. This was intended
to make up for the $26 million per year which had been
promised at the December 1969 Rabat Conference but which had
later been suspended.
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In April 1977, the Arab League set up the Arab Monetary
Fund with capital assets set at $757 million which the members
7 f\ 7
could draw from for various uses. Another Foreign Ministers'
Conference was convened in Baghdad in November 1978 at which
the PLO was granted $150 million with another $150 million
earmarked for the Steadfastness Forces in the occupied ter-
7 f\ R
ritories. All of these examples point out the apparent fact
that the PLO has no problem obtaining sufficient funds. To
get a clearer picture of the PLO financial status one must add
occasional "additional funds" periodically donated by the
269Saudis, payments by Egypt which is no longer a member of
270
many Arab organizations, and a series of "open funds" in
271the US and Europe and it seems that financial aid is over-
whelming. Indeed, that is the conclusion of the Israelis
27 2
who have estimated PLO wealth to be $70 billion. The
Israelis quickly point out that Saudi Arabia has been most
liberal in its aid to Fatah. Says one press dispatch, "So
far Saudi Arabia has given the PLO approximately $200 million,
of which about $33 million is slated for what is called
'strengthening the firm stand of the West Bank and the Gaza
273Strip.'" In an interview in 1982 former Israeli Prime
Minister Begin told of a recent visit he had had with a "head
of state." Begin told his guest that Saudi Arabia had given
$400 million to the "terrorists" to which the visiting head
of state replied, "Billions, billions, not $400 million. They
274had unlimited money." The total amount in the PLO
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treasury may never be known exactly. The financial report
to the Palestine National Council is careful not divulge
publicly any references to amounts of money collected or
invested. But what comes through very clearly is that the
PLO has considerable wealth and that it receives its aid
solely from Arab sources. It is interesting that there are
no reports of financial aid coming to the PLO from other than
Arab or Islamic sources. With such a considerable amount of
cash on hand, let us now turn to what the PLO does with the
money.
2 . Financial Expenditures
Since the PLO has a tremendous amount of capital to
work with it is natural that a good portion of it would be
used to build up its military capability. The PLO has
certainly used its financial resources to build up a force of
conventionally armed and trained troops who have fought nearly
continuously since 1965 against foes both Jewish and Arab.
The previous section on military arms transfers pointed out
how this build-up of arms occurred and the types of weapons
accumulated by the PLO. The Israeli estimate of $5 billion
worth of arms and sabotage material found in southern Lebanon
in 1982 attests to the fact that the PLO indeed has poured
27 5huge sums into hardware acquisition. Another source
estimates that the PLO used $10 billion of aid money for its
? 7 f\
armed forces during the decade 1973-1982. In addition to
arms acquisition the PLO has also become more active in foreign
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training of their troops. In February 1981, the head of the
PLO office in Moscow, Brigadier Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaier,
said, "Scores and hundreds of Palestinian officers eligible
to command major sectors, such as brigades, had graduated
277from Soviet military academies." He further stated that
2,000 Palestinians were then studying in Soviet schools and
that 300 scholarships per year are reserved for the PLO. The PLO
also finances military operations in foreign countries. In
1979, the PLO was aiding Iran by sending automatic rifles to
2 7 8
Iran and by training "hundreds of Iranians" in Lebanon.
This activity was continued in 1980 when Abu Iyad secretly
279financed Kurdish guerrilla operations in Iraq. The PLO
trained and equipped terrorists through Left- and Right-wing
organizations in Europe and Latin America. One more example
of PLO aid abroad concerns Libya. In May 1980 it was reported
that the PLO, in conjunction with Egyptian intelligence services,
2 8had set up a training camp on the Egypt-Libya border. The
troops at this anti-Qaddafi camp were trained for one month
in carrying out military activity inside Libya or against
Libyan interests abroad. Additionally, Fatah was active in
Europe in the early 1970' s in organizing and financing an
elaborate network of 23 terrorist branches.
The various factions of the PLO pay the members of
their military arm with average or better comparable Arab
wages. PLA and PFLP soldiers are paid about the same as their
Arab counterparts while Fatah military men are paid about
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twice that amount. Saiqa pays its military members the
highest wages of all Palestinian groups. Also, the PLO
established in 1965 the Institution for Social Affairs and
Welfare for the Martyrs' and Prisoners' Families. This
organization provides monetary subsistance payments to the
widows and orphans of PLO combat victims as well as support
for all full-time PLO workers and leaders, and their families.
With branches in Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Lebanon the Institution gave aid to over 40,000
2 8 2persons in 1980. As a part of the Institution is a payment
for secondary and university education for the children of
PLO martyrs. Widowed wives and orphaned daughters are taught
to sew, embroider, or type. Aid is also provided to civilian
Lebanese and Palestinians who have been victims of Israeli
attacks. The budget in 1980 for this expense alone was over
$30 million. In addition to the PLO expense of subsidizing
the Institution for Social Affairs and Welfare for the Martyrs'
and Prisoners' Families, the PLO funds the Palestine Red
Crescent Society (PRCS) . The PRCS was organized in Jordan
in 1968 and has grown since until, as of June 1982, it owned
and operated thirteen major hospitals in Lebanon (11), Syria
(1) , and Egypt (1) . Each hospital is equipped with an operating
room, radiology department, laboratory, pharmacy, blood bank,
2 8 3
outpatient clinic, and most include a dental clinic. In
addition to these thirteen hospitals the PRCS runs 100 smaller
clinics in Lebanon (60) and Syria (20) with the remainder
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scattered throughout the middle east to accommodate the
dispersed Palestinians. Services at the hospitals and clinics
are provided either free or for a very low fee. Table Two
indicates the services the PRCS provided in 1981.
TABLE TWO
PRCS Hospital Care
Type of Care 1981






Specialty clinic visits 123,921
Surgical operations 3,807*
*These figures are for the first six months
of 1981 only.
Source: Rubenberg, p. 51.
The PRCS also has operated a medical training school
in Beirut for 150 students leading to certificates as regis-
tered nurses, practical nurses, medical technicians, and
paramedics. Tuition is free and the graduates are expected
to work for the PRCS for the same amount of time as their
training period.
There are several other items of note concerning the
PLO's financial dealings. First, the PLO maintains responsi-
bility for the refugee camps' management. In this role the
PLO pays for the camps' electricity and water and provides
refuse collection, fire, police, and ambulance services.
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Second, the PLO has an active investment program. Many of
Fatah' s funds are passed to Abu Hassan who transfers them to
bank accounts in Switzerland, Italy, and West Germany. Money
from these accounts is used for various business investments.
In 1972 the PLO's foreign investments were estimated to be
7 Q c
£30 million. The PLO owns and manages a Belgian charter
airline, industrial plants which produce shoes, clothing,
? 8 (\
processed food, and furniture. Third, Palestinian financial
aid sometimes depends on the political platform of the supplier
or the Palestinian faction. For example, the PFLP traditionally
refused to accept direct payments from such "reactionary
2 8 7
sources" as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. But in many cases
these "reactionary" regimes refuse to give aid to radical
Palestinian factions such as the PFLP and PDFLP, preferring
to support the moderate Fatah group. Last, the PLO announced
in the summer of 1981 that it would compensate Palestinian
and Lebanese civilians for the damage or destruction of their
homes during the fighting with Israel. This aid amounted to
2,000 Lebanese pounds per house destroyed and 1,000 Lebanese
2 8 8pounds for each damaged house.
All these financial inputs and expenditures amount
to an estimated PLO budget to $500 million to $1 billion per
year. With that cash flow the PLO has managed to create a
society which provides much of its own secondary education,
medical services, welfare care, tax collection, and
industrial production. The PLO thus has established itself
143
as a solid economic factor to be seriously considered in any
future Middle East peace negotiations.
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VIII. THE PLO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR
This chapter is an attempt to link arms transfers/financial
aid to the behavior of the Palestinian Nationalist Movement on
the international level. In defining behavior, several factors
were analyzed: 1) Intergovernmental contacts; 2) Diplomatic
recognition by other countries; and 3) Palestinian (PLO)
mediation efforts. All of these indicators show an outward-
reaching philosophy on the part of the PLO. The contacts,
recognition, and mediation factors as related to the supplier
countries might show a link of increasing dependency of the
PLO on certain outside powers. Also, this section focuses
on the Soviet involvement on Palestinian affairs and how that
relationship has evolved. The research in this section begins
with the year 1974 because the Rabat Summit which was held that
year had officially recognized the PLO as the sole, legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people. Also, by 1974 all
the major factions in the PLO had been solidly established and
could be easily separated and identified.
The measurement of the Palestinian behavior variables was
as difficult as measuring the military and financial aid to
the PLO. There are no running records of which countries have
granted full recognition status to the PLO, the contacts made
by PLO officials with diplomats of foreign countries, or efforts
by the PLO to mediate in disputes between sovereign states.
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All three of these lists needed to be generated by this writer.
The research task of generating these three data sets con-
cerning subjects which had not previously been examined was
formidable. Hence, the data collection is certainly not
complete. The sources used in the previous section concerning
military and financial aid were used in compiling the data
found in this chapter.
A. INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS
In assessing the behavioral changes in the PLO as related
to the military and economic aid received the various forms of
contact between PLO officials and official representatives of
foreign governments was measured. Counted were all official
visits of this nature from September 1978 to December 1982.
All contacts between PLO leaders and officials of other countries
were counted. The officials of the other countries included
only national leaders (President, Prime Minister, Chancellor,
etc.), diplomatic representatives (Ambassadors or Charges),
and official envoys (only officially appointed representatives)
No differentiation was made between PLO leaders of the various
Palestinian factions, although most of the contacts were made
with Fatah leaders. No differentiation was made between a
Palestinian visit abroad and a foreign official visiting a
Palestinian group in the Middle East. The primary interest
was in the frequency of contact between the PLO and foreign
representatives. Because the author has not been able to
extend the research back to the baseline year he has not been
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able to trace the history of such visits for the full time
periods of 1974-1982.
The results of the September 1978 - December 1982 data
are inconclusive. Due to the Israeli invasion of southern
Lebanon in June 1982 the data for that year are skewed because
of the inability of Palestinian leaders to travel abroad and
the reluctance of foreign leaders to contact the PLO in a
combat zone. The data for this abbreviated time period does,
nevertheless, reveal some interesting information. The Warsaw
Pact countries accounted for about one-half of all contacts
by Palestinians. Of these Warsaw Pact visits the percentage
of contacts with the Soviet Union rose from 19% in 1979 to 61%
in 1980. The ratio fell to 56% in 1981, and dropped again in
1982 to 50%. Contacts with Cuban representatives were more
frequent than with Chinese representatives. Contacts with
Western European representatives held steady at about 50% of
Warsaw Pact contacts except the year 1980 when the ratio was
1:4. Most of the Western European contacts were made with
Austria and France. The other Western European countries which
had contact with the PLO were Spain, Italy, Belgium, Portugal,
Netherlands, Finland, and Greece. The "other" countries with
PLO contact were India, Vietnam, Canada, Japan, Sri Lanka, as
well as delegations from Latin America and Africa. It should
be remembered that all of these contacts were at a high dip-
lomatic level, i.e. Ambassadorial or Head of State. It is
interesting that the PLO has had such contact with seven of
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of the sixteen NATO members, all of the Warsaw Pact countries
and other regional powers such as India and Japan. As the
research is completed and the history traced from 1974 one
would expect to find that PLO contacts with West and with
other international powers to increase year by year showing
an outward reach by the PLO for increasing international
recognition. One interesting note is that in 1982, when the
Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon cut off the PLO from the
international community at least temporarily, the PLO contacted
the greatest number of different countries. Table Three below
provides a graphic description of the contacts with the PLO
over the last four years.
TABLE THREE
PLO Intergovernmental Contacts
1979 1980 1981 1982
Number of
Contacts 44 61 51 48
Number of
Countries
Visited 19 15 16 20
From the above table it is clear that during 1979-1982
the variation between contacts made and number of countries
contacted did not change significantly. What can be shown,
however, is that the PLO maintained a constant contact with
a wide and diverse number of countries at least since 1979.
For some time now the PLO has been active in traveling abroad
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and in receiving foreign delegations. This trend is also
borne out in the following section which deals with worldwide
recognition of the PLO.
B. DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION
Another indicator of PLO behavior is that of international
recognition. Included within this category is the PLCs observer
status and membership in international organizations as well
as official diplomatic recognition by foreign countries.
Several countries have upgraded their PLO recognition status
but have not accorded full diplomatic relations including the
exchange of ambassadors. Also, some countries have allowed
the PLO to operate information offices within their countries
but have not accorded further diplomatic recognition. All of
these instances have been counted as recognition. The intention
was to paint a clear picture of worldwide acceptance of the
PLO by foreign governments. Ideally it would be best to have
pinpointed exactly when each individual country granted any of
these forms of recognition. A source of such information has
not been available and the author had to rely on piecing the
data together from numerous sources. As of early 1980, 115
countries had recognized the PLO which are more countries than
recognize the state of Israel. The recognition history of
the PLO is traced beginning with the Rabat Conference of
November 1974.
The Rabat Conference marked a very significant turning
point for the PLO. It was at this conference of Arab states
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that the PLO was recognized as the sole, legitimate representa-
tive of the Palestinian people. For several years prior to
the Rabat Conference some Arabs maintained that King Hussein
of Jordan should be the spokesman for the Palestinians since
so many refugees lived within his territory. The PLO leaders
refused to allow Hussein to speak for them and for all
Palestinians since it had seemed that Hussein had shown such
close ties with the "imperialist" West and since he had not
proved faithful to the Palestinian cause. Indeed, in 1948
Jordan had been quick to expropriate the West Bank lands and
to incorporate this area into the Hashemite Kingdom. In fact,
the British splitting of the Mandate of Palestine in 1921 into
two separate Mandates, Palestine and Transjordan, was considered
illegal. The distrust between the Palestinians and the
Jordanians began long ago and continued up to the Rabat Con-
ference in 1974. The Rabat Conference recognition brought
with it the recognition of each of the twenty Arab states
represented there. Thus, the recognition of the PLO, not
Jordan, as the Palestinian people's only spokesman was very
significant for the PLO.
It was also during this time, Autumn of 1974, that the
290United Nations General Assembly granted recognition to the PLO.'
Arafat was invited to the General Assembly and while there he
gave his now famous "gun and the olive branch" speech. About
the same time the PLO was granted observer status at the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
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(UNESCO). 291 In 1975 the African, Asian, and Middle Eastern
foreign ministers met at an Islamic Summit where they also
recognized the PLO. Also in 1975 France allowed the PLC1 to
292
open an information office in Paris and India granted the
293
PLO full diplomatic status. ° In 1976 the PLO became a full
voting member of two international organizations, the Arab
294 295League and the Non-Aligned Nations.
The next flurry of recognition activity occurred in 1979.
In July of that year United States UN ambassador, Andrew Young,
had a controversial meeting with the PLO's UN representative
296
at the home of the Kuwaiti UN ambassador. Because of the
US administration's policy of no contact with the PLO, Andrew
Young felt compelled to resign which he did 15 August 1979.
During this time period other Americans, including many Black
leaders, held meetings with PLO officials. Leaders of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference officially supported
297PLO rights and Jesse Jackson visited the Middle East and
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met with PLO leaders. There seemed to be a momentum carrying
the US toward recognition of or at least contact with the PLO.
The Camp David summit and the PLO rejection of the resulting
Palestinian autonomy negotiation process, however, halted these
moves toward recognition. Later in 1979 the UN declared an
299International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.
This Day was celebrated in many capitals around the world but
was boycotted by the US and Israel.
The PLO entered the 1980 T s as a widely recognized organization
and during the early 1980' s official recognition surged ahead on
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a state by state basis. Austria bestowed a new form of
diplomatic recognition (short of the exchange of ambassadors)
in March 1980. Nicaragua's Sandinista government recog-
nized the PLO in July 1980. 301 In 1981, the USSR and Greece
302granted full diplomatic status. After the Soviet recog-
nition was granted it was assumed that the other Warsaw Pact
states would follow suit. Hungary did and announced recognition
303in February 1982. Sri Lanka granted the PLO official status
304in April just prior to the Israeli invasion. After the
summer of 1982 fighting and the PLO had withdrawn from Beirut,
Arafat was granted a twenty-minute audience with Pope John
305Paul II. This again was evidence of the PLO's rising inter-
national standing and prestige. In December 1982 Bolivia
•7 a /;
established official relations with the PLO. These examples
do not obviously represent all of the states which recognize
the PLO and in whose countries the PLO has information offices,
but a trend can be noted. In 1974, the twenty Arab states
recognized the PLO, but few other countries did. In 1974, the
PLO operated six regional offices, all of them in the Arab
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world. By 1977, PLO regional offices were located in an
30 8
additional six countries, none of which were Arab. These
six countries included the two Superpowers, the PRC, France,
Brazil, and a Warsaw Pact country, Hungary. In 1978, Japan
and Austria were added to the list. By 1981 the number and
location of regional offices changed dramatically. Thirty-one
countries hosted PLO offices including three Warsaw Pact
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countries, seven Western European countries, six other
309Western countries and six additional countries. Added to
this list in 1982 were three European states -- Belgium,
Ireland, and Switzerland. Another European country joined
31
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the list in 1982 -- Italy. All of this points out the
trend that the PLO has been expanding its operations throughout
the world. Its offices are located in Eastern European
capitals, in Western Europe, North America, Central and South
America, and Asia. Their offices are located in the free
world as well as behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. This
expansion has been steady since 1974 and corresponds in the
late 1970's and early 1980 T s with the increased military and
financial aid which the PLO recieved. Again, although this
list is not exhaustive and does not document each country that
recognizes the PLO, it does provide enough evidence to trace
the unmistakable trend toward greater recognition of the PLO
and its increased status in the world community.
C. MEDIATION EFFORTS
As the PLO became generally accepted as a political entity
it also began to act more and more like an international actor.
The previous section dealt with how the various nations of the
world have come to officially recognize the PLO. This has
brought the Palestinians the international exposure and pub-
licity they had previously sought through terrorist acts. This
section deals with a new facet of PLO activity -- mediation on
the international level.
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The US has called upon the PLO at least twice to assist
during international crises. The first instance was during
the Lebanese Civil War in 1975-76. In 1976, the US decided
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to evacuate American civilians from Lebanon. Because of
the fighting which was occurring, the danger to the Americans,
and the need to evacuate them quickly the US turned to the
PLO to assist them. The PLO was apparently the only group in
Lebanon who could effectively spirit the Americans safely out
of Lebanon. The American citizens were safely evacuated and
the US government gave official thanks to the PLO. The second
313incident occurred during the Iranian hostage crisis. The
US attempted several mediation approaches to negotiate the
release of the US hostages. One of the mediating groups the
US employed was the PLO. A PLO delegation met with Iranian
officials but was unsuccessful in securing the hostages'
release
.
There are at least four other mediation efforts in which
the PLO played the major role. None of these four efforts
involved the US. The first of these incidents occurred in
July 1980. Relations between Iraq and Syria had been deterio-
rating for some time. The PLO was concerned that each country
supported separate Palestinian organizations and that each
country disapproved of PLO good relations with the other. In
an effort to cool Iraqi-Syrian tensions Arafat went to Damascus
to hold talks with President Assad while PLO political chief,
314Faruq Qaddumi, traveled to Baghdad to speak with Iraqi leaders.
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This two-pronged approach succeeded in at least temporarily
averting a Syrian-Iraqi conflict. But less than two months
later the Iraqis launched an attack on Iran. This Iraq-Iran
War is now over four years old with no end in sight. During
this conflict the PLO has played a role in attempting to
negotiate a peaceful settlement. It is significant that the
Palestinians were called upon to mediate in this dispute between
warring Islamic states. The next PLO effort to mediate came in
31 5February 1982. The Soviets decided they wanted to upgrade
their relations with Saudi Arabia. The Soviets requested the
PLO to negotiate with the Saudis in an effort to allow the
USSR to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. The
last PLO mediation effort was between Mitterand's France and
the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
.
This mediation effort extended over the years 1980-1983 with
the goal of reducing ASALA attacks on French personnel and
+ 316interests
.
For the purposes of this study the outcome of these five
mediation efforts is immaterial. What is significant is that
the PLO has begun to operate in a new role. Never before was
the PLO called upon to act in the role of mediator. These six
examples include two requests by the US, a nation whose official
policy is not to recognize the PLO or to have any contact with
them. The US government asked for PLO help and gave official
thanks after receiving that aid. The third mediation effort
was in an inter-Arab dispute and was apparently undertaken
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solely on PLO initiative. The fourth incident was an inter-
Islamic conflict and the PLO was one of several Arab and
Islamic groups to mediate. The next effort came at the
request of the Soviets. They wanted to upgrade their relations
in the moderate Arab world and called upon the PLO to offer
their good offices to effect that upgrade. The last effort
was between a Middle East terrorist/National Liberation Group
and a Western European power.
The PLO as mediator is a new function for the Palestinians.
The PLO first was called upon in this role in 1978 and all the
other instances have occurred after that time. The action of
the PLO as mediator pulls them even more securely onto the
international political stage as a full-fledged actor. This
brings the PLO closer to receiving international sympathy for
their cause and eventual settlement of their grievances. The
mediation efforts, linked with the trend in official diplomatic
recognition, brings the PLO up to the level of other officially
recognized states. Acting as a mediator also shows the PLO as
an organization not only bent on destruction and prone to using
terrorist acts, but presents the PLO as an organization which
actively seeks peace through diplomatic channels.
D. CONCLUSIONS
As we consider the factors of Military Aid, Financial
Support, Intergovernmental Contacts, Official Recognition, and
Mediation we can see trends which link all five indicators.
The amount of military aid has increased since 1978. The PLO
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managed to purchase and stockpile enormous amounts of military
hardware from 1978-1982. For the first time the PLO received
sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. The types
of weapons increased in capabilities. For example, the re-
ceipt of the SA-6, SA-9, and SA-12 missiles from the Soviets
plus certain unspecified weapons reportedly never before
exported outside the Warsaw Pact point out the new sophisticated
weapons the PLO was able to acquire. The PLO source of arms
narrowed as the USSR became more forthcoming in arms delivery.
As the Soviet aid increased in amount and capability of weapons
so did the Soviet diplomatic relations with the PLO. The
Soviets officially recognized the PLO in 1981 and stepped up
diplomatic contact with PLO officials. Arafat has made several
trips to Moscow at the invitation of Soviet leaders. He also
increased his contact with the Soviet ambassador to Lebanon.
The Soviets have also asked the PLO to help in mediating for
improved relations with the Saudi government.
This upgrade in Soviet-PLO relations occurred during a
shift in Soviet relations with the Arab world in general. After
the 1973 war the Soviets were involved in the Geneva Conference
which was intended to provide a forum for the overall peace
settlement in the Middle East including the Palestinian question
The Geneva talks failed however, the Soviets were expelled
from Egypt, Sadat and Begin signed a series of treaties, and
President Carter hosted the historic Camp David Summit. All
of these events excluded the USSR from the Middle East peace
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process and estranged them from much of the Arab world. The
Soviets began to upgrade relations with other Arab states
including Libya, South Yemen, Iraq, and the PLO. The PLO
became the recipient of increased Soviet attention and aid
which in turn elevated the PLO to higher levels in world
affairs
.
The PLO entered the 1970' s by being expelled forceably
from Jordan. From Jordan the PLO headquarters were transferred
to southern Lebanon where the PLO had established Fatahland.
The introduction of the PLO to faction-riddled Lebanon became
a destabilizing influence. The PLO prompted military crises
on two fronts. First, the inter-factional conflict was exacer-
bated by the infusion of PLO forces into southern Lebanon.
The PLO wanted to help create peaceful conditions in Lebanon
so that it would be able to successfully carry out its primary
goal of fighting Zionism. The Lebanese civil war erupted in
1975 and continued until 1978 with the PLO participating fully.
Secondly, the PLO continued its guerrilla attacks on Israel
from southern Lebanon. The resulting Israeli retaliatory and
pre-emptive attacks into southern Lebanon created even worse
feelings for the Palestinians. Early in the Lebanese civil war
the PLO was opposed by its once staunch supporter, Syria. It
was during this time period that the PLO was able to improve
its world image. The Arab world became better able to
financially support the PLO with increasing financial contribu-
tions. With this monetary aid the PLO massively increased its
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military capability and shored up its social programs. The
PLO became the recognized leader of the Palestinian people.
This recognition began with the Arab states, spread to the
Third World, then to the Communist states, and to the West.
The PLO was able to gain worldwide recognition at the UN and
in 115 countries of the world. All of this is a very signi-
ficant shift in PLO stature since the lowly Black September
beginning of the 1970's.
On 6 June 1982, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched
a combined ground, air, and sea invasion of Southern Lebanon.
One of the IDF's stated missions was to destroy the PLO
military structure and political institutions. By 4 July 1982,
the IDF had encircled Beirut where thousands of PLO fighters
and leaders were holed up and defending themselves. In
September 1982, the evacuation of the PLO leadership and
guerrilla fighters took place and the IDF had apparently
accomplished their goal. The PLO fighters and leaders were
dispersed to eight Arab countries and it seemed that the unity
of the Palestinian political and military structures was
destroyed. The PLO headquarters was established in Tunis, far
from the homeland of Palestine. Arafat began to devise a
scheme leading to a negotiated settlement with Israel and the
establishment of a ministate in conjunction with Jordan.
Arafat's moderate style and President Assad's desire to acquire
control over the PLO sparked a revolt within the PLO generally
and within Fatah in particular. Although Arafat has endured
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previous challenges this threat appears to be more deep-seated
and better coordinated. The PLO, in order to be effective
in opposing Israel, must establish itself in one of the border
states: Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan. Egypt's peace
treaty with Israel and her commitment to the Camp David peace
process make Egypt an unlikely candidate for hosting and
supporting a major active PLO presence. Lebanon, with the IDF
entrenched south of the Awali River, the Syrian army in the
Beqaa region, and with the multi-national force in Beirut, is
also a dismal choice. The Syrian-sponsored fight against
Arafat in northern Lebanon threatens to entirely expel Arafat's
PLO partisans from Lebanon. Syria has already forced Arafat
to leave Syria. Syria supports the Fatah rebels and obviously
Damascus would like to control Fatah as well as the entire PLO.
Jordan is the only state which cannot be immediately ruled out
as a refuge for Arafat and a restructured PLO. Hussein may be
willing to accept a moderate, Arafat-led PLO in Jordan. Hussein
offered a plan for the creation of a confederated Kingdom with
Palestinian rule on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Arafat still
maintains a strong and loyal following in the occupied terri-
tories. A combination of these factors point to a rapproachment
between Arafat and Hussein and a movement toward the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza.
In the wake of the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in
1982, the expulsion of PLO forces from Beirut, and the power
struggle within Fatah many scholars have predicted Arafat's
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fall from power and a Syrian takeover of the PLO. Many of
these scholars see the final days of the PLO and the end of
an era. The information presented in this thesis leads to an
alternate prediction. The PLO is very strong organizationally
and is very well-established. A broad core of leadership has
been in control of the PNC and EC for many years. These
leaders are generally not a part of the Syrian-sponsored
opposition. Habash and Hawatmeh, both leaders of Palestinian
groups which have been traditionally opposed to Arafat's Fatah,
have pledged to support Arafat and the PLO. They recognize
the validity of the Palestine National Charter and are pledged
to abide by the PLO institutional structure. They support the
PNC and EC and believe that only through these bodies should
changes occur within the PLO. They consider the PLO to be a
very democratic organization. The PLO has spent considerable
sums of money to build up military, economic, social, educational,
medical, and cultural institutions which have served thousands
of Palestinians. The PLO had been the organization which
has cared for the material needs of the Palestinian people and
those Palestinians have come to depend upon the PLO. The PLO
as an organization and political movement has been recognized
throughout the world with various forms of diplomatic status.
The PLO has overwhelming support in the UN General Assembly.
It appears that the PLO is too widely accepted, too universally
supported, too well-established, too entrenched in Palestinian
daily life, and too tied to success in international recognition
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to be overcome by a Syrian-sponsored coup. Syria may succeed
in defeating Arafat's forces in Lebanon and driving him from
that country but this would not spell the end of the PLO.
Leadership of the PLO rests in the EC and the PNC. Syria
would gain more Palestinian supporters but would not be able
to control the PLO.
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APPENDIX A
THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER OF 1964*
THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER
Vn.zamblz
We, thz Va.lz.6t4.YiA.cLYi kh.ab pzoplz: Who have waged vigorous
and continuous battles to defend our homelands, and to
safeguard our dignity and honor; and who have through the
years given generously of martyrs and blood, and have written
glorious pages of self-sacrifice;
We, thz Va.lz6tA.YiA.an knab pzoplz: Against whom the forces
of injustice, evil and aggression have conspired, and the
forces of international Zionism and colonialism have colluded
to displace and disperse us, to usurp our homeland and our
property, and to desecrate what we hold sacred; but who,
through it all, have never surrendered, and never wavered in
our resistance;
We, thz ValzAttntan kxab pzoplz: With faith in our Arabism
and in our right to regain our homeland and realize our
freedom and dignity; and with determination to mobilize all
our energies and potentialities, in order to continue our
struggle and to press forward on its path until final victory;
We, thz VaJLz6ttnla.Yi ktab pzoplz: Depending on our right
to self-defense and to the recapture of our usurped homeland
in its entirety— a right which has been recognized by
international conventions and charters, foremost among which
is the United Nations Charter;
In application of the principles of the rights of man;
Realizing the nature of international political relations,
in their divers dimensions and aims;
Recalling and considering past experiences relating to the
causes of the Palestine catastrophe and the methods of
contending with them;
In view of the Palestinian Arab reality; and in pursuit of
the dignity of the Palestinian and his right to a free and
respectable life;




We, thz Valz6ttnA.an ktiab pzoplz,
Enunciate and proclaim this Valz6ttnA.aYi Mattonal dhantzn,
and vow to realize it.
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kntlzlz 1
Palestine is an Arab homeland, bound by the ties of Arab
nationalism to the other Arab countries - -which, together with
Palestine, constitute the greater Arab homeland.
kntlzlz 2
Palestine, within the boundaries it had during the period of
the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.
kn.t-ic.lz 3
The Palestinian Arab people possesses the legal right to its
homeland. It is an indivisible part of the Arab nation,
sharing in its aspirations and sufferings, as well as in its
striving for freedom, sovereignty, progress, and unity.
kn.tlc.lz 4
After the liberation of its homeland has been achieved, the
people of Palestine shall determine its own destiny, in
accordance with its own wishes, free will, and choice.
kntlclz 5
The Palestinian identity is an inherent, essential, and
inalienable attribute; it is transmitted from parents to
children.
kntlclz 6
Palestinians are those Arab citizens who, until 1947, had
normally resided in Palestine, regardless of whether they have
been evicted from it or have stayed in it. Anyone born, after
that date, of a Palestinian father whether inside Palestine
or outside it--is also a Palestinian.
kntizlz 7
Jews of Palestinian origin shall be considered Palestinian if




To provide the Palestinian youth with an Arab national ub-
bringing is a cardinal national obligation. All means of
information and education should be utilized in order to give
the new generation such profound spiritual knowledge of its
homeland as would bind it intimately and firmly thereto.
Ideological systems- -whether political, social or economic--
shall not divert the attention of the population of Palestine
from their primary duty: the liberation of their homeland.
All Palestinians shall be one national front, working together
in complete dedication, and with all their spiritual and
material power- -toward the liberation of their homeland.
kKtldlz 1
Palestinians shall have three mottoes: national unity,
national mobilization, and liberation. Once the liberation
of the homeland is accomplished, the Palestinian people shall
be free to adopt, for its public life, the political, economic
or social system of its choice.
The Palestinian people believes in Arab unity. In order to
contribute its share towards the attainment of that objective,
however, it must, at the present stage of its struggle, safe-
guard its Palestinian identity and the components thereof,
develop its consciousness of that identity, and oppose any
plan that may dissolve or impair it.
Article. M
Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary
objectives the attainment of each of which facilitates the
attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the
liberation of Palestine; the Liberation of Palestine leads to
Arab unity; and work toward the realization of each objective




The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence
itself, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine case. From
this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of,
and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of
Palestine plays the role of the vanguard in the realization
of this sacred national goal.
kKtlclz 14
From an Arab standpoint, the liberation of Palestine is a
national obligation, the full responsibility for which lies
upon the Arab nation as a whole, governments as well as peoples,
with the people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly,
the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, material, and
spiritual capabilities for the liberation of Palestine; and
it must, in particular, furnish the Palestinian Arab- people
with help and support, and make available to it the means and
the opportunities that it will enable it to assume its role
in the liberation of its homeland.
kfitlclz. 7 5
From a spiritual standpoint, the liberation of Palestine will
provide the Holy Land with an atmosphere of safety and
tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's
religious sanctities and guarantee the freedom of worship and
of visit to all, without discrimination on the basis of race,
color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of
Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support
kKtlcln 16
From an international standpoint, the liberation of Palestine
is a defensive action necessitated by the demands of self-
defense, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.
Accordingly, the Palestinian people, desirous as it is of the
friendship of all peoples, looks to freedom-loving justice-
loving and peace-loving states for support in order to restore
legitimate conditions to Palestine to re-establish peace and
security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise
national sovereignty and freedom.
kfitlclz 1 7
The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of
Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time,
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because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian
people and its natural right in its homeland, and inconsistent
with the general principles embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations, particularly the right to self-determination.
kn.tic.le. 1 S
The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, and
everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and
void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with
Palestine are compatible neither with the facts of history
nor with the sound conception of the components of statehood.
Judaism, as a religion, is not an independent nationality.
Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of
its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong
An.tic.l2. 7 9
Zionism is a movement which is colonial in its origin,
aggressive and expansionist in its objectives, racist and
fanatic in its nature, and fascist in its ends and means.
Israel, being the spearhead of this subversive movement and a
base for imperialism, is a source of constant tension and
turmoil, in the Middle East in particular and in the inter-
national community in general. Accordingly, the people of




The demands of security and peace, as well as the demands of
right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an
illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban
its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples
may be preserved, and the loyalty of citizens to their
respective homelands safeguarded.
Kn.tic.lt>. 2 7
The Palestinian people believes in the principles of justice,
freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, and human dignity,
and in the right of all peoples to exercise and enjoy them.
It also supports all international efforts which aim at the




The Palestinian people believes in peaceful coexistence
the basis of legitimate existence: for there can be no
peaceful coexistence with aggression, and no peace with
(foreign) occupation and colonialism.
on
kn.tlc.lo, 2 3
For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its
principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization shall
perform its complete role in the liberation of Palestine,
accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.
in
kn.tjic.lz 14
This Organization shall not exercise any territorial sovereignty-
over the West-Bank (region of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
the Gaza Strip, or the Himmah area. Its activities, in the
liberational , organizational, political and financial fields,
shall be on the national-popular level.
kn.tlc.lo. 2 5
This Organization shall be responsible for the movement of the
Palestinian people in its struggle for the liberation of its
homeland, in all liberational, organizational, political, and
financial fields, and also for whatever may be required by the
Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels.
kntizlz 16
The Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab
states, each according to its potentialities; and it shall
not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.
kntizlz 11
This Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance,
and anthem. All of this shall be decided upon in accordance
with a special Regulation.
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Kfitlald 2S
A Regulation, which shall be known as the Constitution of the
Palestine Liberation Organization, shall be annexed to this
Charter. It shall lay down the manner in which the Organization,
and its organs and institution, shall be constituted; the re-
spective competence of each; and the requirements of its
obligations under this Charter.
kKtlclz 2 9
This Charter shall not be amended save by (vote of) a majority
of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Council
of the Palestine Liberation Organization, (taken) at a special
session convened for that purpose.
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APPENDIX B
THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER OF 1968
kn.t4.cl2. 7 : Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian
people; it is an indivisibile part of the Arab homeland,
and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the
Arab nation.
kn.t4.cl2. 2: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the
British mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.
kn.t4.cl2. 3: The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal
right to their homeland and have the right to determine
their destiny after achieving the liberation of their
country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of
their own accord and will.
kn.t4.clc 4: The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential
and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from
parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the
dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the
disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their
Palestinian identity and their membership of the
Palestinian community, nor do they negate them.
kn.t4.cl2. 5: The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who,
until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of
whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there.
Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father-
-
whether inside Palestine or outside it--is also a
Palestinian.
kn.t4.cl2. 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine
until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be
considered Palestinians.
kn.t4.cl2. 7: That there is a Palestinian community and that it
has inaterial, spiritual and historical connection with
Palestine are indisputable facts. It is a national duty
to bring up individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary
manner. All means of information and education must be
adopted in order to acquaint the Palestinian with his
country in the most profound manner, both spiritual and
material, that is possible. He must be prepared for the
armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his
life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its
liberation.
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kH.ti.ali S: The phase in their history, through which the
Palestinian people are now living, is that of national
struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the
conflicts among the Palestinian national forces are
secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic
conflict that exists between the forces of Zionism and of
imperialism on the one hand, and the Palestinian Arab
people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses,
regardless of whether they are residing in the national
homeland or in diaspora, const itute- -both their organiza-
tions and the individuals - -one national front working for
the retrieval of Palestine and its liberation through
armed struggle.
kh.t4.de. 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate
Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a
tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their
absolute determination and firm resolution to continue
their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular
revolution for the liberation of their country and their
return to it. They also assert their right to normal life
in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-deter-
mination and sovereignty over it.
khttctz 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the
Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its
escalation, comprehensiveness and the mobilization of all
the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their
organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian
revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for
the national struggle among the different groupings of the
Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and
the Arab masses so as to secure the continuation of the
revolution, its escalation and victory.
khttctz 11: The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national
unity, national mobilization and liberation.
kh.ti.cl g. 12: The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In
order to contribute their share towards the attainment of
that objective, however, they must, at the present stage
of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity
and develop their consciousness of that identity, and
oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.
kh.ti.dz 13: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are
two complementary objectives, the attainment of either
of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus,
Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine; the
liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work
towards the realization of one objective proceeds side by
side with work towards the realization of the other.
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knttclz 14: The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab
existence itself, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine
cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's
pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine.
The people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in
the realization of this sacred national goal.
kn.ttc.lz 75: The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab view-
point, is a national duty and it attempts to repel the
Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab home-
land, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine.
Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab
nation- -peoples and governments - -with the Arab people of
Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly the Arab nation
must mobilize all its military, human, moral and spiritual
capabilities to participate actively with the Palestinian
people in the liberation of Palestine. It must, particu-
larly in the phase of the armed Palestinian revolution,
offer and furnish the Palestinian people with all possible
help, and material and human support, and make available
to them the means and opportunities that will enable them
to continue to carry out their leading role in the armed
revolution, until they liberate their homeland.
kn.tlc.l2. 16: The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual
point of view, will provide the Holy Land with an atmosphere
of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the
country's religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of
worship and of visit to all, without discrimination of
race, color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the
people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the
world for support
.
kn.ti.clz 11: The liberation of Palestine, from a human point
of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his
dignity, pride and freedom. Accordingly the Palestinian
Arab people look forward to the support of all those who
believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in the world.
knttclz IS: The liberation of Palestine, from an international
point of view, is a defensive action necessitated by the
demands of self-defence. Accordingly, the Palestinian
people, desirous as they are of the friendship of all
people, look to freedom-loving, justice-loving and peace-
loving states for support in order to restore their
legitimate rights in Palestine, to re-establish peace and
security in the country, and to enable its people to
exercise national sovereignty and freedom.
knttclz 79: The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the estab-
lishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal,
regardless of the passage of time, because they were
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contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their
natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the
principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,
particularly the right to self-determination.
kn.tA.ctz 20: The Balfour Declaration, the mandate for Palestine
and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed
null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of
Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of
history and the true conception of what constitutes state-
hood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent
nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with
an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to
which they belong.
kn.ti.ctz 27: The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves
by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions
which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine
and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the
Palestinian problem, or its internationalization.
kn.ti.ctz 22: Zionism is a political movement organically assoc-
iated with international imperialism and antagonistic to
all action for liberation and to progressive movements in
the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature,
aggressive, expansionist and colonial in its aims, and
fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the
Zionist movement, and a geographical base for world imperi-
alism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland
to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation,
unity and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat
vi.A-a.-vi6 peace in the Middle East and the whole world.
Since the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist
and imperialist presence and will contribute to the
establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian
people look for the support of all the progressive and
peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective of their
affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people
all aid and support in their just struggle for the
liberation of their homeland.
kntictz 23: The demands of security and peace, as well as the
demands of right and justice, require all states to
consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its
existence, and to ban its operations, in order that
friendly relations among peoples may be preserved and the
loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safe
safeguarded.
kntictz 24: The Palestinian people believe in the principles
of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination,
human dignity and in the right of all peoples to exercise
them.
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An.ti.cle. 25: For the realization of the goals of this Charter
and its principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization
will perform its role in the liberation of Palestine in
accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.
kh.tic.le. 26: The Palestine Liberation Organization, representa-
tive of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsi-
ble for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its
struggle- -to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return
to it and exercise the right to self-determination it--
in all military, political and financial fields and also
for whatever may be required by the Palestine case on the
inter-Arab and international levels.
Kh.tA.al2. 27: The Palestine Liberation Organization shall
cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its
potentialities; and will adopt a neutral policy among them
in the light of the requirements of the war of liberation;
and on this basis it shall not interfere in the internal
affairs of any Arab state.
kn.ttc.le. 28: The Palestinian Arab people assert the genuineness
and independence of their national revolution and reject
all forms of intervention, trusteeship and subordination.
kn.ttc.le, 29: The Palestinian people posses the fundamental and
genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland.
The Palestinian people determine their attitude towards all
states and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt
vii>-a.-vi6 the Palestinian case and the extent of the support
they offer to the Palestinian revolution to fulfill the
aims of the Palestinian people.
kh.tic.le. 30: Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of
liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will
be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian
Arab people.
kh.tic.le. 31: The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of
allegiance and an anthem. All this shall be decided upon
in accordance with a special regulation.
kh.tic.le. 32: Regulations, which shall be known as the Consti-
tution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, shall be
annexed to this Charter. It shall lay down the manner in
which the Organization, and its organs and institutions,
shall be constituted; the respective competence of each;
and the requirements of its obligations under the Charter.
kh.tic.te. 33: This Charter shall not be amended save by (vote of)
a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the
National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(taken) at a special session convened for that purpose.
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APPENDIX C
1983 PNC POLITICAL STATEMENT
1. Palestinian National Unity:
The battle of steadfastness of heroism in Lebanon and Beirut
epitomizes Palestinian national unity in its best form. Out
of this leading Palestinian experience, the PNC affirms the
need to bolster national unity among the revolution's
detachments within the framework of the PLO and to exert
efforts to improve organizational relations in all PLO insti-
tutions and bodies on the basis of forward action and collective
leadership, and on the basis of the organizational and political
program endorsed by the 14th PNC session.
Independent Palestinian Decision:
The PNC affirms continued adherence to independent Palestinian
decisionmaking, its protection, and the resisting of all
pressures from whatever source to detract from this independence
Palestinian Armed Struggle:
The PNC affirms the need to develop and escalate the armed
struggle against the Zionist enemy. It affirms the right of
the Palestine revolution forces to carry out military action
against the Zionist enemy from all Arab fronts. It also affirms
the need to unify the forces of the Palestine revolution within
the framework of a single National Liberation Army.
2. The Occupied Homeland:
The PNC salutes our steadfast masses in the occupied territory
in the face of the occupation, colonization, and uprooting.
It also salutes their comprehensive national unity and their
complete rallying around the PLO, the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people, both internally and
externally. The PNC condemns and denounces all the suspect
Israeli and American attempts to strike at Palestinian national
unanimity and calls on the masses of our people to resist them.
3. The PNC affirms the need to bolster the unity of national,
social, trade union, and popular organizations and to work for
the revival and development of the national front internally.
4. The PNC affirms the need to intensify efforts to bolster
the steadfastness of our people inside the occupied homeland
and to provide them with all the requisites for this stead-
fastness in order to end forced emigration, to protect the land,
and to develop the national economy.
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5. The National Council salutes the steadfastness of its
people living in the areas occupied in 1948 and is proud of
their struggle, in the face of racist Zionism, to assert their
national identity, it being an indivisible part of the
Palestinian people. The council asserts the need to provide
all the means of backing for them so as to consolidate their
unity and that of their national forces.
6. The council conveys greeting of appreciation and pride to
the prisoners and the detainess in the jails of the enemy
inside the occupied homeland and in southern Lebanon.
II. Our Dispersed People:
The PNC asserts the need to mobilize the resources of our
people wherever they reside outside our occupied land and to
consolidate their rallying around the PLO as the sole legiti-
mate representative of our people. It recommends to the
Executive Committee to work to preserve the social and economic
interests of Palestinians and to defend their gained rights
and their basic liberties and security.
Contacts With Jewish Forces
:
In affirming resolution No 14 of the political declaration of
the PNC at its 13th session on 12 March 1977, the PNC calls on
the Executive Committee to study movement within this framework
in line with the interest of the cause of Palestine and the
Palestinian national interest.
On the Arab Level:
Arab Relations
:
Deepening cohesion between the Palestinian revolution and the
Arab national liberation movement throughout the Arab homeland
so as to effectively stand up to the imperialist and Zionist
plots and liquidation plans, particularly the Camp David
accords and the Reagan plan and also ending the Zionist
occupation of the occupied Arab land, relations between the
PLO and the Arab states shall be based on the following:
A. Commitment to the causes of the Arab struggle, first and
foremost the cause of and struggle for Palestine.
B. Adherence to the rights of the Palestinian people, in-
cluding their right to return, self-determination, and the
establishment of their own independent state under the
leadership of the PLO -- rights that were confirmed by the
resolutions of the Arab summit conferences.
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C. Adherence to the question of sole representation and
national unity and respect for national and independent
Palestinian decisionmaking.
D. Rejection of all schemes aimed at harming the right of
PLO to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people
through any formula such as assigning powers, acting on its
behalf, or sharing its right of representation.
E. The PNC calls for strengthening Arab solidarity on the
basis of the resolutions of Arab summit conferences and in
light of the aforementioned bases.
The Resolutions of the Fes Summit:
The Arab Peace Plan:
The PNC considers the Fes summit resolutions as the minimum
for political moves by the Arab states, moves which must
complement military action with all its requirements for
adjusting the balance of forces in favor of the struggle and
Palestinian and Arab rights. The council, in understanding
these resolutions, affirms it is not in conflict with the




Emphasizing the special and distinctive relations linking the
Jordanian and Palestinian peoples and the need for action to
develop them in harmony with the national interest of the two
peoples and the Arab nation, and in order to realize the rights
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,
both inside and outside the occupied land, the PNC deems that
future relations with Jordan should be founded on the basis
of a confederation between two independent states.
Lebanon
:
1. Deepening relations with the Lebanese people and their
National Forces and extending support and backing to them in
their valiant struggle to resist the Zionist occupation and
its instruments.
2. At the forefront of the current missions of the Palestinian
revolution will be participation with the Lebanese masses and
their National and democratic forces in the fight against and
the ending of Zionist occupation.
3. The council invites the Executive Committee to work for
holding talks between the PLO and the Lebanese Government in
order to ensure the security and safety of Palestinian nationals
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residing in Lebanon and to guarantee their rights to residence
movement, work, and freedom of political and social activity.
4. Working for an end to the politically motivated mass and
individual arrests of detainees in the jails of the Lebanese
authorities and for their release.
Relations With Syria:
Relations with sister Syria are based on the resolutions of
successive PNC sessions which confirm the importance of the
strategic relationship between the PLO and Syria in the
service of the nationalist and pan-Arab interests of struggle
and in order to confront the imperialist and the Zionist
enemy, in light of the PLO's and Syria's constituting the
vanguard in the face of the common danger.
The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front:
The PNC entrusts the PLO Executive Committee to have talks
with the sides of the pan-Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation
Front to discuss how it should be revived anew on sound, clear
and effective foundations, working from the premise that the
front was not at the level of the tasks requested of it
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The Iranian- Iraqi War:
The PNC admires the efforts which have been exerted by the
PLO Executive Committee to end the Iraqi-Iranian war through
the two committees of the nonaligned states and the Muslim
states. The council calls on the Executive Committee to
persist in these efforts so as to end this war now that Iraq
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has announced the withdrawal of its forces from Iranian
territory in response to the appeal of the Palestinian
revolution and to mass all energies for the battle of the
liberation of Palestine.
On the International Level:
Breshnev's Plan:
The PNC expresses its appreciation and support for the pro-
posals contained in President Brezhnev's plan of 16 September
1982 which asserts the established national rights of our
people, including the right to return and the right to self-
determination and to set up the independent Palestinian state
under the leadership of the PLO, this people's sole legitimate
representative. It also expresses its appreciation of the
stands of the socialist community states toward the just cause
of our people, which is underlined in the Prague statement of
3 January 1983 on the Middle East situation.
Reagan's Plan:
Reagan's plan, in style [ar nahj ] and content, does not respect
the established national rights of the Palestinian people since
it denies the right of return and self-determination and the
setting up of the independent Palestinian state and also the
PLO -- the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people -- and since it contradicts international legality.
Therefore, the PNC rejects the considering of this plan
[rafd i'tibarihi asaean salihan lil-hal al-'adil wa-adda'imi
liqadiyat filistin wa-lisira' al-'arabi as-suhuni] as a sound
basis for the just and lasting solution of the cause of the
Palestine and the Arab-Zionist conflict.
III. International Relations:
1. Developing and deepening relations of alliance and
friendship between the PLO and the socialist states, led by
the Soviet Union, and all ant i- imperialist , anti - Zionist
,
anticolonialist , and antiracist liberation and progressive
forces in the world.
2. Deepening relations with the nonaligned states and the
Islamic and African states for the sake of the cause of
Palestine and the other liberation causes.
3. Strengthening relations with friendly states in Latin
America and working to widen the circle of friends in the area.
4. The intensification of political action with the West
European states and Japan with a view to developing their
stances and widening the recognition of the PLO and the right
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of the Palestinian people to establish an independent
Palestinian state. The PNC salutes all ant i- imperialist
,
ant i- Zionist , and antiracist democratic and progressive forces
in the states of West Europe and all capitalist states, the
latter being a fundamental ally in those countries. It calls
on the Executive Committee to act jointly with these forces so
that their states recognize the inalienable national rights
of the Palestinian people and the PLO.
5. Continuing the struggle to isolate the Zionist state in
the United Nations and in other forums.
6. Standing up to U.S. imperialism and its policy by regarding
it as the leader of the camp which is hostile to our just issue
and the issues of the struggling peoples.
7. The council affirms the (?need) to continue the struggle
against the policy of racial discrimination [passage indistinct]
The (?council) salutes the struggle of the people of Namibia,
under the leadership of SWAPO, for freedom and independence.
The council also salutes the struggle of the peoples of South
Africa against racism and discrimination and oppression.
8. The PNC strongly denounces terrorism and international
terrorists, in particular official American and Israeli
terrorism, which is organized against the Palestinian people
and the PLO, the people of Lebanon, the Arab nation, and the
rest of the liberation movements in the world.
9. The National Council affirms its adherence to the principles
and the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions which
affirm the inalienable and indisposable national rights of the
Palestinian people to establish a just and comprehensive peace
in the Middle East and the right of all peoples subject to
occupation to exercise all forms of struggle for the sake of
achieving liberation and national independence.
The council also stresses its firm condemnation of all
imperialism and Israeli practices which violate international
legality, the International Declaration of Human Rights, and
the principles and Charter of the United Nations and its
resolutions
.
10. The PNC appreciates the activities and achievements of the
UN special committee concerned with enabling the Palestinian
people to exercise their inalienable rights to Palestine. It
greets the efforts of its members, and in particular the UN
General Assembly resolution calling for an international
conference in the summer of 1983 to support the Palestinian
people so that they realize their inalienable rights. The
council also appreciates the achievements of the special
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secretariat for an international conference at the United
Nations to prepare and pave the way for the success of this
conference. It urges all fraternal Arab states and friendly
states to take part effectively in the work of the conference
and also in the preparatory regional meetings in order to
guarantee the success of such an important conference.
Finally, the council thanks Algeria with deep warmth and
appreciation -- the president, government, party, and people --
for hosting the council and its guests, for its great concern
with ensuring its success, for the efforts exerted for coverage
of its activities by the information media, for providing
conditions permitting the smooth running of its debates, for
guaranteeing its security, and for the tranquility of its
members and guests.
The council extends special thanks to the militant brother,
President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and
secretary general of its party, particularly for the official
stand he announced regarding the independence of the
Palestinian decision, the readiness of Algeria to support this
decision, and to continue to support and back the Palestinian
struggle until the achievement of victory and the setting up
of the independent Palestinian states.
The council expresses thanks and appreciation to all the
official and popular delegations which took part in the work
of our council and announced their support and backing for the
PLO and the cause of the Palestinian people. This international
support for our revolution is without doubt a basic element of
the success of our march, with which free people prove their
solidarity in the face of the common enemy -- represented in
imperialism and Zionism -- and for the freedom of peoples,
their independence and progress. As for our brothers in the
Arab delegations which have taken part in our council, we
thank them in particular for their moving role in the Arab
arena in order to create better conditions in support of our
struggle and to confront the plans of the enemy.
We extend special greetings to the UN special committee which
follows Israel's violations of human rights against Palestinians
in the occupied land. The PNC promises the Palestinian and
Arab masses and the forces of struggle and liberation through-
out the world to continue the struggle in all its military
and political forms toward the achievement of the objectives
of our people. It believes that this Palestinian, Arab, and
international cohesion, seen in this council as an effective
weapon among the weapons of support and solidarity among
peoples, must have results in reaching the desired obejctives.
The triumph of peoples will undoubtedly be achieved, and the
solidarity of peace-loving peoples is a solidarity of which
we are proud and to which we cling.
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The National Council greets all the masses of our heroic
people, inside and outside the homeland, and also our brave
fighters, who have preserved the honor of their revolution,
arms, and nation, the souls of all the martyrs of our
Palestinian and Lebanese people who soaked with blood the
soil of the homeland and who have proved that the cause of
freedom in our land will not die.
The PNC greets the brothers in the Syrian forces who took part
with us in the heroic battle in Beirut and other regions, as
well as their revered martyrs.
The council addresses greetings and appreciation to all the
Arab, Muslim, and friendly volunteers who rose to contribute
with the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces in the battles of
Beirut and Lebanon, and we greet their heroic martyrs. The
National Council appreciates all the countries and friendly
and fraternal forces which provided support in the form of arms
money, military effort, training, and equipment, foremost the
Arab and Islamic countries, the nonaligned and African states,
and the socialist countries.
Long live the victorious Palestinian revolution! Long live
the PLO, framework of the unity of our people and the leader
of its struggle! Long live the unity of the struggle of Arab
peoples and the peoples of the world for freedom, national
independence, and the defeat of imperialism, racism, and
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Israeli Navy -- arms










Libya deals with GDR
Libya
China refused to give
to PLO. PLO sought
another donor.





Lebanon- US arms from
$100 mill, arms transfer,
Saudi Arabia- US arms













































26 Sep weapons enough to
outfit
30,000
Libya arranged a deal




USSR- some of the equip-





























$33 mill. Saudi Arabia
North Korea
22 Jul Katyusha










































5 Feb sophisticated weapons -- USSR
1982
5 Feb missiles Military parade in
1982 heavy artillery -- Beirut. The howitzer
modern tanks __ came to the PLO from
US-built howitzer 1 North Yemen.
18 Feb 106mm cannons --
1982 anti-aircraft guns __ --
2 Apr arms large USSR and East Europe
1982 ammunition quantity -- via Syria.
12 Apr SA-7 PLO military capability
1982 SA-9 -- statement
.
22 Apr 130mm cannons 60 Israeli
1982 cannons (long-range) 240 estimate
160mm mortar 200
T-54/55 another 20
14 Jun request: ammunition — — Soviet ambassadors in
1982 arms -- Lebanon and Libya.
15 Jun arms — — USSR airlift
1982 fighting weapons scores, hundreds
of tons Israeli report of
artillery pieces hundreds -
-
PLO weapons found
tanks hundreds hidden in Lebanon.









equipment USSR- airlift began.
Three to five IL-76
Candids land at Damascus
over next five days.
1 Jul
1982














some — PLO military-
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Arafat, "You must co-
ordinate with Syria if
you want to remain alive."
Transferred to PLO near
Zahlah in Bekaa valley.
Shipment to West Bank
Palestinians.
Mines still remain in
Beirut. PLO took
detailed maps of the



















Fatah set up vast contribution net work amon^
all Palestinians and sympathizers.
Financial backing
10,000 Dinars
Huge fund-raising campaign to begin.
$15 million per year (cut off after 1967 war)
$200,000
5% tax on Palestinian workers
"support committees set up to collect
donations 1% tax on Palestinian workers
£1.4 million per year





















PFLP refuses to accept money from "reactionary sources"- Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait.
Saudi Arabia gives aid to Fatah but not to the PLO.
tax on Palestinians outside the war zone Saudi Arabia
2% "Fedayeen tax" on all entertainment tickets
extortion on wealthy Palestinians
current war chest - $25 million
annual income - $10 million
2 Mar 1971
7 Jul 1971
£3 million (Palestine National Fund revenue
for the year 1970-1)
£62,500 (This was the only contribution for
1970)
Qatar
DATE AMOUNT OF AID SOURCE







Top contributors during this fiscal year were Palestinian















Arab country-committed donations not yet
received --$15,896,065
Arab countries
Money in Fatah passed to Abu Hassan. He deposits the money
in accounts in Switzerland, Italy, and West Germany. Total
investment in Europe is $30 million.
£. 1 million Algerian Pounds to Fatah. Annual
contribution.
$3 million to PLO. (Most taken by Fatah)
As of 31 Mar 1974 Arab states' arrears to PLO:
$24,896,056. ($8,157,256 for PLO budget;
16,738,800 for PLA)
$50 million per year for PLO.
$100 million offered to PLO.
$27 million for PLO (1977 adn 1978)
$40 million for PLO
$150 million to PLO
$150 million to Steadfastness Forces in
occupied territories.
$9 million (part of the money promised at the
Baghdad Foreign Ministers Conference)
.
$100,000 for Palestine Red Crescent Society
$150 million per year for ten years to the
Fund for Steadfastness
19 Mar 1980
15 Sep 1980 $10 million loan for PLO
PLO rejected offer of aid from Libya because



























Abu Iyad received millions of dollars from
Libya to finance Kurds in Iraq.
$92 million
$200 million (total contributed)
$ 85 million (per year)
5% of Palestinian workers' wages (continuous)
"additional funds"
100,000 dinars for Palestine Red Crescent
Society
$100 million (during 1980)
$138 million (during 1981)
$28,571,407
$100 million per year (PLO annual budget)
$250 million per year (annual Arab donations)
other sources of income:
-- Palestinian tax
-- Investments
Seven "Open Funds" exist to benefit West Bank Arabs. Among them are:
-- Steadfastness Front Fund
-- Jerusalem Scholarship Program
-- Jerusalem Foundation
















Dh20 million to PLO (about $5.4 million) Dubai
PM Begin claims Saudis have given $400 million. Israeli report
His guest claims the Saudi have given billions.
$70 billion. Israeli estimate of PLO funds.

















































































































































USSR Regional Party Sec. --
Yugoslav Ambassador Beirut
Bulgaria Party Deleg;at ion --
PRC PRC
Cuba Ambassador Beirut





























































NAME WHO VISITED WHERE
PNC Chairman Vasiliy Kuznetsov (USSR) ..
Arafat Gromyko Damascus
PFLP delegation Babrak Karmal Afghanistan
Arafat Kreisky (Austria) Saudi Arabia
PLO representative Diplomatic status accorded EEC (Paris)
PLO official France Ambassador Beirut
Arafat -Invitation- Giscard France
Arafat India Ambassador --
Arafat India India
Arafat -Invitation- Visit Japan
Abu Mayzar Netherlands Ministry Offic:Lai --
Arafat UN Assistant Sec. General Beirut
Habash Visit USSR
Arafat USSR envoy Beirut
Arafat USSR Ambassador Beirut
Arafat USSR Ambassador Beirut
Arafat USSR Ambassador Beirut
Arafat USSR Ambassador Beirut
Qaddumi Yugoslav envoy Lebanon
Arafat Zhivkov (Bulgaria) Damascus
Arafat Cuba Foreign Minister Beirut
PLO spokesman CSSR Ambassador Damascus
PLO office to open Helsinki Finland
PLO delegation Visit India
Arafat PM Suarez (Spain) Riyadh
Arafat USSR Ambassador --
Arafat USSR Ambassador Beirut
Arafat Hua Guofeng China
Qaddumi Official visit GDR
Hawatmeh Press Conference GDR
Hawatmeh Press Conference Hungary
Abu Mayzar Visit Hungary
Abu Mayzar USSR Ambassador --
Abu Mayzar Hungary Ambassador --
Arafat Soviet leaders Moscow
Arafat USSR Party Official Baku
PLO Observer status accorded IMF/World Bank
Arafat Visit GDR
Arafat India Foreign Minister --
Arafat Kuznetsov (USSR) Damascus
Arafat Official visit Yugoslavia
Arafat 48 Hour Visit Moscow
Arafat Soviet Delegation --
Palestinian Deleg. -- Moscow
PFLP Delegation Afghan leaders Kabul
Qaddumi Official visit Bulgaria
Arafat USSR envoy Beirut
Arafat PRC envoy Beirut
Arafat North Korea envoy Beirut





















































NAME WHO VISITED WHERE
Arafat USSR envoy Beirut
Arafat USSR envoy Beirut
Arafat France Ambassador --
Arafat Chesson (France) Lebanon
Qaddumi Interview Paris
PLO envoy Nicaragua envoy Moscow
Arafat Non-Aligned Delegation --
Qaddumi Visit Moscow
Arafat USSR envoy --
PLO embassy USSR diplomatic upgrade Moscow
PLO Delegation Visit Moscow
Arafat USSR envoy Lebanon
PLO Representative Vietnam Delegation Beirut
Arafat Talks Yugoslavia
Arafat Kreisky (Austria) Abu Dhabi
Arafat Visit China
Qaddumi Visit Cuba
Arafat Cuba Delegation Syria
Fatah Official Cuba Charge --
Arafat GDR Ambassador Beirut
al-Wazir GDR Pres. Honeker --
Arafat Visit Greece
PLO First Ambassador in Eur. Greece




Arafat US Congressman Abu Dhabi
Arafat USSR Ambassador Beirut
Arafat Diplomatic status accorded USSR
Arafat USSR Charge Beirut
Arafat Visit Vietnam
PLO Official African Delegation --
PLO Official CSSR Delegation --
Arafat 2 -Day Visit GDR
Arafat Visit Hungary
Arafat USSR Charge Lebanon
al-Fahum USSR Deputy Minister --
Arafat USSR Delegation --
Arafat Angola Deputy Minister Kuwait
Fatah Official Canada Delegation --
Arafat Cuba Ambassador --
-- Cuba Foreign Minister --
Arafat Cuba Delegation --
Arafat GDR Delegation --
Arafat 3-Day Visit India
Arafat Visit Pakistan
PLO Representative Socialist Ambassador --
PLO Diplomatic status accorded Sri Lanka
PLO USSR Damascus
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DATE NAME WHQ VISITED WHERE
16 Jul 1982 PLO Representative Party Official Angola
21 Sep 1982 Arafat China Ambassador Damascus
31 Aug 1982 al - Fahum Flavio Bravo (Cuba) --
4 Aug 1982 Arafat France Legislators --
3 Sep 1982 Arafat Officials Greece
20 Aug 1982 Arafat Italy Ambassador --
22 Sep 1982 al- Fahum Japan Delegation --
23 Jul 1982 Arafat Romania envoy --
23 Jul 1982 Arafat GDR envoy --
9 Aug 1982 Salah Khalaf Visit USSR
27 Oct 1982 Arafat Visit Algeria
28 Dec 1982 Arafat Kreisky (Austria) Maj orca
15 Dec 1982 PLO Diplomatic status accorded Bolivia
7 Dec 1982 Qaddumi China envot United Nations
2 Nov 1982 Arafat Visits East Bloc
12 Nov 1982 Qaddumi France Foreign Minister --
23 Dec 1982 Arafat Colombo (Italy) --
15 Oct 1982 Arafat King Hassan Morocco
7 Dec 1982 PLO Office opened Netherlands Amsterdam
18 Nov 1982 Arafat Brezhnev funeral Moscow
29 Nov 1982 Arafat USSR Ambassador Damascus
7 Dec 1982 Qaddumi USSR envoy United Nations
22 Dec 1982 PLO Official USSR consultations Jordan
7 Jan 1982 Arafat Andropov Moscow
21 Jan 1983 Arafat Pakistan Ambassador Tunis
21 Jan 1983 Arafat India Foreign Minister Tunis
21 Jan 1983 Arafat UK Undersecretary Tunis
21 Jan 1983 Qaddumi Romania Ambassador Damascus
21 Jan 1983 Qaddumi Hungary Ambassador Damascus
4 Feb 1983 Hawatmeh CSSR Visit CSSR
11 Feb 1983 Fatah Delegation Annual Visit USSR
28 Feb 1983 Arafat USSR Ambassador Tunis
7 Mar 1983 Arafat USSR Charge Tunis
11 Mar 1983 Habash Visit CSSR
22 Mar 1983 Arafat USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Tunis
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS
1979 1980 1981 1982
Warsaw Pact
(including USSR) 16 28 18 16
USSR only 3 17 10 9
Western Europe
(including NATO) 8 7 5 8
Other 9 7 12 9

















PLO Regional Offices 1976-77































































PLO Regional Offices 1981-82 PLO Regional Offices 1982-85
1. Lebanon 1. Lebanon
2. Syria 2. Syria
3. Kuwait 3. Kuwait
4. Egypt 4. Italy
5. Algeria 5. Algeria
6. Libya 6. Libya
7. USA 7. USA
8. USSR 8. USSR
9. PRC 9. PRC
10. France 10. France
11. Brazil 11. Brazil
12. Hungary 12. Hungary
13. Japan 13. Japan
14. Austria 14. Austria
15. Cyprus 15. Cyprus
16. Qatar 16. Qatar
17. Saudi Arabia 17. Saudi Arabia
18. Iran 18. Iran
19. Abu Dhabi 19. Abu Dhabi
20. South Yemen 20. South Yemen
21. Ethiopia 21. Ethiopia
22. Jordan 22. Jordan
23. Turkey 23. Turkey
24. Greece 24. Greece
25. GDR 25. GDR
26. FRG 26. FRG
27. Tanzania 27. Tanzania
28. Pakistan 28. Pakistan
29. Sudan 29. Sudan
30. United Kingdom 30. United Kingdom
31. Luxembourg 31. Kenya
32. Kenya 32. Mozambique
33. Mozambique 33. Belgium
34. Belgium 34. Ireland





(Recognition ranges in various degrees from full
diplomatic status to accreditation through an Information/ Cultural office)
.
1. Abu Dhabi 42. Malaysia Regional Distribution
2. Afghanistan 43. Mali
3. Algeria 44. Malta Western Europe 14
4. Angola 45. Mauritania Sub -Sahara Africa 17
5. Austria 46. Mexico
6. Bahrain 47. Morocco Western Hemi-








Nigeria Eastern Europe 7
10. Brazil 51. North Korea East and South
11. Cambodia 52. North Yemen Asia 12
12. Canada 53. Pakistan Middle East 20
13. China (PRC) 54. Panama
14. Congo 55. Patan Total 81
15. Cuba 56. Peru
16. Cyprus 57. Poland
17. Czechoslovakia 58. Qatar
18. Djibouti 59. Romania
19. East Germany 60. Saudi Arabia
20. Egypt 61. Senegal
21. Ethiopia 62. Somal ia
22. France 63. South Yemen
23. Gambia 64. Spain
24. Greece 65. Sri Lanka
25. Grenada 66. Sudan
26. Guinea 67. Sweden
27. Guinea Bissau 68. Switzerland
28. Hungary 69. Syria
29. India 70. Tanzania
30. Iran 71. Tunisia
31. Iraq 72. Turkey
32. Ireland 73. United Arab Emirates
33. Italy 74. Uganda
34. Japan 75. United Kingdom
35. Jordan 76. United States
36. Kenya 77. USSR
37. Kuwait 78. Venezuela
38. Laos 79. Vietnam
39. Lebanon 80. West Germany











- 360 delegates attend.
- Ahmed Shukairy, chairman.
- Hikmet el Masri - Vice President.
- Nikola el Durr - Vice President.






Nasser gave opening address.




Gaza Abd al-Munim Husni (Gaza Governor Gen-
eral of UAR spoke on behalf of Nasser)
PLA troops currently training in PRC,
Cairo, Damascus, and Iraq.
PRC openly supplying arms and training.




Cairo Session delayed by one year because
of June 1967 War.
Kamal ad-din-Rifat (UAR Labor Minister)
spoke on behalf of Nasser.
PNC to meet every six months.
PNC Charter amended/re -written.
11-member Executive Committee elected.
1 February -
4 February 1969
Cairo - Nasser gane opening address.
- PFLP, PLA refuse to attend.
- 84 delegates attend.
- Abd al-Majid Shuman - chairman of
Palestine National Fund.
- Hayha Hammudah - PNC chairman.
- Executive Committee elected:
Yusuf al Barzi
Ahmad ash-Shihabi
Yasir Amrah General Secretary
Muhammad Yusuf an-Najjar (Abu Yusuf)
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Cairo Arafat unanimously re-elected EC
chairman.
EC membership increased from 12 to 15
June 1970 Cairo




Purposes: 1) devise ways of
opposing US Roger's Plan and
2) defeat plots against the
Resistance in Jordan.
115 delegates attend.













- PLO to embrace all Palestinian
revolutionary forces.
- 150 members in PNC to establish
strategy for political, military,
information, and financial action,
- Military Command - To command
all Palestinian strugglers
.
- Central Committee .
- Political Bureau.




Cairo Arafat became: Commander-in-chief
of PLO, Revolution, PLA, and Fatah,
Re-elected chairman of EC.
DFLP attends.
Central Committee dissolved and
powers transferred to EC.
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PNC # Dates Place Comments
- Dr. Yusuf Sayigh - President of
Palestine National Fund.
- Khalid al-Fahum elected PNC Chairman,
- New EC elected:
10 6 April -
12 April 1972
Cairo












Bahj at Abu Gharbiyah Independent
Hamid Abu Sittah Independent
Kamal Nasir Independent
- Khalid al-Fahum - Re-elected PNC
Chairman.
- Detailed plan adopted for inte-
grating and unifying all Palestinian
groups, unions, etc.










Bahj at Abu Gharbiyah
Hamid Abu Sittah
Kamal Nasir















- PNC delegates increased from 151 to 175,
- 148 delegates attend. (18 were
detained by Jordan)
.
- Central Council formed:
- 19 to 21 members.
- Chosen by EC.
- Connecting link between EC and PNC.
- Khalid al-Fahum - Chairman (He
also continues as PNC Chairman)
.
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Adib 'Abd Rabbuh DFLP
Dr. 'Abd al-Wahhab al-
Kayyali AOLP
Kamal Nasir Independent
Hamid Abu Sittah Independent
Dr. Yusuf Sayigh Independent
Zuhdi an-Nashashibi Independent
12 1 June -
9 June 1974
Cairo - Eight new PNC delegates -
Palestinians deported by Israel
from West Bank.
- Disagreement on size/composition
of EC
- New EC elected:
(1st PFLP-GC Representation)
(New Palestine National Fund Chairman)
Yasir Arafat Fatah
Faruq Qaddumi Fatah









'Abd al-aziz al-Wajih Independent
Hamid Abu Sittah Independent
Iliya Khuri Independent
'Abd al -Muhsin Abu
Mayzar West Bank
Deportee
al-Jawwad Salih West Bank
Deportee
Walid Qamhawi West Bank
Deportee
13 12 March - Cairo
20 March 1977
- PNC delegates increased from 187
to 290.
- Arafat declared a plan to establish
a Palestinian state on any liberated
part of Palestine.
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- Palestine National Unity
- Popular Organizations
- Social Affairs and Labor
- Legislative
- Information and Educational
Affairs
New EC elected:
(Chairman- Palestine National Fund)
(Director- Palestine Research Center)
(Chief-Land Establishment for Studies
in Damascus)

























'Abd al-Jawad Salim Independent




Hamid Abu Sittah Independent
Ahmad Majdi Abu Ramadan Independent
- PFLP and ALF agree to work with PLO
and EC.
Session was not held in Cairo because
of Camp David "capitulation."
President Assad gave opening address.
No new EC elected. Current EC may serve
serve for another year. (They








President Assad gave opening address.
92 foreign delegations attend from
Arab and friendly states.
PNC # Dates Place Comments
- Occupied Jerusalem declared to be
the capital of Palestine.
- Issam Sartawi resigned (16 April)
.
He was not given the opportunity
to address the PNC.
- New EC elected:
(Head of PLO Office, Cairo)




'Abd ar-Rahim Ahmad ALF
Talal Naji PFLP-GC



















PLF and PPSF not represented on EC.
16 14 February - Algiers
22 February 1983
- First PNC session since 1982
evacuation from Beirut.
- Khalid al-Fahum: Borders of the
Palestinian state to be West Bank
and Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as
capital
.
- Issam Sartawi resigned (20 Feb) . His
resignation was rejected (21 Feb).
- New EC elected:
Yasir Arafat Fatah
Faruq Qaddumi Fatah
Muhammad ' Abbas Fatah












PNC # Dates Place Comments
Jamal Surani Independent
Hamid Abu Sittah Independent
Ahmad Sidqi ad-Dajjani Independent
- Khalid al-Fahum - Speaker of the PNC,
- Salim az-Za'Nun - 1st Deputy Speaker.
- Mahmud Tayim - 2nd Deputy Speaker.
- Mahmud as-Sabih - PNC Secretary.
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